THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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Paul Kelly

The Future of 'The West'
Conor Cruise O'Brien

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Fareed Zakaria • Robert W. Tucker • Owen Harries

War and Human Nature
Robin Fox

Europe's New Populism
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Jean-Claude Casanova, Rawdon Dalrymple, Amitai Etzioni, Mark Katz
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The Future of 'the West'

Conor Cruise O'Brien

THE DISINTEGRATION of the Soviet Union has set loose disintegrating tendencies in the West also. At first, it seemed as if the reverse was about to be the case. In Europe, the unification of Germany took place amid a heady surge of federalist rhetoric. "A united Germany within a United States of Europe" was Bonn's theme-song during this period, and it was echoed from Paris, which had initially prompted it, though with slowly waning conviction on Paris' part. There were already signs of trouble. The entente between Paris and Bonn was never as cordial as official rhetoric made it appear. President Mitterrand actually flew to Moscow in an effort to avert, or at least postpone, German unification. Bonn was able to make light of this because of the failure of Mitterrand's mission, but it was evident that the old French distrust of Germany is still strongly there.

Formally, at governmental level, the West is very much alive and kicking in 1992. For the European governments (with the exceptions of Britain and Denmark) the objective of a United States of Europe—which is of course built into the 1949 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany—implies an emulation of America. Europe, ridding itself of its old divisive nationalisms, becomes like the USA. The new West, consisting of the United States of Europe in alliance with the United States of America, will be more solid than ever.

In reality, there is not going to be a United States of Europe. The high-water mark of the European Federalist project was the Treaty on European Union, signed on behalf of the twelve Member Governments of the European Community at Maastricht in January 1992. The British succeeded, with some difficulty, in keeping the *word* "federalist" out of the Treaty, but there is no doubt that the Treaty is federalist in spirit. Then things began to go wrong for the federalist project. First the people of Denmark rejected the Maastricht Treaty by a narrow margin. The remaining eleven Member Governments made statements indicative of an intent to go ahead anyway. Legally, however, this is not feasible unless the Danes reverse their position in a new referendum. The basic document of the Community, the Treaty of Rome, cannot be amended without the assent of all the members, and the Maastricht Treaty constitutes an amendment.

More distressing than the legal barrier, from a federalist point of view, has been the popular response in the principal European countries to the Danish *No*. That *No* had struck a responsive chord in the bosoms of millions of Europeans. The French voted *Yes* by as narrow a margin as the Danes had voted *No*. Narrow as the margin was, it was only secured by blatant governmental manipulation, made possible by the French system

Conor Cruise O'Brien's latest book is *The Great Melody*, a biography of Edmund Burke.

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of direct state control of the National Broadcasting system. Advocates of a *Yes* vote were given four times as much television time as *No* advocates, and they used that advantage in order to frighten people about what they claimed would be the horrendous consequences of a French *No* to Maastricht.

The French referendum debate was bitterly divisive, both internally and—even more ominously—internationally. Both *Yes* advocates and *No* advocates spoke in terms of "unleashing the demons of German nationalism" if their particular advice was not heeded. The *Yes* people claimed that only the Treaty on European Union could tie the Germans down and make them safe. The *No* people claimed that the European Union would be dominated by an increasingly arrogant and overwhelmingly powerful united Germany.

On the other side of the Rhine the German media relayed the French debates, with emphasis on the unanimity about the existence of a German threat, despite the division over how the perceived threat should be handled. Both French and German nationalism were heating up. The federalist project was inflaming the very passions it was intended to lay to rest. This was inevitable. The European federalist project was flawed from the beginning, because the European states are not states in the American sense; with the exception of Belgium, the European States are all *nation*-states. You cannot federate nations, and when you seriously try to do so, you arouse nationalism as in the case of Maastricht.

Both in Britain and in Germany, polls made it clear that, although the political parties were still committed to Maastricht, the people were against it. The British government claimed that it had secured changes in the original draft of the Treaty that make it entirely compatible with the preservation of British national sovereignty and institutions, but they have failed to convince the British people that this is so. The Germans see European Monetary Union—the most concrete objective of the Treaty—as robbing them of their most precious possession: the deutschemark. They are also made restive by the favorite argument of other Europeans in favor of the Treaty: that it will tie up the Germans in such a way as to make them safe.

The End of German Deference...

IT IS ALREADY evident that the new United Germany is not nearly as anxious to propitiate its European partners as the old Federal Republic of West Germany had been for the duration of its separate existence. The change was symbolized shortly after unification by the reinterment in Berlin of the bones of Frederick the Great. The old West German government would have been afraid of any gesture that might stimulate fears of German militarism. The government of the new United Germany clearly did not feel inhibited to the same degree.

The reawakening of German national pride, a product of the process and realization of German unity, has been slowed down by some of the consequences of German unity. The unexpectedly heavy strain on the economy through the cost of unity, plus the friction and mutual resentment between West and East Germans, have kept Germans in general more preoccupied with their internal difficulties than with the development of a common national pride. I think this is a transitional phase. As time goes on, the differences between East and West Germans are going to fade, and along with them the memories of the cost of unification. When that transition is completed, the Germans are likely to feel a need to reassert themselves on the international scene, as an independent force, and not a mere component in a united Europe.

Already, within the European Community, it is the new United Germany which is shaping Community policy towards Eastern Europe. It was Germany which overcame the reservations of other Europeans about policy towards Yugoslavia, and led the process of

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recognizing the independence, first of Slovenia and Croatia, then of Bosnia. The recognition of homogeneous Slovenia was sound, because uncontested; that of Croatia arguable; and that of Bosnia supremely rash because certain to result in the immediate disintegration of the newly recognized state, through the secession from it of both the Serb and Croat minorities, which, between them, form about half the population of an independent Bosnia, riddled by civil war and "ethnic cleansing." This record does not suggest that German leadership in the formation of European policy towards Eastern Europe is an unmixed blessing.

I would expect to see a resurgence of German national pride over the next three years and perhaps more. This will be partly due, as argued above, to the consolidation of German unity. But there will also be another force at work, whose emotional impact should not be underestimated. This consists of the last phase of the fifty-year commemorative cycle of the events of the Second World War. From early 1993 to 1995, what will be commemorated will be a series of German defeats together with the greatest of German crimes. The most punishing of the defeats were of course those in the East. But the commemorations will involve the greatest political and psychological strain where the events commemorated are victories of the Western Allies over the Third Reich during the phase of the cycle, opening with the Normandy landings, that is due for commemoration in the summer of 1994. And the celebration of the Allied victories will go in parallel with the solemn commemoration of the greatest crime in history: Nazi Germany's Holocaust of stigmatized minorities, most of whom were Jews.

It can safely be predicted that these commemorations will cause a considerable strain on the German national psyche, and on German relations with most of its partners in the European Community and its allies in NATO. It would be much harder to predict the full political consequences of that strain. But German media reactions are easier to predict. The German media, responding to the feelings of their audiences, are bound to get restive under the pressure of all these uncongenial commemorations. The milder national media reactions will be on the following lines:

> These events are part of history, and we accept that they have to be appropriately commemorated. But, after the final defeat of Nazi Germany has been commemorated in 1995, let that be an end of the matter. We should not be expected to continue indefinitely apologizing for our existence. We accept that the Holocaust happened, and that it was a terrible crime. We have no desire to palliate. But the generation of those who planned that crime and helped to perpetrate it has mostly vanished from the scene. Soon it will be gone entirely. We do not accept that the generations of Germans, who were small children during the Second World War, or those who were born after that war, have any responsibility for that crime. How could we? *We weren't there.* To try to make us responsible for them is an example of a theory of genetic blood-guilt, quite similar to the thinking of the Nazis themselves. If the Americans, or the British, or the French want to meditate on the crimes of the past, let them take a look at the crimes of their own ancestors: at the slave trade, at the genocide of the American Indians, at the Irish Famine, and, in the present century, at the massacres in Indochina, Madagascar, and North Africa. If instead of doing that, they should insist, after 1995, on reminding us about the Nazis, we shall take that as an unfriendly act.

That sort of reaction is likely to represent the milder German reaction to the closing phase of the commemorative cycle. On the wilder shores of the media, I would expect to see a vogue for "revisionist" history, suggesting that the Holocaust has been greatly exaggerated; also a tendency to "reassess" Hitler, emphasizing his positive economic achievements and with some bolder efforts at general rehabilitation.

By the time the commemorative cycle

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has thus closed at the middle of the present decade, I would expect the German relationship to the West to have altered, not indeed out of all recognition, but very significantly. The basic difference will be psychological; no more deference—either to the French, the British, or the Americans—for Germany under Chancellor Kohl's successors. Political and even military consequences will attend the great psychological change. Germany (together with Japan) will insist on eliminating those international arrangements that continue to distinguish between the victors and the vanquished of the Second World War. This means that there will have to be seven Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and no longer just five. It also means that the old tacit assumption that Germany cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons, because of its history, will have to be dropped as insulting to the new Germany, and also as dangerous. Russia, with its huge nuclear arsenal and unsettled political conditions may again be dangerous, perhaps under some kind of junta of right-wing ex-communists and the military. Under such conditions, a non-nuclear Germany would be the most vulnerable of European powers to Russian nuclear blackmail. Germany will therefore demand the same right as Britain and France to its own independent nuclear deterrent. The other Western powers will not feel able to resist its demand.

Under Chancellor Kohl's successors, the Germans will take the lead in the dismantling of the federalist project. Germany will remain part of the European Community, but the Treaty on European Union, with its monetary union and aspiration to political union, will be finally dropped, probably to the relief of most Europeans. The Germans will change their constitution, removing from it the remaining stigmata of defeat. The aspiration to be absorbed in the nirvana of a United States of Europe will be dropped. So will limitations on the deployment of Germans troops. Germany will remain in NATO, but with the same freedom of action, outside NATO, as is possessed by the United States, Britain and France. The status of Germany in the Western system following World War II was that of a defeated aggressor working its passage back, under a kind of implicit parole. No vestige of that status will any longer be acceptable to the Germans under Chancellor Kohl's successors. It will all be either gone or going by the middle of the decade.

The new Germany will cast less and less emphasis on its role as an integral part of the West. It will see itself as the greatest European power, at the heart of the continent, with spheres of interest both to the East and also to the West. It will no longer seek to hide its Germanic light under a European bushel. It will no longer accord deference. It will begin to require it from others, in proportion to its own strength, discipline, population, and economic resources.

...and of French Pretension

THE EMERGENCE of the new Germany does not itself mean that there will no longer be a West. For millions of Europeans, indeed, the idea of a West that includes North America will become more attractive than ever before, with the emergence of the new Germany. The idea of the "containment" of Germany within European political union, under French political leadership, is well on the way to losing all credibility, even in the eyes of the French as the recent referendum campaign and its result, an almost even split, showed. Europeans other than Germans will increasingly look to NATO, with its North American dimension, to fill the role once formally attributed to European union. For a time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Europeans felt there was no longer any role for NATO. But as the new Germany flexes its muscles by the middle of this decade, those Europeans who happen not to be German are going to feel more comfortable in an institution with a major extra-European dimension than in a

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purely European institution dominated by Germany. In short, the idea of "containing" Germany within the NATO alliance is about to replace the wilting European federalist idea of containing Germany within European union. The federalist idea is still *à la mode* in European official discourse, but is dying at the European grass roots (where it was never very vigorously alive anyway).

The idea of containing Germany within NATO may not work either, but it has certainly greater intrinsic credibility. There can be no "containment" without balance. There is nothing in the European Community, on its own, to balance the power of a united Germany. But within the NATO system, the United States, together with Germany's European partners, can provide that balance, if the United States should continue to be interested in such a role.

In the new circumstances, I would expect French policy, by around the middle of the decade, to undergo a literal sea change, in the direction of Atlanticism. In the heyday of the Bonn-Paris entente, in the years before German unification, there was a strong element of *folie de grandeur* in the French concept of European unity. The *folie* in question consisted of French intellectual conceit, fueled by German deference in the period from the 1950s to the 1980s. This gave rise to the image, dear to French diplomats and Eurocrats, of the powerful German horse controlled by its clever French rider. But the supply of German deference is beginning to run out, even under Chancellor Kohl, who practiced it for so long on behalf of West Germany. French conceit is proportionately shaken. In the recent referendum about half of the French people would no longer buy the old "horse and rider" stuff. The French idea of a Europe controlled by the French is unlikely to survive Mitterrand, just as a Germany deferential to the French is unlikely to survive Kohl. The two phenomena are linked, and reflected in the present unpopularity of these two leaders with their own peoples.

In the changing circumstances, the Paris-Bonn entente will dissolve, amid increasingly perfunctory expressions of mutual esteem. From being inclined to exclude the Anglo-Saxon powers from a Europe it foolishly thought of as its own secure domain, Paris will seek *rapprochement* with Washington and London. There will be hints that the return of NATO to its old headquarters of Fontainebleau would be acceptable. Britain, with its deep-rooted fears of whatever power looks like dominating Europe, will discreetly encourage the French detachment from Bonn, and encourage the French, with apparent generosity, to share in their special relationship with Washington. The generosity will be more apparent than real, since Britain will always have the inside track, because of the linguistic factor and because they have taken more trouble to understand Americans.

Both Britain and France, in the shadow of the new Germany, will seek to "bring in the New World to redress the balance of the Old." But to what extent will the New World be willing to be drawn in to redress that balance? On the answer to that question, perhaps more than any other, depends the answer to the question of whether "the West" will continue to exist as a meaningful factor in world affairs.

THERE IS certainly a tendency towards neo-isolationism in the America of the 1990s. American internationalism, after all, from 1946 to the end of the 1980s had been essentially about containing the power of the Soviet Union and about combating international communism. The Soviet Union no longer exists, and international communism is comprehensively discredited, through its repudiation at the hands of so many of its former subjects. The emphasis, in the recent electoral campaign, on American domestic issues, and the widespread refusal to be impressed by President Bush's foreign policy successes, are therefore understandable.

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Yet a full withdrawal into Fortress America seems unlikely, at least for the present decade. The euphoric security of 1989-90 has not endured. Hardly anyone any longer chants with Fukuyama: "History has ended! Democracy is busting out all over!" Saddam Hussein, by annexing Kuwait at a time when he was being assiduously courted by the United States, reminded Americans that the world, even without the Soviet Union, remains a very dangerous place, for those with a lot to lose as well as for everybody else. Subsequent events showed the utility of having allies, and international institutions within which to work, along with both allies and former enemies, though less with the latter. And even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, an economically and politically ruined Russia is still immensely formidable, in military terms.

These things being so, even an America with growing neo-isolationist tendencies is likely to hold on to NATO and to the vague and elastic, but reassuring, concept of the West. Within that framework, the United States will receive French overtures with cautious satisfaction, as signaling the end of a French-led tendency to set up a United States of Europe as a counterweight to the United States of America. The French shift, once Maastricht is not only dead but also buried, should have the effect, among others, of making the GATT negotiations a bit easier.

The United States will want to welcome improved relations with the French, without offending the Germans. This will not be easy since the Germans will know that France is drawing closer to America out of fear of them. The United States will be careful to avoid anything dramatically Francophile; Fontainebleau is unlikely again to become the headquarters of NATO. Tension will remain, despite the avoidance of the dramatic. The collapse, in the wake of Maastricht, of the illusory but comforting Franco-German entente will make the Rhine, once more, the most significant frontier in Europe.

1914: Parallels and Differences

TO THE EAST of the Rhine lie Germany and its willing satellites: Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, the Czech lands, Slovakia, possibly Poland, and the Ukraine. Here are the new Central Powers, a term with ominous resonance for all who live west of the Rhine, including the North Americans. *Formally*, all this is still part of the West. Germany will seek membership, both in the European Community and NATO, at least for the most favored of its satellites: Austria, Hungary, and Slovenia. Membership will no doubt be accorded. Formally, legally, institutionally, and in terms of official rhetoric, the West will extend to the Danube basin. In terms of sympathies and sense of shared traditions and values, it will extend securely as far as the Rhine, and hesitate thereafter.

Post-Maastricht Europe resembles pre-1914 Europe in some important ways. East of the Rhine there is emerging, in all but name, a new German Empire, a greater power than anything else on the Continent. United Germany, unlike the West German Federal Republic, claims the heritage of Prussia and Imperial Germany; the reinterment of the bones of Frederick the Great is decisive in that regard. The Nazi period is seen as a brief and inexplicable (or at least unexplained) aberrant episode in German history, which the West should begin to forget, fifty years after the defeat of the Third Reich. To the south and east of the new German Empire there is a great zone of instability which includes the Balkans, now as before 1914. But the zone of instability is now far larger than it was then, since it also includes the huge question marks over all the territories of the former Soviet Union. West of the Rhine, the countries which withstood the Germans at enormous cost in two World Wars are looking with apprehension and suspicion at the new German Empire, as their forefathers looked at the old one before 1914.

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I don't of course mean that this is, or soon will be, 1914 all over again. Fortunately, there are divergences as well as parallels between the two situations. In 1914 there were two adversarial sets of military alliances with mutually hostile contingency war plans. Now there is just one military alliance, comprising both the new German Empire and the former Western forces of the old one. The shots that were fired at Sarajevo in the summer of 1914 set in motion the mobilization of the adversarial alliances and led directly to the First World War. The shots fired at Sarajevo (and elsewhere) in the summer of 1992 produced only the most cautious reactions from the NATO allies, to the distress of many scandalized Westerners, and to the relief of others, including myself.

If too much should not be made of the ominous parallels, too much should not be made of the reassuring divergences either. It is a good thing that Germany belongs to NATO and to the European community (of which the old title "European *Economic* Community" is again becoming a more precise description). This is better, obviously, than the pre-war system of adversarial alliances. But institutional affiliations cannot by themselves keep Germany "safe," as the Eurocrats, and the French in particular, unwisely assumed. A new wave of national pride—perhaps early in the new century—might cause Germany to resent its subordinate position within a NATO perceived as dominated (like the United Nations) by the United States, France, and Britain. Germany might then withdraw from NATO (and possibly the UN also) and set up its own system of alliances in Central Europe. Neither NATO nor the UN could, or would, do anything about that development, except prepare for its possible consequences. And then, one reassuring divergence between 1914 and now would be replaced by yet another ominous parallel.

The Eurocrats, in the aftermath of the Second World War, assumed that economic integration of the European states would make war between those states impossible in the future. That has always seemed to me a shaky assumption—rather like the old Marxist dogma, held by James Connolly as late as 1916, that capitalist wars would always respect capitalist property. Germany can, if it ever chooses to do so, withdraw from all the European institutions it (or its West German predecessor) once freely chose to enter. There are no legal documents and no institutional devices that can make Germany "safe." That is all an illusion based on intense and prolonged wish fulfillment. Nobody except the Germans themselves can make Germany safe.

All present indications are that Germany is very safe indeed, in the sense that there is not the slightest present sign, on the part of either government or people, of any disposition towards any kind of military adventurism. This has been most clearly demonstrated in the case of Bosnia. It was at Germany's behest that the European Community recognized Bosnia as an independent state. Then the Serbs, with some assistance from the Croats, dismembered Bosnia. Germany did not propose that the Community should come to the rescue of the state for whose recognition it was primarily responsible. This is an inglorious chapter in the history of the Community. But it ought at least to reassure, for the time being, those who fear a revival of German military aggression.

I don't believe that modern Germans feel very much remorse about what the Third Reich did to other people. But I do believe that they retain a lively sense of the huge misfortunes German militarism brought down on the German people themselves, in two World Wars. In contrast, they have a blissful sense of the prosperity and power attained by the Germans, entirely through peaceful courses, in the two generations following the *Nullpunkt* of 1945. In the psyche of modern Germans, the place once occupied by the Flag, *die Fahne*, is now occupied by the deutschemark. As long as that is the case, the world need not fear any revival

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of German military aggression. But of course it may not always be the case.

As far as the present century is concerned, there is no question of confrontation between the new German Empire and the West. It is more a matter of distancing and feeling different. The German people never felt as affectionate towards, or as loyal to, the leadership and institutions of the West as the official discourse of their spokesmen constantly suggested. A conquered people simply does not have such feelings towards its conquerors, although it may find it expedient to feign them. The Germans found this expedient, because it looked to one set of conquerors to protect it from the other, much more dreaded. The need to feign is now greatly reduced through the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is true that Chancellor Kohl still goes on more or less in the old vein. A politician likes to go on saying the things he has been in the habit of saying, even when the context has changed to such an extent that his words are no longer appropriate or congenial to his audience. That is why Kohl and Mitterrand have both become unpopular. Kohl's successor will sound more German, Mitterrand's more French—both, less "European."

The Shrinking West

IN SHORT, I believe in the future of a West which is not now embodied in distinct institutions; a West with, at its core, the United States, Britain, and France, and around them Canada and the smaller countries of Northern and Western Europe. These countries are joined by common memories and fears. The principal countries concerned were allies in two World Wars. That is enough to constitute a potent, common memory bank, which will be stimulated and enriched by the commemorative cycle of the next three years.

The fear is of the unknown, of the hugely unfamiliar environment created by the end of the Cold War, followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the emergence of a united Germany, and the (still unacknowledged) failure of the European federalist project. The new Europe is an unstable and potentially dangerous place. The Soviet Union is gone, but Russia and its nuclear weapons are still there. Fears of a recrudescence of German militarism are probably exaggerated, as I have argued here. Exaggerated though they may be, they are real and have strong historical roots.

The European Community, as an institution, includes United Germany as does the institution of NATO. But the spirit of Western Community stops at the Rhine. Despite nearly fifty years of *communautaire* rhetoric, Germans and Western Europeans still feel uneasy with one another in a deeper way than the slight prickliness associated with normal international contacts. Europe did not become a community by calling itself a community.

In short, there is still a West, but it is smaller than the scope of the institutions commonly associated with it would suggest. It is to be hoped that the West—in the territorial terms defined here—will strengthen the real, historical ties that exist between its member nations, and prepare to face together the challenges that may come their way, out of Central, as well as out of Eastern, Europe. □

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Fatal Attraction
War and Human Nature

Robin Fox

WE SEEM, at the moment, to be going through one of those "war is dead" periods that occasionally try to brighten up the otherwise uninterrupted march of continual human warfare. It is a sociological generalization rarely made but easily tested that somewhere a war is always going on and always has been. Very few people today seem to read Lewis F. Richardson's magnificent *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*,[1] but any one who doubts the generalization should spend a few minutes browsing through its dense pages. The ubiquity and persistence of war, however, is still seen by the "war is dead" movements as some kind of annoying aberration: if it were not for arms races, imperialism or colonialism, class oppression and capitalism, monarchical rivalries, communist expansionism, or the sick minds of evil dictators (the list is endless), we could lay down our swords and shields by the riverside and study war no more.

History is not kind to the hopeful. And it may have the last laugh over the equally perky "end of history" movement. Even God is making a comeback it seems. So it behooves us to tread carefully in the business of proclaiming the end of these obvious human enjoyments. You know the arguments: that force is losing its efficacy as a means of extending policy (*pace* Clausewitz); that democracy is now in worldwide demand and democracies are of their nature pacific (Michael Doyle); that the growth of transnational corporations aided by better transport and instant worldwide communications is creating a level of international interdependence that will not tolerate war; that all this raises the cost of war to an unbearable level (following on Norman Angell)...and so on.

Very few of these are actually new arguments. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and even the first half of the nineteenth, no one bothered much to get into the war-is-dead business. It was pretty much taken for granted that war was a normal and natural mode of national policy making, to be resorted to under fairly specific conditions and ended under equally specific conditions. With perhaps the exception of the Thirty Years' War—a nasty foretaste of things to come—international wars were for the most part contained, fought by professional armies, and not troublesome to the mass of the population. Civil wars could get nasty, but the per capita losses were never great and countries recovered rapidly.

It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that the war-is-dead movement gathered force. The unprecedented rises in population, the huge move-

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[1] Pacific Grove: Boxwood Press, 1975.

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ments of people, the massive growth of trade and colonies, and the general industrializing of at least the western world, while obviously creating the potential for more conflict in the eyes of some observers, were cause for sunny optimism for many others. The Spencerian laissez-faire liberals, for example, echoed their master in prophesying that, paralleling the growth from "simple" to "complex" social structures, there would be a replacement of "military" forms of social structure with "industrial" forms, which would be (for reasons pretty much like those advanced at present) inherently inimical to war.

Thus universal free trade would lead countries to specialize, and hence be dependent on each other, and hence not be able to go to war with each other. I remember that when I first read Spencer's arguments as a teenager (along with those of Buckle and Emerson and other nineteenth-century war-is-dead prophets), I found them very convincing, but wondered at the same time how the Franco-Prussian, American Civil, Anglo-Boer, Spanish-American, Japanese-Chinese, Russo-Japanese, Russian Civil, First and Second World, Indo-Pakistan, Korean, and Israeli-Arab wars (to say nothing of numerous minor skirmishes in Spain, Ethiopia, Ireland, and the like, and of course the almost overlooked acts of colonial genocide, as in the Belgian Congo) had managed to happen in the meantime. Diehard Spencerians (there weren't many around) might have argued that these things took time, there could be relapses, etc. Spencer himself had denounced Disraeli's Suez Canal purchase on the grounds that it was a backsliding into the "military" mode which, of course, would be obsolete if we just left well alone.

BUT WE DON'T seem inclined to leave well alone and let the inevitability of pacific history take its course. This continues to be annoying to the "inevitability of pacifism" school, which included, in my youth anyway, the two schools of socialism and internationalism. For the socialists, once the proletariat had taken over in enough nations, they would obviously cease to want to fight each other. Or even before their worldwide triumphs, once they developed class consciousness the proletariats of the world would refuse to fight each other at the behest of their capitalist masters. At the London School of Economics in the 1950s, this was still being seriously preached by the hard core. Even then I felt one could learn more about the inevitability of human folly—including war—from the almost lunatic stubbornness of such foolishness than from the content of the doctrines themselves.

The internationalists, some of whom were moderate socialists but many of whom were not, plied their own version, which included the familiar arguments: reduce the arms races, strengthen the League of Nations, make the cost of conquest insupportable, expand tourism and exchange programs, and teach everyone Esperanto—the language, literally, of hope.[2] I suppose one must add here the various kinds of isolationists, especially in the United States, who, while not having a truly coherent theory of the end of war, could be said to hold the view that if we all tended our own gardens and didn't go foreign-adventuring, then this would at least cut down on wars. We can derive little comfort from the isolationist leadership of such military geniuses as "Colonel" Lindbergh, who assured Roosevelt that the Polish air force would make short work of the Luftwaffe.

[2]I had an older cousin who actually did part of his language degree—at Liverpool University—in Esperanto. I even bought the basic text and joined the local Esperanto club, only to find it was engaged in a furious feud with the rival Golapuk society. We forget so easily the failed idealisms of the past as we enthusiastically reinvent them for the benefit of the future.

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War and Social Circumstances

THE URGE TO announce the end of war is thoroughly understandable, and there can be few who would not like to believe it to be true. But war has been a constant of human history, and before we start the celebrations we have to ask ourselves the uncomfortable question whether any changes in social circumstances will affect its constancy. In other words, whether social circumstances alone can account for the constancy of war, such that a profound alteration in them could profoundly affect war's prospects. Or whether war, like sex, is something that can be affected by social circumstances, certainly, but is not necessarily "caused" by them and cannot necessarily be ended by changing them, however radically.

Those who believe war is "caused" by particular social circumstances have proposed a list of such causes that is almost as long as the list of wars themselves. T. E. Lawrence, lying sick in his tent in Wadi Ais, ruminated over this same problem while trying to figure out just what the Arab revolt was about: "Clausewitz enumerated all sorts of war...personal wars, joint proxy duels, for dynastic reasons...expulsive wars, in party politics...commercial wars, for trade objects...two wars seldom seemed alike. Often the parties did not know their aim, and blundered til the march of events took control."[3] While in each case any of these particular circumstances might have triggered the conflict, it would appear odd that each war had its own cause and that there were potentially an infinite number of "causes" of war.

No general formula for the "cause of war" has ever held up (neither Richardson nor Quincy Wright could come up with a convincing one). In most cases of "primitive war" for example, none of the proposed "causes" is present and wars often seem to be fought for their own sake—for the sake, that is, of intrinsic rewards stemming from the very business of warfare itself. It is this that is hardest to swallow: that war may very well have intrinsic, self-rewarding qualities, and that these are easily appealed to, and the emotions associated with them easily aroused. Of course, there have to be "occasions" for war, but these should not be confused with "causes." In basically bellic societies, for example, the occasions were often highly conventional, more like "signals" for warfare than causes. Often they were simply seasonal.

Critics might immediately object that we still have to "explain" why some societies are bellic and others not. Actually the truth is better stated as "some societies are more bellic than others," in the sense of being perpetually geared for war. But very few societies are totally ungeared for potential war, and those that are usually are very small and at the fringes—Pygmies, Eskimos, and the "Gentle Tasaday." Many who have been touted as non-bellic, such as the Pueblo Indians (whom I know first hand) and the Bushmen, in fact turn out to be, or to have been, formidable warriors when the occasion demanded it. The so-called "neutrals"—Sweden, Switzerland, etc. (much touted by the war-is-dead crowd) all maintain efficient and ever-ready armies. There is no question that there is variation in this, but there is constancy across the variation also. And while no one would question that by varying social circumstance, by cutting down on the *occasions* for war, one could perhaps affect the incidence of warfare, there is no evidence so far, from history or ethnography, that one can effectively eradicate it.

I would like to argue that such a view of warfare actually offers us more hope than the "war is dead because the causes have been eradicated" approach, which may well turn out to be dangerous in itself: just as dangerous as internationalism and isolationism were in their time. If the leaders of the anti-fascist world in the 1930s had had a more pessimistic view of human nature and its fatal

[3] *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 190-191.

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attraction to the appeals of war, then perhaps they might have moved earlier and more decisively to squash the obvious signs of it. Because unfortunately it remains another simple but true generalization that one of the most effective ways to stop the use of force is by the threat of even greater force. Thus the anti-bellic school has real problems with the obvious fact that the reason the major powers have not fought directly with each other over the last forty-five years is probably the existence of a nuclear deterrent. It is in fact the threat of the end of this very effective "anti-war" device and the prospect of proliferation that seems to have spurred the booming industry of reassurance in the "universal democracy" solution.

One of the most extensive war-is-dead statements recently came from John Mueller in his *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*.[4] This was published in 1989 and trotted out all the usual arguments about war becoming a "peculiar institution," as dueling and slavery had become. *But what if war is not basically like dueling and slavery, any more than it is like feudalism or bear-baiting or any other now-obsolete institution? What if it is more like sex or religion?* The question is not asked. But the end of religion was also much prophesied and has not happened, while no one trumpets the end of sex as yet—but wait. Not only do few ask whether dueling and slavery are good analogies for war, but Buckle's arguments from the mid-nineteenth century are revived with enthusiasm. Buckle noted the long period of relative peace from 1815 to 1862 and decided it heralded a new age (he refused to count the Crimean War). This was because war was becoming repulsive to civilized people.

His conclusion came at about the same time as Spencer's, and the subsequent sanguinary march of history has not dampened enthusiasm for this kind of reasoning. Thus the long period of relative peace (not counting wars by proxy) between the "major powers"—and especially the major democracies—over the past forty years, is heralded as a sign as significant as it was to Buckle that war is dead between these enlightened national entities. But this indeed does require you to discount war by proxy, as Buckle discounted colonial wars (they were not between "enlightened and civilized" nations, you see). If proxy wars are counted, then "hot" war has been going on again more or less constantly over this period. The major powers have simply, in this view, found another, more Orwellian, way to fight each other in cases like Korea, Afghanistan, and Vietnam by drawing one of the major players into direct warfare with a Third World country, to the loss and embarrassment of the power involved.

This will not matter now, the argument is pressed, because with the triumph of democracy and the end of history, even the Russians and Chinese will become democratic and behave nicely like their models in the West. (Who in the meantime have invaded Grenada and Panama, fought Argentina over the Falkland Islands, and Libya over Chad.) Would the fact that, a few months after Mueller's book was published, a major world conflict involving more than thirty nations erupted into large-scale classical war in the Middle East, daunt the prophets of bellic obsolescence? One wonders. Much depends on definition, and the definitions are not all in. Germany was, after all, technically a democracy in 1914—it had an elected parliament; but this too doesn't count, it seems, because it was not democratic "in foreign affairs," which were controlled by the army and the Kaiser. This gets hard to pin down after a while, and wishing so easily becomes wishful thinking, which in turn becomes a refusal to admit the possibility that the basic premise may be just plain wrong.

War and the Older Professions

WE HAVE ALREADY hinted that the "disease" model of war—in

[4] New York: Basic Books, 1989.

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that it is something aberrant which can be eradicated with the proper therapeutic measures—is what is at fault. This is the "epidemiological" attitude optimists and progressives love to take towards all persistent social conditions they dislike and want rid of: divorce, teenage pregnancy, terrorism, illiteracy, rape, juvenile gangs, drugs, domestic violence, poverty, driving deaths, sexual and social inequalities, prejudice, and so and on. We have already seen that Mueller uses as his prime analogies dueling and slavery, and we have already questioned that analogy. What if war is more like religion or sex? Sex is too general since war is organized and institutionalized, so let us say like religion or prostitution. These vie for the claim of the oldest profession, and both have been pronounced obsolescent by enthusiastic rationalists and reformers. (The constant in prostitution is not money, which is a recent invention, but the need of many males to have sex without complications or consequences. The two favored methods, where "free sex" is not practiced, are gifts (payment) and rape. The latter may even be having its own kind of revival if the current publicity is to be believed.)

Let us take the "end of religion" analogy. Religion, the rationalists claimed, boosted by Sir James Frazer's "inevitable" evolutionary sequence from magic through religion to science, would wither away once scientific explanations were available to substitute for superstition. Similarly, with the advent of "free love" (as we used so optimistically to call it), the need for prostitution would disappear and so would the institution. But as we have seen, both institutions, despite the advent of advanced science and casual sex, remain and flourish and even seem to be staging world-wide comebacks. We are forced to ask ourselves whether the "disease" premise was not false to start with: whether religion cannot be accounted for in terms of "wrong explanation" and whether prostitution is not just an outlet for frustrated puritan males. Hard as it is for rationalists to face, they have to consider whether or not both institutions answer needs that have nothing to do with explanation and frustration.

One approach to this problem of the constant elements in war has been to link war to human aggression, and to suggest that wars are in some way a direct outcome of the more basic aggressive "instincts." There is no question that aggression is related to war, just as sex is related to prostitution or mysticism to religion, but neither *institutional* form follows directly from the basic instinctive drive. Much ink has been spilled by the forces of good[5] to refute the thesis that "aggression causes war." And indeed such a straw man is not hard to huff and puff down. Even the most primitive of wars is a complicated, orchestrated, highly organized act of human imagination and intelligence, of which aggression is a necessary component, but often not even the most important one. By the time we get to the large-scale wars of history, the aggressive component is even more reduced, and the logistical factors by far dominate the violent.

Let us put it this way: to run a war successfully the leaders must tap the aggression of the fighters for battle purposes. But battles are often spasmodic and episodic parts of the total war, and modern technological war, with its distancing of attackers and attacked, can often bypass the need even to tap aggression for many of its operations. We might even paradoxically claim that war is "safer" the closer it stays to basic aggression, since aggression seems to have its own inbuilt inhibitions and ritualizations (which readily translate into formalized fighting of one kind or another, like medieval jousting), while the cold imaginations of the techno-warriors have none. They must depend, as Clausewitz insisted, on "reason"—and this is a far more terrifying prospect than depending on instinct, which takes care of itself pretty well.

[5]"The Seville Statement on Violence" is one of the latest; see *Academic Questions*, 1:4, 1988.

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But if the constant of war (unfortunately, perhaps) is not aggression then where does its "religious" appeal lie? What is it that makes it so easy to start wars, so easy to make whole populations support them with enthusiasm, and sustain them with courage and sacrifice unknown in peacetime? William James found this paradox to be at the heart of the issue, in his appeal for the "moral equivalent of war." It is a paradox (if it is a paradox) that we have never solved: that while war brings out the worst in us, it also brings out the best. (The same might be said of religion, and the more we look at it the more alike they do in fact appear to be.)

I recently bought a second-hand copy of a sad little book, with no specific date but probably brought out in 1944, called *Prefaces to Peace*, and containing the collected peace-wisdom of Wendell Wilkie ("One World"), Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson ("Lasting Peace"), Henry Wallace ("Free World Victory"), and Sumner Welles ("Blue-print for Peace"). Every peroration—following on the usual list of one standard *eirenicon* after another—stressed the same thing: that, in the words of Welles, peace could only be obtained and sustained "by sacrifice, by courage, by resolution, and by vision": all the qualities called up with ease in war and almost impossible to maintain in peacetime—especially "the vision thing." Even solemn declarations of "wars" on poverty, or "wars" on drugs, or "wars" on illiteracy, have little effect. People are not fooled: they know a war when they see one, and these are not wars within the meaning of the act. Within a few months again of the publication of this particular call for the end of war, the atom bombs were dropped and the Cold War started up, to grow hot in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. Six million were to die in wars of partition between India and Pakistan; a million in Nigeria; two million in Cambodia—and so it was to go. And the paradox continues that the slaughter in India was the direct outcome of Ghandi's attempt to put "sacrifice, courage, resolution and vision" into the service of "nonviolent resistance" and avowed pacifism.

Imagination, Symbols, and Intelligence

IF THE RELIGIOUS analogy is the better one it may give us some clues. After all, war and religion have been inextricably intertwined since the beginning. Religion (using a broad definition that would include such apocalyptic or "visionary" doctrines as Marxism and Imperialism) seems to tap some basic need for a holistic and satisfying view of life in which the individual, otherwise alone and doubtful, becomes integrated into a "church" and filled with certainty. Humans, unlike animals who, with the interesting exception of our closest relatives the chimpanzees, do not seem to fight wars as we understand them, are endowed (blessed/cursed) with imagination and symbolic intelligence.

The roots of war, like those of religion and prostitution, lie in these essentially human attributes, not in aggression *per se*. Of course, if we were not aggressive by nature then the issue would not arise, but there are many outlets for aggression at a level lower than organized warfare, and these suffice in some very small-scale societies. What war does is to tap the aggressive tendencies, and, using them in conjunction with some others equally basic, orchestrate—with the use of symbols, imagination, and intelligence—a sustained effort of "sacrifice, courage, resolution and vision." The depth psychologists have their own elaborate versions of what these attributes are, but we need only take a common sense view here. The main one is obviously the need for an "enemy." This is so obvious it is often overlooked. Our lives do not always go very well and someone has to take the blame, from the primitive scapegoat up to the international conspirators or the yellow peril or whatever. One of the easiest motives to tap is the motive of blame; and one of the easiest solutions to propose is the removal of its object. The number of "causes" of blame is limitless, like the "causes" of

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war; but what is constant is the need for a blamee.

What does the enemy threaten? Not necessarily even persons and property. The enemy threatens the ideas that we live by. These ideas (our "religions" in the broadest sense) encompass persons and property in that they define our notions of such. Even primitive warfare, which seems perhaps least ideological, is still so at base. The enemy tribe threatens the things that we deem "sacred"—which in the primitive world no less than our own, includes our "way of life" which is demonstrably different from theirs. Our gods are different. The occasions for each particular war will vary perhaps. But ultimately "we" fight "them" because they are different, and their difference is threatening in its challenge to the validity of the ideas we live by. Thus all wars are ideological wars. This is why they bring out the necessary element of fanaticism (and why religion plays so large a part in them). It is fanaticism that sustains "sacrifice, courage, resolution and vision." Since we are an animal that lives primarily by ideas and only secondarily by instincts (or put another way, since it is instinctive in us to live by ideas), we react fanatically when our basic ideas—those that decide our identities individual and collective—are threatened. And a combination of basic paranoia and xenophobia ensures that we will constantly feel such a threat. Extreme fear of the very different stranger is rooted indeed in our animal heritage as much as aggression is, and the combination of these with ideological fanaticism—our human contribution—ensures a constant basis for the appeal of war.

But the skeptical will ask, why war? There are other ways to attack the ideological enemy. Indeed there are, and we will pray for his destruction and invoke sorcery against him and try to best him in commerce. But we have to call the latter a "trade war" to get any steam into it. And the sad fact is that none of these suffices for us. However "civilized" our string of responses, at some point the only satisfaction is the physical defeat of the enemy. We can get by on analogies just so far, but there seems to be no diminution of the need to obliterate the threat physically when it gets too serious. We all know in our own lives how often we have wiped some infuriating obstacle off the face of the earth in our imaginations. Governments get to do this in reality with the infuriating Other, while taking a dim view of the citizenry adopting the same track on a personal level. We mere citizens (now that dueling is obsolete) have to be content with vicarious satisfactions derived from violent entertainment, and the occasional chance to join in a collective expedition with government, and usually official religious, sanction.

The apostles of peace will protest that I am generalizing from my own nasty motives and that they and their friends are free from such base thoughts and feelings. People do oppose wars, they will say. Right. I have seen them in their serried ranks spitting hatred and screaming defiance at the perpetrators of hatred and defiance. The "anti-war" religion becomes itself a set of ideas to be prosecuted and protected with often more fanatical vehemence than that shown by the warmongers themselves. The moral equivalent of war is the anti-war movement, because, in effect, it is the same thing. And to those who oppose war from the comfort of their studies, let me say that fanaticism can be a quiet and composed type; it does not have to foam at the mouth. The civilized opposition can have as much in common psychologically with the calm, calculated decision-making of the war leaders, as the screaming opposition has with the most vociferous hawks.

Of course, the mob is fickle, and if wars do not go their way (as with the Boer War—or for that matter the American War of Independence—in England), then there will be growing opposition. But there is rarely very effective opposition to a successful war. The Gulf War did indeed, at least initially, kick the Vietnam syndrome. Eighty percent or more were solidly behind it at the begin-

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ning, and since, unlike Vietnam, it was (relatively) short and (relatively) successful, the support did not waver. It does not need all of the people all of the time; just most of them some of the time will do.

Again the objection will come: even if you are right, what if we reduce all the possible "occasions" for war? Won't this reduce war itself? I would like to think so, but I fear that as long as the basics are there—that is, as long as we are human, the occasions will be sought out or even invented (Orwell's insight again). There will always be, for example, the problem of what to do with millions of testosterone-infected, young, rambunctious, unemployed males. The solution in the past, for the older males threatened by them (an inevitable result of our long evolution as a species with competitive sexual reproduction), was to ship them off to fight their counterparts threatening older males in other countries. They are not growing any less numerous or any less dangerous, the yuppie phenomenon notwithstanding.

The Democracy Argument

BUT LET US take up again, in this context, the "end of history" argument (not because it is particularly good but because it is currently chic). Since "liberal democracy" has triumphed, and all the world can now look forward to is more of the same, and since democracies don't fight each other the way lesser social systems do, then war is probably over (although it may take a bit of time to sort this out—either a few generations or a few centuries, depending on the version). Note how this regards war as a contingency "caused" by conflicting types of social systems, the eradication of which will eradicate war itself. Precisely the thesis we have been at pains to refute.

Truly, if people everywhere were indeed exactly the same then there could be no perceived differences for the paranoia and xenophobia to work on. But the "sameness" is not something that universal "liberal democracy"—should that even happen—could produce. Races and religions and customs and laws ("nationalism" is a phase in the history of these) will still differ; in short, ideological differences will remain however alike the market economies/democracies may become. And the "end of history" thesis wildly exaggerates how alike such economies/polities are. There are, in fact, only superficial likenesses between, say, Japan and Sweden, or Britain and the United States. (Americans, so anxious to export their own version of democracy, do not always appreciate how alien and peculiar, not to say corrupt and unrepresentative, it seems to those from other democratic societies.)

The existence of universal suffrage and stock exchanges only scratches the surface, as recent run-ins with Japan have shown us to our distress. True, we have not gone to war with Japan again, yet, but don't forget all those prophecies about how free trade, through "interdependency," would make war impossible "in the long run." It was precisely free trade and specialization that led us to abandon our own oil fields and depend on the cheap stuff from the Middle East. And we see where that got us in the "death of war" game. Economic and political similarities do not wipe out perceived threatening differences: they may even exaggerate them as we come to hate those who have stolen our clothes while we were bathing, and now look better dressed than ourselves.

The Hegelian "end of history" thesis, with its view of man as a "product of his concrete historical and social environment" is deliberately opposed by Fukuyama to "earlier natural right theorists" who would have man be "a collection of more or less fixed 'natural' attributes." Clearly my thesis has more in common with these "earlier"—and by implication cruder, less "modern"—theories than it has with either Hegelian historical determinism, or, as Fukuyama rightly sees, the subsequent radical relativism that emerges when the historical process is stripped of its driving force of "progress." Indeed, I have

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spent a lot of time and effort defending just such a position (as in, for example, *The Search For Society*[6]). And this is because any thesis such as Hegel's or any derivative version (or, for that matter, any of the other so-called philosophies of history) are based on a fatal error: they take the historical process itself entirely for granted and treat it as totally self-contained. Fukuyama wonders if periods of history might simply be "blips" on the total scale, but he never stops to consider that *history itself* is only a blip on the total scale of man's "concrete historical and social environment." For that environment stretches back at least three and a half and possibly up to five million years. To ignore this huge stretch of human history and privilege a mere few thousand years of good weather in a particularly mild interglacial (now coming to its close by the way) is to make an arbitrary cut off as to where "history" begins—as well as where it ends.

Looked at in the context of the whole, (and even this whole is part of 72 million years of primate history, and 128 million years of mammalian history), the "historical" period can be viewed not as the progressive manifestation of increasing rationality (or whatever), but rather as a series of wilder and wilder swings away from an upper-Paleolithic norm. The upper-Paleolithic was when we, as a species, had reached the top of the food chain and were in a sound balance with our environment. We hunted successfully, perfected beautiful weapons (we're still doing that), practiced elaborate religions, and created spectacular magical artworks; there were probably about a million and a half of us. We now face a world with a projected population of ten billion in the year 2,000, with a good deal of our environment irretrievably destroyed, and with a state of complexity running beyond our capacity to handle. And we face it, as one of my psychology colleagues put it, with the emotional equipment of a jungle rat. Actually it is worse. We face it with the added imaginative and intellectual equipment of a terrestrial primate, evolved to be, among other things, especially sensitive to differences, and warlike about dealing with them. The jungle rat has a better chance of survival, if we leave it any jungle to survive in.

"History" may well end. Indeed I prophesied this myself about the same time as Fukuyama.[7] But I doubt it will end as Fukuyama envisages; that is, because we shall invent happy liberal democracies where we shall live boring but peaceful lives in an increasingly homogeneous world. It will end because it has been an evolutionary aberration that has grown out of hand: too much for its inventors to handle. He allows that the huge problems of the Third World and "nationalism" might get in the way for a while until the benefits of liberal democracy shall wipe away all tears from their eyes. But what he does not realize is that behind the population explosion (which gets short shrift from him), and behind tribalism, neo-fundamentalism, and nationalism (see what were Yugoslavia and the USSR), lie those "more or less fixed natural attributes" that Hegelian historicism and neo-relativism would ignore, and that liberal democracy will not wish away. Hegel lived before Darwin, and for him there was some excuse (and his basic insight about the role of ideas is obviously right—that men will fight to defend ideas more than material interests is something we can agree on). But more than a hundred years after Darwin there is no excuse for ignoring 99.9 percent of human history and its living fossil record that is human nature.

Goodnight Eirene

IN 1806, AS Francis Fukuyama reminds us, "Hegel saw in Napoleon's defeat of the Prussian monarchy at the Battle of Jena...the imminent universalization of the state incorporating the principles of liberty and equality."

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[6]New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989.
[7]Ibid., p. 216.

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Clausewitz, a brilliant contemporary of Hegel (and who was equally a student of Kant) did not just watch, and rejoice in, the battle of Jena; he fought in it, was captured, and learned a lasting lesson: history had not come to an end in 1806 at Jena, nor would it come to an end as long as we remained human beings. One can only appeal to the subsequent two centuries to decide who was the better prophet, and to watch in wonder as the neo-eireneans start the latest wake. Hear the incomparable Clausewitz:

> War is...a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs to the purity of reason.
>
> The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second, more the general and his army; and the third, more the government.
>
> These three tendencies, which appear like so many different law-givers, are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject, and at the same time variable in degree. A theory which would leave any one of them out of account, or set up any arbitrary relations between them, would immediately become involved in such a contradiction with the reality, that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that alone.[8]

Thus the United States fought the Gulf War, in the purity of governmental reason, to protect western oil interests (other of the allies had other rational interests of their own). It was executed as a free activity of the soul by the generals and the armies. But the people were sustained in it by the blind instincts of hatred and animosity towards a rapidly dehumanized enemy whose uncompromising alienness threatened not only their pocket books but their image of the good. The same went in double measure for the other side. Reason, chance and instinct in inseparable interaction.

The interaction of these "basic attributes of human nature," not the dialectical evolution of Spirit towards Absolute Freedom, was reality for Clausewitz: reason, chance, and instinct would always interact to produce both "policy" in the first place, and its "continuation by other means" in the second. So to those who ask (as in Washington they inevitably do) if there are policy implications in this analysis, I can only answer in the most general terms: The meek may someday inherit the earth, but in the meantime be vigilant and keep up your guard.

If the general position outlined here be valid, then wars are not a disease to be cured, but part of the normal human condition. They stem from what we are, not from some contingencies of what we do from time to time ("history"). They are, like religion and prostitution, basic responses to basic human fears and hopes; in the case of war, these include: fanaticism, xenophobia, paranoia, scapegoatism, and the vulnerability of ideology. But the paradox remains: that so important is the defense of our ideas—our definitions of ourselves and our societies—that we will willingly strive to destroy their perceived enemies and exhibit the highest forms of human courage in so doing. And who is to say that we are wrong? What is most worth dying for, material interests or diacritical ideas? It is ideas that make us human after all. □

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[8] *On War*, I.i.28.

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Is Realism Finished?

Fareed Zakaria

FOR THE THIRD time this century the United States has waged and won a world war. And for the third time the postwar environment brings with it calls that this nation transcend international politics rather than engage in it. As in 1918 and 1945, the end of a great struggle against an evil empire has brought with it the hope that a new world order can arise, if only we assist in its creation. Leading statesmen and publicists now urge, as they did twice before, that American foreign policy be based not merely on preserving the peace and protecting America's interests but on collective security, international law, democratization, and other noble causes. In some versions, the goal of American diplomacy is nothing less than a wholly democratic world that lives in perpetual peace.

The school of thought that has traditionally cast doubt on the ability of the United States—or any country—to make the world anew is "realism," a term usually prefixed in the mouths of its detractors with the words "cold-blooded" or "heartless." Its adherents are charged with all manner of crimes from coddling dictators to spurning America's "true" values. The hall of shame to which realists are assigned includes controversial luminaries like Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, academics like Hans Morgenthau and Raymond Aron, and of course George Bush. Today its critics have branded realism obsolete, a relic of the days of courts and princes, an approach out-of-sync with a world of borderless economies, peace-loving democracies, and global crises like the greenhouse effect.

In fact realism has been attacked in similar terms for hundreds of years, and despite recurrent onslaughts from liberals, Marxists, pacifists, environmentalists, deconstructionists, and others, it persists as the fundamental method of analyzing world politics. Indeed as one liberal theorist notes, "these critiques seem only to confirm the centrality of Realist thinking in the international political thought of the West." The public debate on this subject, however, has been shallow, dominated by name-calling on both sides (realists are not averse to branding their opponents woolly-minded dreamers). This is unfortunate because a serious discussion of first principles in international relations raises crucial issues about war, peace, and foreign policy.

Although the distinction between the two has often been blurred, realism is not so much a normative guide for foreign policy as an explanation of how the world works, a theory of international relations. From this understanding of world politics one could propose different foreign policies depending on the kind of risks, tradeoffs, and goals one seeks—in fact realists have often disagreed

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on specific policy issues. One could, alternately, regard realism as a pivotal but incomplete understanding of inter-state relations and set out to supplement its spare analysis with additional factors (which is this writer's position). Or one might reject the entire framework and replace it with something else. Whatever one's final conclusions, it is worth asking at the start: What is realism?

The Causes of War

A THEORY of how the world works must be able to explain the most persistent and disturbing feature of international history: the periodic recurrence of war. One strand of realist thought locates the roots of international conflict in human nature. Drawing on the Christian philosophical tradition running from St. Augustine to Reinhold Niebuhr, this view is associated with modern realist thought mainly because of the writings of Hans Morgenthau, the German emigré political scientist who dominated the postwar study of international relations in America. Morgenthau wrote against a backdrop of Anglo-American idealist thinking which had declared war to be unnatural, caused by nefarious interest-groups, a defective intellectual environment, and misinformation. Conflict was like a disease; it could be eliminated if men and nations were properly socialized. One prominent English thinker, Alfred Zimmern, even suggested establishing an international lending library to educate properly the next generation of cosmopolitan statesmen.

In a withering critique of these "utopians," Morgenthau argued that war was the result of "forces inherent in human nature." "The ubiquity of evil in human actions," he said, inevitably led human organizations to struggle for power, transforming "churches into political organizations...revolutions into dictatorships...and love for country into imperialism." Morgenthau moved the discussion of war away from Enlightenment rationalism with its view of human perfectibility, towards an older, darker Western tradition in which "the sinfulness of man is conceived not as an accidental disturbance of the order of the world sure to be overcome by a gradual development toward the good, but as an inescapable necessity." Although he pointed to other causes of conflict, this one loomed largest in his work and became the most widely caricatured, cited whenever critics wish to charge that realism rests on a fundamentally cynical view of humankind.

Other realists, however, have long believed that Morgenthau's focus on an *animus dominandi* is at best incomplete. As today's leading realist scholar, Kenneth Waltz, points out, if human nature explains the recurrent episodes of conflict in the world, does it not also explain the many periods of peace? "Human nature may in some sense have been the cause of war in 1914, but by the same token it was the cause of peace in 1910. In the intervening years many things changed, but human nature did not." While the evil in humans may be the fundamental cause of war, the good in them is the fundamental cause of peace. Human nature cannot explain why some eras are more war-ravaged than others; nor why domestic politics, while conflictual, is usually non-violent.

The International System

THE OTHER, more important, tradition in realist thought, running from Thucydides through Hobbes and Rousseau, explains the persistence of war by the situation in which states exist. The international system is anarchic, with no overarching authority providing security and order. In such a "self-help" system each state must rely on its own resources to survive and flourish, and in this uncertain climate competition and conflicts of interest abound. Because there is no authoritative, impartial method of settling these disputes—i.e. no world government—states are their own judges, juries, and hangmen, and often resort to force to achieve their security interests.

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War persists in this view because "nothing exists to prevent it."

The defining characteristic of realism has always been its belief that the international system is different and separate from the domestic one, and that this competitive atmosphere exerts a powerful influence on states. Everything else is a footnote to this observation. In the sixteenth century, diplomats and scholars of the Italian city-states noticed that their external relations followed a pattern determined by their relative power positions. A century later the Huguenot Prince Henri de Rohan spoke of the need for princes to follow the "national interest," because it represented the dictates of the international system: "The Princes command people," he explained, "and the Interest commands the Prince." Two centuries after that the great Austrian statesman Metternich argued that "the society of states [is] the essential condition of the modern world."

This strand of realism, is often termed "structural realism" or "neorealism." It treats the international system as a distinct analytic concept. Because this realm has no ruler, its cardinal feature is the distribution of power within it, determining who can do what to whom. Thus the distribution of power has a potent influence on world politics. The seminal example of systemic pressures affecting international outcomes, indeed creating a pattern of history, is the recurrent formation of *balances of power*. The logic of competition under anarchy suggests that states, jealous of their independence, will balance against a rising, threatening great power, rather than jump on its bandwagon.

The broad outline of modern European history bears out this generalization. There have been five unsuccessful attempts by individual powers at continental hegemony. The Hapsburg bid for mastery of the continent in the seventeenth century was thwarted by a combination of powers; France's attempts at dominance in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century were finally defeated by the Quadruple Alliance; Germany's two massive campaigns to conquer Europe ended in failure in the two World Wars; and the Soviet Union's quest for domination of large parts of Eurasia collapsed under the pressure of a world-wide anti-Soviet alliance. The pattern of aspiring hegemons and neighbors who gang up on them is not limited to modern Europe. The fundamental cause of the Peloponnesian War was, in Thucydides' oft-quoted phrase, "the rise of Athens and the fear which this caused in Sparta."

While realists debate how strong systemic influences are on a state's foreign policies, most agree that *in crises* and *in the long run* they tend to dominate other factors. Of course states pursue goals unrelated to their physical security, such as economic welfare. They often form alliances for reasons of ideological affinity. They make many foreign policy decisions because of domestic pressures. But because the stakes in the realm of international security are so high—ultimately national survival itself—in a crisis they usually respond to the strategic environment rather than to their ideological preferences. Thus when Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the Western world's most ardent anticommunist, Winston Churchill, quickly embraced Stalin's regime as an ally. Thirty years later Richard Nixon, a charter member of the "Who Lost China?" Republicans, went to Beijing to forge an anti-Soviet alliance with a communist elite fresh from perpetrating the barbarisms of the Cultural Revolution. Most recently, when President Bush needed a united Arab front to back his anti-Iraq campaign he travelled to Damascus to befriend Hafez Assad of Syria, a man his administration had boycotted for years and branded a terrorist.

This discussion raises one of the great misconceptions about realism. Critics, even well-meaning ones, have been puzzled by the fact that realists often assert that the international system pushes states to act in a certain manner; yet these same realists can be found urging the United States to follow one course rather than another. Robert W.

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Tucker asks, "If the national interest is so objective, if it is analogous in nature to gravity, then what is the reason for the repeated failure of statesmen to see what is self-evident?" Why do realists keep imploring statesmen to do what they will be forced to do anyway? The answer is simple. Realists do not believe that states always follow systemic pressures; they do believe that states that ignore these pressures pay a price. As Henri de Rohan said in 1640, "According [as the national interest] is well understood, it maketh states to live or die."

States exist in the international system in much the same way that firms do in a free market. Markets impose certain imperatives on firms—most basically, look out for your interests, keep an eye on the competition, and maximize your profits. Most firms follow these incentives and disincentives. Those that do not, in the long run, go bust. The international realm works differently, but not much. States rise and fall more frequently than we may think. In the sixteenth century there were over 500 states in Europe. After 300 conflict-ridden years there were fewer than thirty. Over the last century all of the great multinational empires have collapsed and there are now close to 200 member-states of the United Nations. Of course, just as some firms perish for technological or structural reasons, some states have been victims of forces beyond their control, e.g. the rise of sea power favored island and coastal nations. But, just as many firms go bankrupt through bad management, so do nations. Eighteenth-century Poland miscalculated the capabilities and intentions of its neighbors; the result was that it disappeared from the map of Europe for over a hundred years.

For the great powers, the international system resembles an oligopolist market, with its handful of large actors, more than it does a free one. Because their size insulates them from the effects of any one error or change, death rates for firms in such markets are low; Ford did not close down after the Edsel fiasco. Instead, mistakes result in large losses, which erode a firm's market position. Similarly, when great powers err they bleed rather than die. If they truly overextend themselves, as Germany and the Soviet Union did in this century, they can be reduced to second-rank status for a generation. If they are very strong and make smaller errors—e.g. Britain in the Boer War or the U.S. in Vietnam—they will still pay a price in the blood and treasure of their citizens.

For great powers survival is usually assured. Freed of this basic constraint, they often concern themselves with goals beyond security, such as spreading their beliefs or religion abroad. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with spending "surplus power" on non-security related goals. For example, America's vigorous promotion of democracy abroad is a noble cause. But from Versailles to Vietnam, idealistic statesmen, distracted by the grandeur of their goals, have neglected prudence and calculation. Realists worry that it is too easy, when pursuing such policies, to ignore basic systemic discipline and to forget that in the uncertain environment of world politics, misperceptions, unintended consequences, and Murphy's laws abound. Hence, while most realists were early and strong supporters of containment, many were also early critics of the Vietnam War. What realists often suggest as a grand strategy for states is the foreign policy equivalent of a long-term strategy for a big business. It eschews dramatic short-term profits and risky investments in return for smaller but more lasting gains, long-term profits, and security. It is the grand strategy of Warren Buffet rather than Donald Trump.

Good great power strategy is rare, but two models can be emulated—Britain during the nineteenth century and America since World War II. The roll call of Europe's aspiring hegemons listed earlier omitted these two names because they did not invite upon themselves the large countervailing coalitions that the others did. Alone among modern great powers, these two countries were able to remain utterly dominant in the

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world without causing rivals to collude against them. The reason is simple: America and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain followed policies that concentrated on essentials, building economic power at home and commercial links abroad. Each was the most important power of its time but did not try to destroy other great powers. (In fact, at the turn of the century Britain chose to appease both America in the Western hemisphere and Russia in Central Asia.) They intervened when vital interests were at stake, most dramatically when the European balance of power was threatened, denying Germany and the Soviet Union conquest of the continent. By husbanding their own power and using it with wisdom and restraint, Britain and America outlasted all their rivals.

The Challenge from Political Liberalism

FROM THE DAYS of the Greeks some philosophers have argued that international relations are determined not by states' power positions but by their internal characteristics. In the last two centuries this viewpoint evolved into a coherent critique of realism, and by the early twentieth century, liberal and Marxist variations of this view became quite popular. Two specific issues crystallized this disagreement, in arguments that continue to this day: Britain's great surge of imperialism in the 1880s and 1890s; and Germany's attempt to dominate Europe in World War I. The British liberal J.A. Hobson set forth a powerful argument, later adapted by Lenin, that the economic and social structure of British capitalism caused Britain's "scramble for Africa." At the same time various German scholars argued that the roots of German *Weltpolitik* lay in that country's part-feudal, part-industrial socio-economic structure. Despite their cynical view of domestic politics, these critiques were in a larger sense a product of Enlightenment optimism. If war and expansion were caused by diseased societies, then they could be cured. Turning states towards Marxism or democracy, depending on one's politics, would hasten the millennium.

Over the centuries, critics of realism have associated various internal causes with imperialism and war. When most of the world's great powers were religious monarchies, they claimed that religion caused war; but states became increasingly secular and war persisted. Then they said that it was kings who caused war; yet monarchies vanished and war did not. Marxist-Leninists proclaimed that capitalism caused war, pointing to the many imperial powers at the time that were capitalist. But many equally imperial regimes were not capitalist at all, Japan and Russia for example. (A more difficult problem for dialecticians was the fact that communist states proved as expansionist as any in history.) Today, it is the turn of nationalism to bear the blame. These various theories of imperialism and war are partially true in the sense that many of the factors identified—religion, capitalism, or fascism—had close connections with specific wars. But they do not explain the larger phenomenon of war itself. Let us be clear: realists believe that while "bad" states cause wars, they do not cause *War*.[2] If a particular domestic regime were the cause of war in general, how could it be that in the thousands of years of recorded history every kind of regime known to man has engaged in war and expansion? Monarchies, oligarchies, aristocracies, republics, city-states, nation-states, holy empires, dictatorships, and even democracies have gone to war regularly and with roughly uniform zeal.

Marxism having been discredited in both theory and practice, the most important challenge to realist thought now comes from political liberalism, which argues that democracies are inherently more pacific than

[2]The confusion over a similar kind of distinction between history and History has led to the almost universal misunderstanding of Francis Fukuyama's thesis in his "The End of History."

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other regimes and that a world of democracies would hence be one of "perpetual peace." These ideas were first put forth by Emmanuel Kant and have been revived and adapted by political scientist Michael Doyle. Kant wrote that republics would not war on one another, and Doyle claims that the last two centuries bear out the generalization that no democracy has ever gone to war with another democracy. One can quibble with the specifics—the War of 1812 is skipped by defining Britain as undemocratic at the time; the American Civil War doesn't count either—but the correlation is impressive, and if it holds up over the next decades it will pose a serious problem for realism.

For an international theorist the existence of peace among democracies leads less to self-congratulation than to further questioning. Why don't they fight each other? Is it that they abhor violence? Or is it that ordinary people won't pay for costly expansionism? Or is it, as Francis Fukuyama claims, in Joseph Schumpeter's tradition, that "imperialism and war are related to a certain social class, the class of masters, otherwise known as the aristocracy, who derived their social status from their willingness to risk their lives in bygone days." All three arguments, however, should make democracies more peaceful across the board, towards all other countries. In fact democracies have been more war-prone than other regimes—they fight wars more often and with greater fury than the average state. Only in relations with each other do democracies keep the peace.

Even though the logic behind the "liberal peace" is still unclear, it would be foolish dogmatism not to recognize that important trends have changed the world over the last two centuries, making the Western capitalist democracies less war-prone than they have ever been. They are fat, contented, unwilling to spend thousands of lives in military adventures, and, when dealing with each other, less susceptible to the egotism, insecurity, and paranoia which often lead to war. Bitter rivalries and struggles for influence among liberal democracies will develop in the world ahead; but these conflicts of interests will not turn into conflicts of armies as long as the political and economic conditions in which the Western states live remain unchanged. Similar progress towards great power peace was made in the nineteenth century, another era of spectacular economic and political progress. Then came economic rivalries, depressions, xenophobia, nationalism, and war. If the prosperous economic order of the post-1945 world were to crumble, the liberal peace might not survive the strain.

The Challenge from Economic Liberalism

ECONOMIC liberalism is the dominant Anglo-American perspective on economic affairs. Over the last two centuries it has replaced all other modes of economic thought in Europe. More recently it has gained adherents across the globe as other nations have tried to copy the Western world's staggering growth. Economic liberalism is defined by its reliance on the concept of the market. It assumes that free markets occur naturally and spontaneously, and that the unfettered exchange of goods, money, and services is the most efficient way of organizing economic life, domestically and internationally. Liberals may differ on how much efficiency should be sacrificed for other social goals—spending on the poor, for example—but all of them, Keynesians and supply siders alike, accept that the market and its pricing mechanism are the most efficient available system of allocating resources. The individual pursuit of self-interest, in this view, leads to general economic welfare; as Bernard Mandeville put it in 1706, "Private vice is public virtue." If nations allow free exchange the world economic pie will keep growing bigger. Of course some nations will gain more than others, just as within a nation comparative advantages and relative efficiencies make some millionaires and leave others paupers.

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Post-war realists like Morgenthau and Kissinger thought little about economics. The Soviet threat was a political, military, and ideological one and they dealt with it on those terms. But earlier realists, from Thucydides to Alexander Hamilton to E.H. Carr, were always vitally concerned with economics. This school of thought has recently been revived in a sophisticated manner by Robert Gilpin of Princeton University. Modern realists have an ambiguous relationship towards economic liberalism. Virtually all contemporary American realists happen to be liberals in the sense that they believe that the market and its pricing mechanism allow for maximum economic efficiency. Almost all of them are economic liberals in a deeper, normative sense in that they value individual freedom and limited government. They believe that free markets create the greatest wealth possible, and that an international economy characterized by the free exchange of people, capital, and goods holds the greatest prospect for world economic growth and welfare (in this they depart from realists like Hamilton, List, and Bismarck).

But realists believe that the distribution of power is the most important fact of international life. Thus the widespread practice of particular economic and political arrangements are the result of the preferences of the world's dominant states. Realists do not believe that free markets arise spontaneously, nor that the liberal economic world is a "normal" or natural state of affairs. Instead they see this beneficent arrangement as the product of the power and liberal preferences of the world's two economic hegemons, Britain in the nineteenth century and America in the twentieth century. The *Pax Britannica* lasted approximately from the repeal of the Corn Laws through World War I. The global economic system was unhinged in the 1930s because British power had collapsed and America failed to step into the void. The spectacular growth of the OECD economies from the late 1940s to the present has rested on five American-made pillars: the political and military protection provided by the United States; the West's unity, itself based on fear of the Soviet threat; the dollar's pivotal role in the international monetary system; the free trade system, also sponsored by the United States; and American foreign aid and direct investment.

American hegemony, though still unrivalled, has already begun eroding, largely from forces beyond its control—the uneven nature of international growth, the pace of technological change, and free-rider advantages for other countries. Some American policies and practices have also hurt. By the 1960s the United States was consuming more and investing less, and the massive Keynesian state intervention of that era coupled with the Vietnam War accelerated this trend. By the 1970s American productivity growth rates, once the envy of the world at 3 percent, had declined to 0.8 percent, behind Germany, Japan, and the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). This shift in relative economic power had clear political consequences. The world monetary system came apart with the collapse of Bretton Woods, and is now kept patched together by ad hoc arrangements and summit meetings. The free-trade system is under similar pressure, as bilateralism, sectoral protectionism, and regional blocs are on the rise. Moreover, Japan appears both less able and willing to help create and maintain the post-war, liberal, economic order.

Some people see the international economic ills of the last fifteen years as being caused by specific problems and policies—such as Vietnam, the oil shocks, and the budget deficits. Realists tend to see the growing disharmony of the OECD countries as the result of structural problems, which threaten to get worse. With the end of the Cold War, concerns about relative military gains have given way to concerns about relative economic gains. The United States was once willing to encourage Japan and Western Europe to grow robustly (in fact, faster than its own economy) so as to stand as a bulwark

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against the Soviet Union. Today the victorious OECD powers are increasingly worried about each other's competitive position and their global market-share in key industries.

Where liberals might assume that great powers will be satisfied with absolute economic gains—rising standards of living for their citizens—regardless of whether they are doing better than other states, realists know that international influence stems from *relative* national power. Take one example: Britain grew impressively over the last century at an average rate of 1.75 percent. The average citizen in Britain today enjoys a much higher standard of living than did his Victorian predecessor. But other industrial nations grew just a little faster than Britain, the United States by an average of 2.25 percent during the same period. The result: while Victorian Britain strode the world like a colossus, Britain today limps hesitantly, bringing up the rear of the great power club.

Sources of Optimism

TWO LIBERAL schools argue against the pessimism implied in this realist perspective on political economy; both have some merit. The first believes that interdependence, the increasingly intertwined nature of national economies and societies, has created countless incentives for peace and cooperation. Wars between nations that trade, manufacture, invest, and research together would be too disruptive for statesmen to contemplate; they would be forced to find peaceful solutions to their troubles. Clearly there is some truth to the notion that commerce creates the sentiments and interests that make war less likely.

Interdependence, however, is double-edged. While it creates incentives for peace, it also gives rise to the irritations, frictions, and conflicts that can lead to war. The great powers of nineteenth century Europe were far more integrated, in every sense, than their counterparts since 1945. Asa Briggs has called that age of *truly* borderless commerce and travel "the belle epoque of interdependence." Using a simple economic measure of interdependence—exports plus imports as a percentage of GNP—we see that nineteenth-century Britain, France, Germany, and Italy ranged between 33 and 52 percent. Observing this happy state of affairs, the British liberal Norman Angell explained that war among the advanced European nations had become unthinkably costly and was therefore obsolete. His book, *The Great Illusion*, was published in 1913.

Using the same measure of trade as a percentage of GNP, during the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union ranged between a modest 8 and 14 percent, a dramatically lower level of interdependence than in nineteenth-century Europe. In fact one might argue that the Cold War was relatively peaceful precisely *because* the two superpowers had such little contact with each other and were largely independent of the rest of the world (both having large internal economies). Had there been constant contact between these two arch-enemies there would have been constant friction and many more Berlin and Cuban crises. One need only look at Yugoslavia, a nation that was consciously made as economically, politically, and ethnically intertwined as possible, to recognize that the quiet caress of interdependence can sometimes turn into a deadly embrace.

The second source of optimism derives from a faith in international institutions. Harvard political scientist Robert Keohane argues that cooperation can continue even after the decline of a hegemon, as long as the major powers commit themselves to international institutions and regimes that will recognize and implement their common long-term interests. This would ensure continued prosperity for the major powers and provide a hospitable environment for the fledgling capitalist democracies around the globe. The occasions for conflict inherent in multipolar anarchy would still exist, but they would be moderated by growth, democracy, and multilateral problem-solving.

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The institutionalist viewpoint is often caricatured by realists as a naive belief that peace derives from membership in world bodies like the League of Nations and the UN. In fact recent writings in this tradition have made more modest claims that are firmly grounded in realist logic. They proceed from the assumption that anarchy and uncertainty are the cause of inter-state conflict, and propose solutions that ameliorate these two conditions. International regimes serve to regularize cooperation, reduce transactions costs, and provide institutional support for multilateral policies. These regimes often play a positive role in international life, but they cannot make member-states choose international over national interests. During the recent monetary crisis in Europe, for example, Germany put its own economic interests over those of Europe as a whole.

The happiest prospect for the future of the world economy is that the United States, Japan, and Germany join together and rejuvenate the liberal international economy, placing it on a firmer footing. This is America's preeminent strategic challenge in the next decade, and it is not a futile one. Each of the major powers has a strong interest in an open world economy and there exist many trends that will keep those interests alive. Grand strategy, however, must be based not simply on a best-case scenario but on other likely ones as well. America, having long struggled with the question of how a politically liberal state operates in a realist world, must now consider what an economically liberal state might have to do in an increasingly mercantilist world.

The Problem of Peaceful Change

AS WE HAVE demonstrated, in an anarchic world the distribution of power has powerful effects on international events. Changes in this distribution, therefore, have serious, system-wide repercussions; witness how the collapse of the USSR has influenced politics from the Middle East to South Africa to Nicaragua. But the distribution of power is in constant flux, and this dynamic condition ensures that world politics can never stay the same. For all kinds of reasons—technological change, demography, and leadership skills among them—*uneven economic growth* is a permanent feature of international life. Nations rise and fall, and they do so at different paces. The new rich want influence commensurate with their wealth, the newly impoverished hold more territory or prestige than they can afford. The lack of a supranational authority ensures that states will take it upon themselves to sort these matters out, often resorting to force.

Great powers have a vested interest in systemic peace. First, a general war would be ruinous for most of them. Second, stability and predictability are the foundations on which the material and moral welfare of their citizens rests (America has a special interest in a peaceful world because it provides the best breeding ground for democracy and capitalism). Thus the great power statesman's responsibilities are threefold: to maximize his country's security and influence in the world; to allow for the inevitable shifts in international power and prestige; and finally, to preclude or preempt a general war. These three tasks are rarely harmonious, which is why E.H. Carr termed the central dilemma of international relations "the problem of peaceful change."

In this century the most commonly proposed solution to this problem has been collective security: a binding system of laws by which all nations commit themselves to the defense of *any* nation attacked. The criticisms of collective security are well-known: no system can work if it requires that states go to war, expending blood and treasure, for reasons that they regard as peripheral to their own security. More generally, collective security is a static concept; it attempts to outlaw the inevitable frictions of a dynamic world. The international hierarchy cannot be frozen circa 1945, with first rank powers like Germany and Japan

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placed on the same footing as Bolivia and Costa Rica.

A more modest proposal would be to return to a concert of great powers, a loose, informal, arrangement for cooperation. It would operate in much the same way as the nineteenth-century concert of Europe did; making the assumption that while each great power has its own distinct interests, they all agree that a large-scale war should be prevented. In each region, the relevant great power would undertake to provide "public goods" for its neighbors, chiefly security. The benefits are obvious—peace and the conditions for political and economic progress—and, additionally for the great power, international prestige. The system is likely to work better than it did in the nineteenth century because, unlike then, the great powers today are governed by fairly responsible regimes. Of the seven—America, Japan, Germany, Russia, China, France, and England—none appears to harbor major territorial grievances; most are liberal, capitalist democracies, and none presents a radically different ideology, which would make it a "revolutionary" state. Such revisionism as exists is limited to demands for clout in global economic affairs, international organizations, etc—concerns that can be satisfied more easily and peaceably than, say, the claim on Alsace-Lorraine.[3]

In practical terms, for this concert to work, Japan and Germany must be integrated into the ranks of the great powers, even if that means eventually encouraging them to take on military responsibilities. If the concert is to work through the United Nations, as it should, those two states must become permanent members of the Security Council with veto powers. It also requires a frank recognition that, unlike under a system of collective security, there will not be a universal commitment to respond to *every* act of aggression, regardless of cost or location. Those conflicts that threaten to spill over into general conflagrations will require concerted responses. Other flare-ups may be regional in nature giving only one or two of them the interests and incentives to get involved. Regional balancing and discrimination will take the place of the global deterrence of the Cold War.

Concerts of power have often been criticized for their ad hoc nature. They are, of course, only as good as their members, but in the absence of a world government, that will be true of any system of peace-making. It is argued that concerts are too flexible, tolerating minor conflicts to minimize the possibility of a major one. They are seen to represent an old idea that seeks not to eradicate war, but merely to keep it in temporary abeyance, a "second best" solution compared to more ambitious schemes that hold out the prospect of a permanent end to international violence. This is true. The realist statesman assumes that there is no final solution to the problem of war. He tries instead to avoid wars between great powers; to pursue his nation's interests; and to mediate change in world politics using diplomacy and, if need be, force. Conflict, in his view, will persist in international life whatever scheme one concocts. Better an admittedly sloppy, "second-best" arrangement that works most of the time, than an intricate mechanism, beautiful in abstraction, that collapses under the stress of international life.

Morality and Foreign Policy

THE GREAT Italian statesman Count Cavour is reported to have said to a friend, "If we were to do for ourselves what we are doing for Italy, we should

[3]China is clearly the odd man out, though in the international arena its behavior has been cautious. Because of a combination of uncertainty over its future, and the confluence of fast-growing nations, disparate regime types, border problems, and historical animosities, East Asia is likely to be the most unstable region in the world over the next fifteen years.

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be great rogues." Many of the critics of realism have judged Cavour and his ilk to be rogues anyway, the most popular criticism of realism being that it is immoral or at best amoral. Its advocates supposedly reject the conjoining of politics and morality, and preach instead a gospel of naked self-interest, brute force, and national advantage. Like the Athenians in Thucydides' Melian dialogue, realists are said to embrace unabashedly the belief that might makes right: "the strong do what they can and the weak do what they must." This critique rings loudest in America, a country defined by its liberal roots, and uneasy with what is often portrayed as a cynical European art. (Critics of realism prefer the German term *realpolitik* to make that point.) It remains for most Americans *the* problem with—the cause for rejecting—realism. This is a caricature of serious realism. Far from being philosophic skeptics, realists like Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans Morgenthau have devoted years of their lives and hundreds of pages of text in order to establish moral imperatives in the international arena. It is no accident that today's most prominent realist statesman, Henry Kissinger, and its most prominent realist scholar, Kenneth Waltz, have both written serious works on Emmanuel Kant. No realist thinker believes that morality is bunk or that politics and morality are incompatible.

From Thucydides on, however, realists have recognized that the domestic sphere is so different from the international one that standards of morality devised for the former cannot be applied easily to the latter. Domestic morality rests on an ordered polity and an accepted social framework. By contrast, "international relations," in Stanley Hoffmann's words, "is a competition of groups with no consensus among them, and no power above them." It is a realm with no uniform social, political, or moral system; comprised of groups with widely different values and philosophical traditions, and with great inequalities of status and power. In *Duties Beyond Borders*, Hoffmann's eloquent exhortation for greater moral sensibility in foreign policy, he concedes that because of these differences, "moral opportunities for the statesman in world affairs are quite limited." A moral statesman operating in a realist world must hence keep in mind three caveats—chaos, competition, and caution.

Chaos. The moral responsibilities of international life are different from those of domestic life. In an anarchic world, order it is the essential precondition for other ideals to flourish. This concern with the consequences of chaos underlies Henry Kissinger's approving use of Goethe: "If I had to choose between justice and disorder on the one hand, and injustice and order on the other, I would always choose the latter." Though the quotation is a cruel overstatement, those who scorn entirely its hierarchy of values would be well advised to ask themselves whether they would prefer to live in Yugoslavia under Tito or in Yugoslavia today; in Somalia under a tin-pot dictator or in Somalia today. It is easy to celebrate, from the safety of suburban America, every breakdown of unsavory authority in the belief that it will usher in a new birth of freedom. Often, however, it brings chaos, death, and destruction—not the best breeding grounds for liberty.

Competition. States must rely upon their own devices for their security. This creates constraints on moral action that do not exist in a civil society with a governmental authority. Were human beings forced to live in a world without laws or governments, we would expect different standards of behavior of them than we do now. Self-defense, even within an ordered polity, justifies otherwise illegal actions. In fact, states routinely behave in ways that, in other contexts, would be considered rank immorality. They spy, they betray trusts, they cheat, and they consciously plan to do great violence to one another. Cavour was not being cynical; he was making a careful distinction between what he might legitimately do for himself on the one hand, and for Italy on the other. The competitive

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nature of international life ensures that if one country *alone* acts out of moral rather than strategic concerns, it will encourage others to seek advantage.

Caution. Misperceptions and unintended consequences are a constant feature of the uncertain global milieu, and statesmen are forced to act with greater caution and modesty than they would in domestic affairs. Max Weber explained the difference between the "ethic of intentions" and the "ethic of responsibility." The ethic of intentions does not ask about the consequences of its actions; it draws its sanction and its morality from the purity of the statesman's intentions. The ethic of responsibility, however, acknowledges that the statesman must "give an account of the foreseeable results of his action." It recognizes that in the international realm the road to hell is frequently paved with good intentions. But the statesman will, and should, be held responsible for the consequences of his actions.

This political prudence also suggests a certain kind of moral humility. It is all too easy to brand your opponent immoral when discussing complex issues of international responsibility. Take, again, the debate over American policy in what was Yugoslavia. Morality could not have been the deciding factor for the proponents of American intervention. Yugoslavia is no worse in moral terms than most of the ethnic wars that are taking place, and have taken place, in Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia over the last fifteen years. In terms of numbers of deaths, brutality, and the conscious nature of the violence, the Yugoslavian tragedy is on the low end of a sad scale. Thus the interventionists must have decided that *this* tragedy alone merited a response for other reasons; fears of a wider war or political instability in Europe, a desire for strict collective security, or even empathy for the suffering of white Europeans. These criteria may or may not be valid; in any event, they are not moral ones. Having selected Yugoslavia for largely nonmoral reasons, however, these debaters have had no compunction about using *exclusively* moral pronouncements to shame their opponents. Kant denounced this kind of "political moralism"—the manipulative use of morality for political ends.

Morality has an important place in foreign policy. International constraints are rarely so tight that national survival is a state's only concern. In fact, most great powers have ample room for maneuver. As important, any politics that is devoid of purposive action degenerates into sterile selfishness. America's foreign policy in particular, is properly concerned with ideals and principles, and the world is a better place because of the spread of Anglo-American values. But the conditions for a steady global movement towards capitalism and democracy are better served by quiet purpose than sensational emotionalism. The changes wrought by foreign economic, social, and political ties in a closed society are often more lasting than any superficial concessions gained by hectoring its government. Incremental progress, while not dramatic, is often the most enduring.

During the Cold War diplomacy was war by other means. But this victory of coercive diplomacy took forty-five years, nine American administrations, a world-wide alliance, and at least five trillion dollars. Today, without a strategic or ideological threat that warrants a new cold war, American diplomacy should return to its traditional tasks; securing American power and interests, and strengthening the conditions for economic and political development across the world. In that order. □

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Realism and the New Consensus

Robert W. Tucker

POLITICAL REALISM has seldom found much favor in American thinking on foreign policy. Historians may remind us that the Founding Fathers thought and acted in terms of interest and power, that it was this country's first president who cautioned that, "No nation is to be trusted farther than it is bound by its interests"—a statement that presumably applied to the new American nation as much as to others—and that Washington's Farewell Address, so long the nation's sacred text on foreign policy, was cast in classic realist terms.

Yet the realism that undoubtedly characterized so much of early American thinking about foreign policy was not unalloyed. There was from the outset another outlook that vied with realism, that contended the American nation stood for something new under the sun, and that saw our destiny as a nation to lead the world from an old and discredited international system to a new order of things. The principles and policies of republican government were considered to be the very antithesis of the principles and policies that marked the monarchies of Europe.

The logic of reason of state was the logic of monarchies, not of republics. It was the logic of those who found in war the principal outlet for their passions and energies, and who made the fundamental rule of governments the principle of extending their territories. "Why are not republics plunged into war," Thomas Paine had asked, "but because the nature of their government does not admit of an interest distinct from that of the nation?" Paine's answer might just as well have been given by Thomas Jefferson and by the party of Jefferson, the Republicans.

The view that republics were naturally peaceful, monarchies naturally aggressive, was rejected by Jefferson's great adversary, Alexander Hamilton. That the "genius of republics is pacific" seemed no more plausible to Hamilton than the equation of peace with commerce. "The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable," he argued in *The Federalist*, and they operated independently of forms of government. War was to Hamilton an inescapable fact of political life. It was to be avoided not through the absence of preparedness but through the moderation of diplomatic ambition. In this respect as well, Hamilton was at odds with Jefferson, whose diplomacy entertained grand objectives while shrinking from the means required for realizing those objectives.

It is often said that the nation's views on foreign policy are above all an amalgam of the views of Jefferson and Hamilton. But this gives to Hamilton a greater influence than the historical record warrants. Particularly in this century, it is Jefferson—or rather Jefferson's principal successor, Woodrow Wilson—who has dominated our thinking

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about foreign policy. Wilson articulated, as no other president has done in this century, the nation's ideals and aspirations. Wilson is the great expositor of America's distinctive reason of state, the expansion of freedom, just as he is the fount of the reformist impulse that has marked American diplomacy. It is true that America's post-World War II foreign policy embraced Hamiltonian means, the means of the old diplomacy. The essential feature of the policy of containment was the organization of power to counter power. In the pursuit of a favorable and stable balance of power, an alliance system was created and sustained over a period of four decades. The principal means employed in waging the Cold War can scarcely be seen as a vindication of either Jefferson or Wilson.

If, however, we consider the ends for which the great contest with the Soviet Union was ostensibly waged, the paramount influence of Wilson is clear. The ends held out by the Truman Doctrine—the prospect of a world in which free peoples might work out their own destinies in their own way, of a world that would make possible the lasting freedom and independence of all nations—were vintage Wilson. The Truman Doctrine reflected Wilson's belief that only a democratic world would be a truly peaceful world, just as it reflected Wilson's belief that a peaceful world could only be achieved and maintained through America's leadership.

The world that has emerged after the Cold War appears to many a striking vindication of Wilson's vision. The promise of a new international order—an order in which the principles of the consent of the governed, equality of right, and freedom from aggression are joined with the idea of America's leadership—has never seemed brighter. America's leadership, it is maintained, will no longer be expressed through a balance of power but through a community of power (the United Nations) whose working will result from this nation's hegemonic position in a progressively capitalist and democratic world that is no longer dominated by the prospect of war between the great powers.

It is around this vision of a new order that a foreign policy consensus is now forming. That this consensus is unreceptive to the outlook and counsel of political realism is not surprising. Experience indicates that realism is likely to be given a serious hearing in times of adversity, not of good fortune; that its persuasiveness is the result of harsh necessity, not of benign freedom. The great spokesmen of realism—from Thucydides to Max Weber—have written against the background of conflicts and disaster. In our own history, the realism of the Founding Fathers was forged in a hostile and unforgiving world. More recently, the experience of the Second World War and of the early years of the Cold War gave to realism a currency and standing that it had not enjoyed for some time.

The circumstances of the passing of the Cold War, however, are not such as to evoke a realist outlook. The task of maintaining a balance of power no longer forms the overriding imperative of American policy. Without a great power adversary, the United States is released from the necessity that was for so long the principal, if not the sole determinant of its foreign policy. For the foreseeable future, at any rate, this nation has no major military competitor; for all intents and purposes, it is freed from the requirements of the balance. At the same time, it is more than ever before the dominant military power in the world. In the reach and effectiveness of its military forces, America compares favorably with some of the greatest empires known to history. If its military power nevertheless has limits, those limits reflect domestic political constraints more than those imposed by a resistant world.

IT IS IN—and because of—these circumstances that a new foreign policy consensus is forming today, a consensus that in time may match the vaunted Cold War consensus of a generation ago. The consensus that fell apart over Vietnam was one of

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ends and means. Critics eventually attacked both. America had become, the argument ran, not simply the world's policeman but a reactionary policeman. From a progressive and liberating force it had become a repressive and counter-revolutionary power. The identification of American power with reaction persisted well into the 1980s. But the collapse of the Soviet Union and its socialist satellites, and the avidity with which the developing world has embraced liberal-capitalist principles and institutions, have dealt a fatal blow to this criticism of yesterday. The skepticism with which the purposes of American policy were once viewed by the liberal left has all but disappeared. In its place, we have a Democratic president-elect who has urged that America, "lead a global alliance for democracy as united and steadfast as the global alliance that defeated communism."

More significant still is the emergence of a consensus over means. The great division in foreign policy since Vietnam reflected more a disagreement over the means of policy than over ends. It was the issue of force, of the interests for which and the conditions in which military power should be employed, that formed the nerve root of controversy. The major fault line of the foreign policy debates of a generation, that issue separated an interventionist Republican Party from a non-interventionist Democratic Party. The Gulf War, in all likelihood, marked its last appearance. That conflict promises to be to the divisions of the past generation what the war in Vietnam was to the early Cold War consensus. Long-standing democratic opponents of intervention learned a lesson that has since led to a striking shift in attitude toward force and its uses. The causes of this shift, domestic political expediency apart, are apparent. It was in large measure due to an appreciation that with the Soviet Union's disappearance from the international scene, intervention no longer carried the risks and costs it once did. The Gulf War appeared to provide a persuasive demonstration of this lesson. But it was also seen to demonstrate that given sufficient technological superiority in arms, intervention might be undertaken quickly and almost painlessly. And it indicated that in a world no longer driven by superpower conflict, intervention under the leadership of the remaining superpower could be endowed with the kind of international legitimacy seldom enjoyed in the past.

Clearly, these are not the circumstances in which realism might be expected to flourish and there are a few signs that a new foreign policy consensus arising from them will be so informed. In the prevailing contemporary temper, realism cannot but seem curiously irrelevant. Realism is above all a profoundly conservative outlook, a classically conservative outlook. Its temper is skeptical both of human nature and of the possibilities of political action. Its emphasis is on the limitations attending the conduct of statecraft. Its principal prescription is prudence.

In almost any period, these elements of a realist outlook have formed at best an uneasy fit with American views on foreign policy. If there seems little fit at all today it is because the extraordinary success and good fortune that in recent years have attended our encounter with the world have not surprisingly encouraged traits long resistant to the insights of realism. A reformist tradition in foreign policy, more exuberant today than it has been in many years, can have little use for a view that is as skeptical as realism over the prospects for anything resembling fundamental change in the international system. A nation so deeply committed to the belief that it is a great power unlike other great powers in history, that its power is only exercised on behalf of justice and freedom, must find it difficult to accept the realist admonition that hegemonic states have always called forth the counterbalancing efforts of others and that, sooner or later, these efforts may be expected in the present instance as well. A diplomacy addicted to entertaining grand ends unmatched by adequate means may be expected to give little heed to the realist

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counsel of prudence in circumstances where it does clearly enjoy a vast superiority in military power over all other states. Where power is seen for all practical purposes as being virtually unlimited, what need is there for the discipline of realism?

YET IT IS precisely in these circumstances that realism may be most needed, for it is in these circumstances that the limitations attending all statecraft—even the statecraft of a nation as powerful as this one—will be ignored or simply rejected. The utility of the insights afforded by realism have often been exaggerated. As a general disposition toward politics—above all, international politics—realism deals with the perennial conditions that define the activity of statecraft, not with the specific conditions that confront the statesman. It does not so much tell the political actor what he can do in a concrete situation as what he can not expect to do in almost any situation. Realism warns that successful policy can no more afford to ignore the contingent than it can the invariable. Still, it cannot deduce the specific requirements of a successful policy from necessities that are independent of time and place. This is one reason why realists, although sharing common assumptions about the nature of political reality, have often had marked disagreements over policy.

That realism cannot provide a ready "policy guide" to success for the statesman is a defect only from the perspective of those who impose this unreasonable requirement. A far more serious charge, however, is the failure of realists to live up to the essential commitment of realism, in Machiavelli's words, "to go to the real truth of the matter" when the real truth is far reaching, even transforming, change in the international system. At a time when the international system appears to be undergoing such change, this failure may be critical. An unwillingness today to acknowledge that among liberal democratic states war may well become all but precluded as a means for resolving conflicts of interest or that nuclear weapons may rule out the possibility of major war among states that possess them can only serve to discredit realism. Both propositions may be true; there is increasing evidence to support the conclusion that they are true. Their truth would not invalidate realism, only a version of realism that insists on making the structure of the international system—that is, its decentralized or "anarchic" character—the overriding determinant of war and its persistence. The case for doing so, however, has never gone unchallenged. Today, it appears more questionable than ever.

Nor can realism resolve the great moral dilemmas of statecraft. To be sure, realism prescribes prudence and insists that the political actor concern himself with the likely consequences of his actions. But prudence may otherwise set little limit to self-interest. After all, if Churchill was prudent, so was Stalin. Prudence is compatible with almost any purposes that hold out the solid prospect of success. Realists nevertheless have often contended that realism enjoins reciprocity, and that it does so not only by virtue of its emphasis on prudence but because of its preoccupation with the limits on statecraft. There is surely some merit to these claims. Even so, realism, while mitigating, still does not resolve the moral dilemmas the conduct of foreign policy so often raises.

These considerations no more than make the point, which should be obvious enough, that there are limits to the utility of political realism. But if realism does not explain the whole of international politics and foreign policy it still explains a great deal. Even more, it encourages an outlook toward foreign policy that is sorely needed in a time of triumphalism and unbounded optimism. Whether it will gain the hearing it deserves, though, remains very much in doubt. □

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Europe's New Populism

Anthony Hartley

RECENT EVENTS in Western Europe have shown with some clarity how far those who ride in Mercedes to international gatherings have erred in their view of politics as a rational activity to be neatly programmed by themselves. A revolt against the political class in France and Italy, acute xenophobia in Germany, the destruction of a consensus regarding economic policy in Britain—all these disturbances seem to indicate that the strangely tranquil years when we were all subject to the disciplines of the Cold War are over. Another political era has arrived and, with it, a new and unexpected political style—a style which can be described as 'populism.'

What is populism, and why should its various manifestations destabilize European politics just at the moment when the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire in Eastern Europe signals an end to the danger of a major war?

The word is, of course, a familiar one to anyone who has studied American political history. It evokes memories of figures like "Sockless" Jerry Simpson or "Alfalfa" Bill Murray, of injunctions to Kansas farmers to "raise less corn and more hell." In the 1890s, American populism sprang from a combination of economic pressure on the largely rural population of the West and South with mistrust of Washington politicians and Wall Street bankers who were thought to be too far removed, both geographically and in habits of mind, either to care for, or be affected by, the plight of dirt farmers.

American populism, therefore, derived from the impact of economic hardship on those who, unable to understand what had hit them, concluded that "they," the men of power and money, were not only indifferent to what was happening, but were actively conspiring against the well-being of the poor and powerless. Bewilderment was followed by paranoia, and paranoia by anger. Though the populists failed in the end, many a politico paid the penalty for his failure to understand the needs and inarticulate fears of the voters. It was, as Robert Penn Warren wrote about the election of Huey Long, "hell among the yearlings and the Charge of the Light Brigade and Saturday night in the back room of Casey's saloon rolled into one..." Confusion is a feature of populist politics.

Of course, the confrontation between "them" and "us" is familiar enough in European politics, too. Writing in the 1930s, the French politician and journalist Robert de Jouvenel remarked that "there is more in common between two deputies, one of whom is a revolutionary, than between two revolutionaries, one of whom is a deputy." This sentiment received a theoretical setting from the Italian political philosopher Gaetano Mosca, whose writing brought the concept of

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a "political class" into general use. His definition of it was based on the view that "everything in government which concerns decision-making, the exercise of authority, command and responsibility is always the function of a special class...which is always a tiny minority compared with the ruled mass on which it imposes its will."[1] Mosca, indeed, approved of this state of affairs. The political class was obeyed because of its "innate superiority" and its "coordinated organization."

Looked at from below, however, or as an object of populist suspicion, the political class appears as a group of men who, while performing certain undoubted services to society, are also concerned to develop and maintain their own power. Gradually they build up a special interest which may come to take priority over that of the citizen. Mosca saw access to that class as being gained by certain social qualities: "military valor, wealth, education, birth, merit." Substitute for these quaintly ordered qualifications "membership of the Communist Party bureaucracy," and we encounter Milovan Djilas's "new class," a derivative of Mosca's theory. Add bankers, lawyers, university presidents, and prominent ecclesiastics, and an enlarged "political class" becomes "the establishment," a crude and potentially paranoiac description of the same phenomenon. The composition of such a group and the weighting of the various elements within it will depend on national habits and tradition. In France, the existence of the *énarchie* ensures a considerable role for civil servants and technocrats; in Germany the Bundesbank is an independent power within the political class. Differences of opinion and allegiance exist, patrons and political clienteles proliferate, but, to return to the quotation from Jouvenel, there is an underlying similarity and solidarity.

Now of course the conduct of government or political life by small interlocking groups of people is quite normal. That is to say that Mosca's description is often accurate and not always sinister (were it always sinister, then we should be living in the world of Oliver Stone). It is, after all, government by "those who know" or "those who have learned." But the perception by the citizen of such a function will alter according to the times in which he lives. If those times are difficult and he feels that his interests are being neglected by the political class, he will react with bewilderment and hostility. His view of it will impart a conspiratorial tinge to its actions. If, on the contrary, there is a political leader who, by fireside chat or public oration, can address his anxieties directly, then the mass of society will be brought closer to the political class, and the credibility of the system reinforced.

Failures of the Political Class

IN THE PRESENT condition of Western—let alone Eastern—Europe there are many factors that have converged to produce symptoms of populist revolt. The most interesting of these concerns the workings of the European Community and its impact on democratic government, but there are other factors that should be mentioned.

For some years now, ever since the catastrophe of state socialism became evident, political theorists, from both right and left, have concentrated on what might reasonably be called "populist" ideas. The fashionable phrases of the 1980s have been "participation," "decentralization," "community politics," "empowerment"—all of them slogans of an intellectual movement ostensibly concerned to return power "to the people." Right-wing libertarians and left-wing anarchists can join forces to storm the citadels of a political class described in lurid terms: "the military-industrial complex," "the secret society," "bureaucracy run wild." Jurists

[1]This and other quotations from Mosca's *The Theory of Governments and the Parliamentary System* (Turin, 1884) are taken from Ettore A. Albertoni, *Mosca and the Theory of Elitism* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 21-23.

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emphasize "rights," but ignore the duties whose performance is the condition of rights being more than pie in the sky. The fact that the object of all this is not so much the elimination of a political class as its replacement by an alternative power structure of local activists somehow escapes attention.

Moreover, while being under attack from populist theorists, the political class in the United States and Europe has been none too successful over recent years in wrestling with the economic and social problems of late twentieth-century industrial society. It was the extreme nature of this failure in Eastern Europe which overthrew communist rule. But Western countries too have been afflicted by economic stagnation and growing social problems, culminating in an accumulation of the social wreckage which we have agreed to call "the underclass." Unemployment is only one result of a depression that appears to the man in the street as the consequence of post-industrial society painting itself into a corner. How can the political class explain to an unemployed workman in Britain or France that he is being crucified on a cross of high German interest rates brought about by the economic demands of reunification? In 1929 it was already difficult enough to explain the causes of the slump to those affected by it. Now, with international flows of trade and currency more complex and more rapid, it is almost impossible. The worst frustration of this situation is that the casualties are left with no one to blame. Governments are no longer in control; the only obvious target is the "system" or the "political class," the classic scapegoat of populist rhetoric.

In addition to economic depression, the classes who voted against Maastricht in France's referendum—manual workers and poor farmers—are being exposed to other social disorders caused by an increased flow of immigration into Western Europe. This new *Völkerwanderung*, set in motion by the opening of Eastern European frontiers and a population explosion in the Maghreb and black Africa, is socially disruptive and politically destabilizing. Its consequences can be seen in the xenophobia and violence directed against Romanian gypsies in eastern Germany. It is ironic that matters have been made worse by an idealistic gesture on the part of convinced Europeans, the "Schengen agreement," which threw open the frontiers of continental Europe at the very moment when national control of migrants was most needed. Immigration is the most serious political problem in Europe today; its consequences will be far-reaching and unpleasant.

However, the most striking populist reactions in Europe have been those brought about by the French and Danish referendums on Maastricht. These spasms of revolt against an idea applauded by elites over many years are not accidental. For one of the effects of the European Community's existence has been to move government further away from the citizen, while rendering its decisions still more incomprehensible to those affected by them. What used to be domestic legislation is now decided after prolonged negotiations, in which secrecy of procedure and the hidden motivations of those taking part closely resemble the ways of the old "cabinet diplomacy" applied to foreign affairs. Individual issues are mingled in the famous "Brussels packages" rather than decided on their own merits. Intent on arriving at a consensus, ministers and officials may neglect valid objections or else ignore reality altogether. In any case, the man in the street (or even the journalist) cannot trace the reason for decisions or find out who is to be held responsible for them.

The connection of this situation with populism is clear.Those who make European policies—ministers, commissioners, technocrats, both national and supra-national—are an exact photo-fit of Mosca's political class—even, in some cases, to the extent of holding their positions through heredity. But they have lost even that tenuous connection with grass-roots politics possessed by a national political class. Indeed, when the

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European Community was first founded, this was believed to be an advantage. The Commission, a collection of philosopher-kings, would, it was thought, be able to judge conflicting interests with a lofty objectivity overriding national prejudices and, when required, enact measures which politicians in member-states would have shrunk from taking. The European Community, therefore, came to serve as a whipping-boy for national governments. Of course, it was other things too: in Germany, an outlet for a patriotism which could not be avowed; in Italy, a substitute for a political system despaired of by its citizens. Nevertheless, the impression retained of it by most individuals is one of remote and arbitrary power.

Us vs. Them

THERE ARE many factors encouraging populist politics in Europe today. Economic despair and xenophobia bring violence in their wake. Movements arise which see in that violence the most effective means of political self-expression. In that case, events like those in Rostock become commonplace. Is Western Europe going down that path? None of the irritants mentioned above can be easily removed. The pressure towards instability will continue, and it may be that the least harmful way of giving it an outlet will be a renewed nationalism. That bone can always be flung to the populist dog, however doubtful the consequences. What else, for instance, can be offered to the Russian people than the sense of national mission described by Sergei Stankevich?[2] All countries need totems. Their destruction by the conditions of interdependence or by a corrosive skepticism confuses peoples who require national landmarks by which to navigate.

The present state of Europe is one of disorientation. The political class is rapidly losing authority. Governments lack credibility as their perceived power to cope with the terrors of the year 2000 lessens. The European Community has not yet acquired it. The future of European politics will remain turbulent, until Mosca's political class remembers that it must address the real preoccupations of the governed, and that institutions are not made by summit conferences alone, but accumulate authority through habit and use over a long period.

The commissioners and officials of the European Community also need to meditate this lesson after their narrow squeak in the French referendum. Peoples are not to be hustled out of accustomed ways of behavior by bright-eyed meliorists. Technological change brings enough confusion to the individual European without additional bewilderment being added by seemingly arbitrary and, in any case, unexplained decisions from Brussels. Once disorientation has spread through large sections of a society, it is not easily remedied. The gap between "them" and "us" widens. For "us," goaded by despair at our own helplessness, there remains a recourse to populist revolt and perhaps the catharsis of violence. If the great and the good drop bricks, we can at any rate throw them. □

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[2]See "Russia in Search of Itself," *The National Interest*, Summer 1992, pp. 47-51.

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Russian Orthodoxies

Little Change in Military Thinking

James Sherr

WITH THE dissolution of the Soviet Union, a "Europe without blocs" has ceased to be merely the clarion call of "new thinkers" and of Westerners prepared to "trust Gorbachev." This concept has become the accepted basis of discussion for mainstream, pro-defense governments, as well as for wide bodies of opinion in the former halves of divided Europe. While few would regard "common security" as an accomplished fact, it is widely treated as an emerging reality, threatened less by hostile governments or powerful military establishments than by ethnic strife, economic dislocation, and other pressures from below.

It is thus ironic that the first formal, comprehensive statement of military policy to emerge from the new Russian Army—the draft military doctrine of May 1992—restates orthodoxies long thought abandoned, and does so with remarkable bluntness. The Russian minister of defense, Army General Pavel Grachev, and his associates see the post-Soviet and post-Cold War world as a more, rather than a less, dangerous place. The new doctrine is striking for its disquieting, pre-Gorbachevian combination of defensive intent and aggressive mood. It illustrates the classical Soviet fixation with fighting rather than deterring wars—not *Yugoslav-type civil wars, but the kind fought* against great powers and coalitions in multiple theaters of operations.

The statement leaves one in no doubt that the United States and NATO are, respectively, the state and coalition whose capabilities must set the standard for Russian "defense sufficiency" in the years to come. This worst-case view of Western military capabilities, intentions, and political reality, though delusory, could well redouble calls—in the West as well as in Russia—for NATO's liquidation or, at the least, its subordination to pan-European structures like the CSCE. If our future "security partner" regards even a disarming and hospitable NATO as nothing but the germ of a new Cold War, who can possibly benefit by prolonging its life?

Such a view overlooks several unpalatable truths. First, the Russian military establishment shows little sign of being reconciled to the post-Cold War status quo that Westerners widely celebrate. Second, to a degree scarcely appreciated, the apprehensions of the Russian military stem far less from the survival of what are perceived as "hostile alliances" than from what it sees as elemental and immutable geo-strategic realities. Third, since the establishment of a Russian Defense Ministry on March 16 of this year, the political influence of the army (and its General Staff) has not been on the wane, but on the increase. Fourth, this growth of the military's influence has been

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amply matched by the renewed prominence of other "core" institutions: the security and intelligence services and the military-industrial complex.

Given these developments, three interrelated questions become not only timely, but urgent. How might NATO's future influence the perceptions and conduct of those who make Russia's military policy and command Russia's forces? How might it affect the future character of the Russian state, given the role which military considerations still exert in resource allocation and in foreign policy (including intra-CIS relations)? Finally, how might developments in NATO influence the political-military status quo in the former Soviet Union, the former Warsaw Pact, and Europe as a whole?

The Influence of NATO

ANSWERS TO these questions about NATO's future significance require an understanding of the recent past. NATO played an important, though not always acknowledged, role in the changes that led to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. The combination of NATO's 1979 dual track decision, its adoption of "follow on forces attack," and its exploitation of advanced technologies not only plunged the Soviet General Staff into gloom, but politically strengthened those in the USSR who saw the tension between Soviet military power and Soviet national interests.

It is worth recalling the attributes of NATO that fueled this pessimism. First, there is the American commitment. In Russian eyes, NATO links two formidable power centers, multiplying capabilities and diffusing risks. "Atlanticism," even if no longer dominant, remains a powerful counter in Western Europe to "all-European" security projects promoted by Moscow. Second, NATO possesses a truly multinational structure encompassing major and subordinate commands throughout the treaty area. Thus, in armed conflict, NATO would not only be able to coordinate large-scale multi-theater operations from the North Cape to the Mediterranean. Even more important, the United States and Canada would be transformed into the Alliance's strategic rear, raising the risk that a war against *any* NATO member would become vastly more prolonged and extensive than the war intended. In such an extended war, Russia would be forced to compete with the economic potential of all member states. It is a cardinal axiom of Russian military science that the economically superior opponent is bound to win a prolonged conflict.

Finally, there is NATO's nuclear dimension. Although British and French independent nuclear forces are convincing deterrents against direct threats to their respective national territories, only American theater and strategic forces would present high levels of risk and complexity in any military action against a NATO opponent. While nuclear weapons do not make war "unthinkable" for the Soviet/Russian military establishment, their employment against the homeland would destroy any utility which war might have for them.

The Russians regard these attributes as uniquely impressive in combination. A European defense community which tried to assume NATO's prerogatives would lose at least one of them. It would inevitably forfeit the American dimension and much of the nuclear dimension: inevitably, if not necessarily intentionally, because whatever the wishes of the European Union, North Americans would not consent to assume risks, accept burdens, and undertake commitments on behalf of an organization whose most striking characteristic was that it excluded them from its decision-making and membership.

The Warsaw Pact possessed none of NATO'S impressive attributes. Unlike NATO, it was essentially a Potemkin facade, designed to disguise Soviet military domination of Eastern Europe. Whereas NATO's military structures only acquire operational (i.e. *com-*

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mand) authority in time of war, the military structures of the Warsaw Pact would have disappeared in time of war. Each national military establishment, Polish, Czech, or Hungarian, would simply have been absorbed into the order of battle of the Soviet Armed Forces, under operational control of the Soviet General Staff. It is not the dissolution of the Pact that dissolved Soviet control over the armies of Eastern Europe. That control was destroyed once truly sovereign governments came to power in the states concerned. In contrast, the dissolution of NATO would remove the only mechanisms of military integration which enable British, American, and German military establishments to plan, train, and operate together on a continual basis. In truth, the Warsaw Pact was the political alliance, NATO the military one.

For these reasons, the armies of the former Warsaw Pact still are not proper armies. The ghost of the Pact continues to haunt them. None of them (save Romania's) are trained, deployed, structured, or equipped to mount an integrated, let alone effective, defense of their own national territories, either on their own or in combination. In the absence of a strong NATO, security cooperation of the kind established between Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary in 1991 would do little to discourage Russia should she decide to reassert herself in Europe.

The Inheritors

THE ENDURING strengths of NATO, then, remain impressive in the eyes of today's Russians—most of whom are yesterday's Soviets. The events of August 1991 were not a revolution, but a collapse. This is not because the revolution was "faked," but because it simply is not possible to have a revolution of the classical kind against a system as entrenched, pervasive, and corrosive as that which Lenin, Stalin, and Brezhnev built. To talk about dislodging this system in a month, a year, or even five years is about as realistic as talking about removing a man's vertebrae from his body. In August 1991, the communist system was decapitated, long before that the heart stopped pumping, but to this day, the vertebrae—the structures, institutions, and elites of the old USSR—remain very largely in place.

However impressed we might be by the figure of Boris Yeltsin, the issue today is not Yeltsin or any other personality, but the 750,000 people who really run Russia. Half of these people are unreconstructed and probably unreformable. The other half—for reasons of self-interest as well as national interest—want to change, but for the most part do not know how. So long as these people think and work in traditional ways, even the most radical Russian president will be nothing more than the titular head of his country. And so long as we focus on personalities rather than on elites and institutions, we will fail to see who really holds power and will find our expectations continually disappointed.

In the old Soviet Union, it was clear who held power: the KGB, the Armed Forces, the military-industrial complex, the state bureaucracy, and, penetrating and linking them all, the Communist Party apparatus. As the dust settles, we are finding that, with the exception of the Communist Party apparatus, power is held by the successors to the KGB, the Armed Forces, the military-industrial complex and the state bureaucracy. With the demise of the Communist Party as a mechanism of command and supervision, we are also finding that these institutions have become *more* autonomous than they were before, and in some cases more opaque to outsiders, including the country's political leadership.

To be sure, the power which these institutions now enjoy is almost entirely negative. Their guardians have lost, and will not easily regain, the ability to achieve most of their own positive objectives. What they do pos-

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sess is the ability to maintain themselves in being and to dilute, sabotage, and derail the projects of others. Yeltsin's concessions to the defense industrial lobby in April (and consequent dilution of Gaydar's government with fresh ministerial appointments), and his appointment of Army General Pavel Grachev as Defense Minister on May 18, suggest that he has a shrewd sense of where power actually lies.

Legacies of Empire

IN FIVE areas, the legacies of old elites, old institutions and old habits of mind are proving extremely difficult to root out.

The first and most obvious of these is the multinational structure of the old Soviet Union itself. The Soviet Union was deliberately set up—geographically, demographically, and economically—to be as binding as a straitjacket, creating an inseparable interdependence. By focusing almost exclusively on the *political* attributes of Soviet totalitarianism, Western observers often failed to see that the economic features of the system could keep its subjects enchained even after the system's collapse. In contrast, Soviet and Russian leaders, Boris Yeltsin included, wagered that if "sovereignty" had to be conceded, "interdependence" could be counted upon to preserve a Soviet Union in all but name. Although there was an iron logic to this analysis, it was also a recipe for trouble. The interdependence of the old Soviet Union was essentially wasteful, exploitative, and misaligned: an obstacle, not an asset, to the creation of normal, productive economies and balanced trading relationships. Thanks in no small part to this fact, antipathy to the Soviet empire had become so great that a large proportion of its non-Russian inhabitants, after August 1991, were willing to wreck their own neighborhood in order to be masters in their own house. Realization of this fact no doubt accounts for Yeltsin's injudicious remark shortly before the USSR was formally dissolved: "If Ukraine refuses to participate in the union (sic), we will be on opposite sides of the barricade."[1] Thus, not only military, but also political figures proceed from peculiarly Soviet notions of what "independence" ought to mean.

A second area of concern is the Russian economy. Free markets will not be established by the very people who oppose them. Yet, the Russian government, partly out of confusion and partly out of necessity, is relying upon the old Soviet bureaucracy to dismantle the old command structures. When local bureaucrats obstruct rather than assist, the center responds in a characteristically Soviet way: by strengthening the power of the center. Whereas Gorbachev's Prime Ministers, Ryzhkov and Pavlov, gradually reduced the number of central officials from 70,000 to 36,000, the numbers since August 1991 have climbed (from 800 to 2,000 in the Ministry of Agriculture alone). Where ministries have collapsed, local legislative bodies have rushed in to issue decrees, export licenses, and the registration and authorization documents entitling enterprises to be "in business." Where they have not collapsed, they have often been broken up into gargantuan "concerns," run by the old methods. Managers of many large enterprises report a lack of control over budgets and wage levels, as well as a lack of authority to replace machinery or maintain plants. The result of such practices in post-Soviet conditions is not a return to Soviet-style centralization, but administrative anarchy. In these conditions, "accountability spreads like watery porridge" and the decrees of Yeltsin and Gaydar are little more than conversation pieces.[2]

A distinct, but no less vital issue is that of the defense complex, the scale of which has

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[1]Brest Conference, 8 December; for related comments, see CNN interview 25 December 1991, excerpted in the *New York Times*, 26 December 1991.

[2]Stanislav Shatalin, *Izvestia*, 29 April, 1992.

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no analogue in the West. Yet the most intractable problem with the defense economy is not its scale but its nature: by design, it was a separate and autarkic economy, with its own system of supply, support, and pricing, operating entirely at variance with market principles. Although this complex has historically been responsible for most of the country's quality civilian production, very few of its facilities could survive under market conditions. These enterprises were never efficient, only effective. Their effectiveness was achieved by production and quality control methods so wasteful of labor and materials that they would have bankrupted Detroit in the 1920s. The real price for this "effectiveness" was paid by the country, whose assets were systematically stripped and plundered.

For this reason, a "market economy" which excludes the defense complex is not a market economy. To say "we will free all prices except those in the defense sector" is like saying, "we will tax all incomes except those derived from work." Either the complex is propped up by exemptions and subsidies (in which case, the plunder continues), or the props are removed and the complex collapses, at a social and political cost which probably no Russian government could withstand. Yeltsin's growing concessions to the defense industrial lobby will neither save the complex nor help the country, but they are dictated by the unfavorable balance of political power which he confronts.

The fourth area of difficulty is the KGB. On the internal side, it has largely won its battle to keep its files closed, pretending that the real battle was about "witch hunts" against ordinary citizens, rather than about connections between the KGB and people *in power*. On the external side, the KGB as well as the GRU (military intelligence) are waging a battle to persuade Western opinion that Russia, as the "successor to the USSR," has the same right as any state to an intelligence service—and to an intensity of intelligence activity undiminished since Soviet times.[3]

Here again, choices are being fudged. Either the Russian Federation bases its legitimacy on revolution against the USSR, in which case the KGB becomes the enemy of the Russian government, every bit as much as the Czechoslovak security service (STB) became the enemy of Havel's government in Prague; or it bases its authority on continuity with the USSR in which case it has little right to demand equal treatment as a friend and partner. What reception would Konrad Adenauer have received had the German Federal Republic styled itself the successor to the Third Reich and claimed a corresponding "right" to protect the sources, working methods, and institutional integrity of the Gestapo?

Army and State

IT IS IN the context of the foregoing problems that we must approach the fifth and final area of difficulty, the Russian Army. Like its Soviet predecessor, it remains a very opaque institution. After the coup, most assumed that the outsiders, the pro-Yeltsin military reformers in the USSR Supreme Soviet, would become the new insiders. This did not happen. After the formal demise of the USSR in December, it still has not happened. In February 1992 their tribune, Major Vladimir Lopatin, claimed "virtually the entire Yazov apparatus is preserved"; there is no transparency, no discussion, no reform.[4] That assessment would be equally valid today.

A military defense minister has been appointed to head a military-dominated defense ministry, after nine months of assurances that a civilian ministry would be estab-

[3]e.g. interview with Colonel Yevgeniy Leonidovich Timokhin (head of GRU) in *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star), 29 April, 1992.

[4]*Izvestia*, 14 February 1992; see also his *Komsomolskaya Pravda* interview of 22 October 1991.

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lished. The new minister, Grachev, is most revealing about these developments: "our state has never had a civilian [defense] leader," "strategic plans are only clear to the military," "the army's psychology...is not ready".[5] Additionally, the General Staff will retain the prerogatives over "operational and strategic planning" that civilian "new thinkers" had tried to wrest from them. The new chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Viktor Dubynin, was the negotiator who told the Polish government that the Northern Group of Forces he commanded were "in no hurry to leave" Polish soil. Of four deputy ministers, one, Mironov, only just laid down command of the Northwestern Group of Forces (Baltics) and two others, Kondrat'ev and the much feared Boris Gromov, are, like Grachev and Dubynin, "Afghantsy," whose views are known to be "hard."

As well as all this, there has been a subtle, but unmistakable, shift of policy with regard to the 600,000 Russian servicemen serving outside Russian territory. From July 1, forces deployed in "hot spots" have been operating under new rules of engagement. If attacked, local commanders need no longer seek the center's authorization to respond; they may now order "retaliation" (not merely defense), without clearance from higher authority.[6]

The conventional wisdom—that these forces operate outside the control of central authority—is, like much conventional wisdom, correct only if critical amendments are made to it. In the first place, "central authority" is not a useful term because "the authorities" themselves are divided, not only between military and civilian, but between civilian and civilian. Moreover, while there is probably no centralized, orchestrated strategy on the part of the Russian army in Moldova and the Baltic states at present, there is nonetheless a conspiracy of common instinct and purpose between local commanders and those whom Foreign Minister Kozyrev has recently termed the "war party" in Moscow.

The common purpose, it would seem, is to defeat separatists in a world where NATO, the EC, and the IMF make it impossible to crush them; and to do so by intimidating, disrupting, and exhausting them to the point where they come to Moscow seeking accommodation. In the Baltic states and Moldova scarcely a day goes by without confrontation between the Russian Army/KGB and civil authority. This all but Hobbesian situation makes economic stabilization, let alone coherent policymaking for the long-term, fanciful and strengthens the "Moscow party" within each separatist movement.

The New (Old) Thinking

A FINAL obstacle to progress and reform is the new military doctrine itself and the justifications accompanying it. Its disturbing features require explanation as well as scrutiny. Among them are:

Worst case thinking. The outlandish projections of the General Staff—e.g. that NATO could instantaneously mobilize seventy-one divisions in general war—stem from modeling methodologies unchanged since the 1970s. These models were based upon parochial, Soviet command-economy assumptions about the convertibility of Western economic assets to wartime use. The Marxist-Leninist animus which sustained these rigidities is increasingly being displaced by xenophobic ideologies like the *Evroziistvo* (Eurasian) concept, which postulates, on cultural and crudely geopolitical grounds, the inevitability of struggle between the Eurasian "world island" and the "oceanic powers."

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[5]Interview on Moscow television, 31 May 1992. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Former Soviet Union [*SWB*], 2 June, pg. C2/2.

[6]ITAR-TASS, *SWB*, 3 July 1992, p.C5/1; also, interview with Deputy Defense Minister Col.-Gen. G. Kondrat'ev, 24 June in *SWB*, 26 June 1992, p. C6/1.

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Threat definition. The threats identified by Army General Grachev differ little from those identified by Marshal Grechko in the pre-Gorbachev era: states and coalitions having "a system of bases close to Russia's borders," "the massing of troops and naval groupings adjacent to its borders," the "introduction of foreign troops onto the territory of adjoining states," and the maintenance of rapid mobilization capabilities.[7] In each case the purpose of foreign states is presumed to be Russo-centric as well as aggressive. When (then) first deputy chief of the General Staff, General Lobov, observed after the invasion of Kuwait that the coalition's buildup was a threat to the homeland, he expressed a widespread sentiment.

To these vintage threats, the new doctrine adds two new ones: "the exertion of political and economic pressure and military blackmail against Russia" and "the violation of the rights of Russian citizens *and of people who identify themselves ethnically or culturally with Russia* (emphasis added)." The clear implication is that such threats would be treated as a *casus belli*.[8]

Priorities. The capabilities demanded in support of this doctrine are not only out of tune with NATO's defense reductions, but totally at variance with economic reality. According to Grachev, the mixed but largely professional army of 1.5 million men scheduled to replace today's 2.8 million man conscript force by the year 2000 must dispose of "advanced, high-precision, mobile, long-range weapons" and must "have its fighting level enhanced." The mixing of conscription and contract service reflects an aim discernible since the late 1980s: that of combing the attributes found in armies of the NATO type (versatile, technically skilled, long service NCO's) with those of Warsaw Pact "cadre" forces (a rapid ability to "flesh out" forces in war to five times their peacetime strength).

Planning is under way for an operational-strategic level rapid-deployment force, based beyond the Urals, and capable of conducting multi-theater operations "on any azimuth" of the Russian defense perimeter. Furthermore, the Russian defense perimeter is defined as the Soviet defense perimeter—a definition which appears to leave Ukraine and the Baltic states inside the zone of "defensive" operations. In addition to the Urals force, it is proposed to maintain up to half the forces in each military district in "constant combat readiness." Russia's neighbors are bound to ask "against whom?" NATO is reducing combat readiness, the condition of ex-Warsaw Pact military establishments is parlous (and likely to remain so), and Ukraine, according to the Russian General Staff's assessment, lacks a viable armaments industry as well as the means to conduct large scale, combined-arms operations.

Defensiveness. As far as the army is concerned, the Gulf War once and for all resolved the controversy over "defensive defense." Now, as much as in the Gorbachev era, the General Staff is seeking to reconcile a politically motivated "defensive doctrine" with a multi-variant strategy and an offensive concept of operations. As Grachev has stated "It by no means follows that we should always defend ourselves always and everywhere. In the event of aggression, we have the right to choose the means of combat which we deem most effective in the existing situation."[9]

What kind of operations does Grachev's formula permit, and what does it rule out? Does it mean that, if attacked, Russian forces will at most undertake counter-offensive action at a tactical or operational-tactical scale to restore the *status quo ante*? Or does it mean that, if attacked, Russian forces will launch an all-out operational-strategic

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[7]Speech to conference on "Democratization of Society and Military Security," 1 June, cited in *SWB*, 3 June 1992, pg. C2/2.

[8]"The Fundamentals of Russia's Military Doctrine (Draft), *Voyennaya Mysl'* [Military Thought], Special Edition, May 1992, pp.3-9.

[9]*Krasnaya Zvezda* [Red Star], 2 June 1992.

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counter-offensive to "crush the aggressor" and create a new *status quo*? According to Soviet military science, a victory which merely restores the pre-existing military-political situation is not a victory. Nothing in today's definition of "defensiveness" undermines this view.

In sum, not only in detail but in essence, it is clear that the Russian Army's view of Russian interests differs fundamentally from that of Gaydar's team. What is more, the appointments made, prerogatives conferred, and rules of engagement adopted make it far from certain that Russia's political leadership exercises effective control over its army.

Prognosis

RUSSIA'S CONDITION is one which Lenin would have understood: a condition where the new lacks the strength to negate the old. Because radicals lack the strength, and increasingly the will, to displace old elites, conditions are difficult and worsening, rather than difficult and improving. Thus Yeltsin confronts the worst of both worlds: one where mass support is eroding, while old elites remain disaffected. That disaffection should not be minimized, let alone overlooked. Manpower shortfalls of 74 percent make a mockery of the General Staff's ambitions, and they know it; yet draft evasion, like economic sclerosis, is caused by the crisis of authority in the country. It is this crisis which makes a putsch by the "forces of order" possible.

Possible yes, but far from certain. The "amateur coup" of August 1991 is a monument to the folly of ill-prepared and ill-considered action. As such, it is both a warning and a challenge to future plotters. For three reasons, those who consider action may well conclude that it is ill-advised as well as unnecessary.

First, do potential plotters possess the confidence and cohesion to act? Here, one must distinguish between those who can pressure governments and those who can topple them. How many whose support is essential believe they know what to do once the legal authorities are toppled? Are they willing to suffer the international cost? Do they believe that they can succeed at an acceptable internal cost? To be sure, Bolsheviks were not troubled by cost in 1917, but Bolsheviks were fanatics, motivated by a radiant future. Not only is there no radiant future on offer today, but Russia, unlike post-Wilhelmine Germany, has no "golden age" to restore. The Soviet Union's defeat was not military but moral. Leaders as well as followers are ideologically exhausted. Analogies with Bolshevik Russia and Weimar Germany are probably misconceived.

Second, who can be confident that his subordinates will obey him? The institutions which matter are fragmented and factionalized, rather than centralized and cohesive. Today the question is not "What is your legal authority?" but "Who answers to you in practice and under what conditions?" These core institutions may be unreformable (and in that peculiar sense "strong"), but that does not make them easy to mobilize or move.

Third, and most important, traditionalists may possess less dramatic means of achieving their ends. To date, old elites have been remarkably successful at defending turf and clawing back losses. Vice-President Rutskoi's recent denunciation of "demagogues," and the latest call by Arkadiy Vol'skiy for "coalition" suggests confidence that this process can continue and that the government can be further altered from within. After all, infiltration, penetration, and the oblique approach are tried and tested Leninist methods.

Just as we should not misread the method of attack on Yeltsin's government, we should not misread the source of it. The Yeltsin-Gaydar team is not threatened by reactionaries but by "centrists": by managers who make up Arkadiy Vol'skiy's Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, by bureaucrats, parliamentarians, and power brokers associated with the Civic Union, and by the

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professionals in charge of Russia's army, KGB, and Ministry of Internal Affairs. They are not an angry mob, but a coalition of seasoned, level-headed practitioners. Neither should we have illusions about the balance of forces. Gaydar, in the words of Vol'skiy's deputy, Vladislavlev, is "a soloist without an orchestra." True democrats are minute in number and effectively sidelined; "principled" communists do not hold power and are unlikely to hold it again.

We should not make the mistake of believing that the choices before Russia are either success of the reforms and "stability," or failure and "chaos." If those who constitute the *pays légal* continue to cede ground to those who constitute the *pays réel*, we may end up with failure and stability. That is to say, we may find a Russia more regionalized and fragmented, but otherwise little changed—a Russia largely unreformed and no longer reforming, inhospitable to its own minorities and menacing to newly independent states. In sum, at least in Russia itself, the odds of "a thousand Yugoslavias" may be lower than the odds of a new stagnation. To be sure, there will be hot spots as well as bright spots ahead, but the Russian core of Russia is likely to remain an inert and dispiriting place, where the gulf between those who hold power and those who do not—between *gosudarstvo* (state) and *obshchestvo* (society)—is wide and, to all appearances, unbridgeable. Russians are more resigned to this situation than outsiders suppose, and their deep reserves of cynicism, wit, and tenderness enable them to endure what others would not tolerate.

While having no wish (let alone ability) to revive the Cold War, Russia will be determined to rebuild its army and remain a power on its own vast periphery: that is, in relation to Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and possibly the Gulf and Far East. It will not threaten members of NATO, and as far as the ex-Soviet republics are concerned will probably prefer "active measures" to war. But it is unlikely to become a "security partner" either, let alone a good neighbor.

If the Soviet Union's collapse is unlikely to produce a time of upheaval, it is certain to produce a time of troubles: troubles with little chance of engulfing Europe, but every chance of impinging upon it. Russia's future directly affects the destinies of the ex-Soviet republics, the prospects of the East European states, and, through time, the well-being and tranquillity of Europe as a whole. In these conditions, military disciplines will remain an essential stimulant to military restraint. NATO is the most vital of these disciplines, the only mechanism which enables the alliance to take military measures as an alliance.

In the future, NATO will be constrained to deter Russian misconduct not through the threat of force, but the threat of rearmament. It is unlikely, to be sure, that British or American electorates would countenance war over the independence of Ukraine or the inviolability of Poland's eastern frontier. But there is every prospect that a functioning Alliance would respond to a menacing Russia as it did to a menacing Soviet Union: with rearmament, modernization, and the exploitation of its economic and technological trumps. It was this response which produced "new thinking" about the relationship between Soviet military power and Soviet national interests in the 1980s. Potential western rearmament may have the same effect in stimulating Russian rethinking.

Russia's military elite, deeply impressed by the vitality (and volatility) of Western democracies, will be more impressed by this threat than many Westerners. Yet it is as unprovocative a threat—and as strong an inducement—as can be offered by states who remain interested in their own security and the well-being of their neighbors. The threat will be empty and the inducement absent if NATO loses its autonomy, integrity, and identity in the seductive pursuit of "common security." □

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The Balkan Muslims

Norman Stone

OF OLD YUGOSLAVIA, it was said: six republics, five peoples, four languages, three religions, two alphabets—and one Party. This jumble showed a remarkable history, as if, in the course of volcanic eruptions, pieces of ancient and modern geology became juxtaposed, putting prehistoric fossils together with the vegetation of modern times. The Balkans had once been just next to the center of civilization—the Mediterranean of Egypt, Greece and Rome; the point at which the Islamic Ottoman Empire met the Orthodox Tsarist Empire and the Catholic Austrian Empire. Then the center of civilization moved away, to the northern Atlantic where, with 1492, Modern Times began. The best American analogy is the Caribbean. There, in early modern times, various empires clashed, and various native peoples, each quite different from the other, co-existed—leaving a jumble of Haitis and Panamas and Guatemalas and Puerto Ricos, when the economic tide went out. The Balkans, Yugoslavia especially, have that character.

But there is far more to the Balkans than an endless string of historical curiosities. There is the ever-present danger that the historical relics will spring to life—the greatest relic being, not communism (the most recent ruin) but a clash with Islam. The hundreds of thousands of people who have fled from their homes in former Yugoslavia; the two million people who may starve to death this winter; the likely next victims of the whole crisis, living in the southern parts of the old Yugoslavia—in all cases the main sufferers are Muslim.

Overlaid on this ancient conflict is the memory of a more recent war. The First World War, a Russo-German clash over who should be boss in Central Europe, had an essential preliminary in three related events, between 1911 and 1913: the Italian invasion of Libya; the Franco-German dispute over Morocco; and the Second Balkan War. All of these had to do with the future, not of Central Europe, but of the vast Ottoman Empire. Its decaying provinces, some of them only nominally under the Sultan in Istanbul, stretched between the Adriatic, the Moroccan Atlantic coast, and the Persian Gulf. Many of them, especially after the discovery of oil, offered rich pickings to adventurist states.

Until the early years of the twentieth century, the European Powers, well-aware that they could quarrel very deeply as to who took what, agreed to put many of these questions "on ice." There was international supervision of the finances of the Ottoman Empire, and a force of international policemen helped to keep order in rebellious provinces. But by 1911, greed in the West met advanced decay in the East. In September 1911, the Italians invaded Libya,

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turning it into a colony. The Libyan war caused German feet to tap: why not assert Germany's rights over Morocco? There followed a clash between France and Germany, and in 1912 the British stood by France. That prelude was important, because it destroyed the trust between London and Berlin: for want of which, these things turned into a world war.

The Balkan nations, seeing that the Powers were no longer united in keeping Turkey "on ice," and sensing that Turkey was falling apart, attacked it, and dispelled the ragged, corruptly led Ottoman troops in a few months of fighting. They took most of what was left of Ottoman territory in Europe. Then the Greeks, the Serbs and the Romanians fought their recent Bulgarian ally over the spoils. Bulgaria collapsed in short order after this Second Balkan War. The war ended in June 1913, with the Treaty of Bucharest; and this offers the most important prelude to what may now happen, eighty years to the day further on. For the Treaty of Bucharest rounded off a process that had gone on for the better part of a century—the emancipation of Balkan Christian nations—and did so more or less within the boundaries of today. Not only did large Muslim minorities now live within the boundaries of the victorious states, but the treaty created a new state, Albania, which was largely Muslim.

Calling Cards

THE OLD Turkish army made one final appearance in a European War in 1917-18, when its 25th Army Corps joined in the German conquest of Romania. But the Turks left calling cards. The great question of today is whether Turkey, vastly revived since the Second Balkan War, will return to Europe to collect these cards.

For several centuries, the Balkans, under Turkish rule had been known for a greater degree of religious tolerance than appeared in the Christian West or the Orthodox East. The higher Christian clergy had privileges similar to those of Pashas, with the right to four horse-tails on their carriages. Jews were given refuge when they were expelled from once-Arab Spain (Sultan Bayazid wrote to the Pope, early in the sixteenth century, to complain: we understand, he said, why you expelled us, the Muslims; but why the Jews as well? They have not been doing you any harm, and are a good element to have around.) Catholics had a harder time, but even in their case, a special arrangement allowed the Franciscans to keep their monasteries and schools. For much of the time, tolerance prevailed, sometimes no doubt based on nothing more elevated than contempt, but real enough nevertheless.

It *was* true that Muslims occupied the high positions of state. It was also true that they tended to be the land-owners as well, through the peculiarly Ottoman feudal institution, the *timar*. By this, they had the rights to revenues, with military obligations thrown in; the nearest western equivalent (though only remotely) is share-cropping. In the Balkans, the land-holding *Agas* lorded it over the *kmets* who were usually Orthodox Christians, and who had no great interest in modernizing land to which they had no permanent title. Ambitious Christians inevitably converted, often obtaining high posts throughout the Ottoman lands. An Albanian, Mehemet Ali, became ruler of Egypt in the early nineteenth century, and subsequently ancestor to its kings. The elite corps of the Ottoman army, the Janissaries, was recruited from Christian boys, taken away from their parents for military training and conversion. Besides, there were Christian sects who, to escape persecution by the Orthodox, took up an Islamic link. These were the Bogumils—a large sect which had a close relationship with Islam, including the Cordoba Caliphate in Spain.

A plausible theory has it that they stemmed ultimately from the old Arian heresy, which denied the divinity of Christ, whom Arians regarded as the greatest of the Prophets. Since the Koran also placed Christ

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as a prophet, a conversion could be made to Islam—as happened with many inhabitants of Visigothic Spain. The Bogumils went over to Islam when, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Turks occupied the Balkans. The Muslims of Bosnia today are mainly descended from these Bogumils, and are therefore unique, being of European origin and speaking a Slavonic language.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries came a counterattack from the Catholics—the Austrian Empire—and the Orthodox—the Balkan peoples, with Russian patronage. As Ottoman finances ran down, parts of Ottoman sovereignty were leased out. The beneficiaries were grasping Greeks, from the light-house (*phanar*) quarter of Constantinople, who first made their money as middlemen, and then invested it in acquiring a title that enabled them to tax the Sultan's subjects. In the eighteenth century, for instance, the princely thrones of the Romanian lands, Walachia and Moldavia, were generally bought, for a year, by Greek families—Ghika, Soutzo—who occupied the throne room with a number of empty trunks, brought along their relatives, and surrounded themselves with Albanian bodyguards. Then they would tax the locals, putting the proceeds in the trunks. They can be fairly said to have made themselves more unpopular than the older rulers, native or Muslim, and tensions rose. Ironically enough, the descendants of these Phanariot Greeks took a lead against the Turks when the Byronic age of romantic nationalism came about, in the early nineteenth century.

Balkan Christian peoples began to stir—Greeks ("that Greece might yet be free," sighed Byron) in the lead. The Serbs followed, becoming autonomous in 1830, with the Bulgarians and Romanians effectively autonomous a few years later. By 1878 and the Congress of Berlin, there were fully independent Christian principalities and kingdoms, their heads generally hired from the West—Saxe-Coburg for Bulgaria, Wittelsbach-Oldenburg for Greece, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen for Romania—although in Serbia two native dynasties emerged. The new states reacted violently against one-time oppressors. In Serbia, for instance, there was an exercise in "ethnic- cleansing"— dozens of mosques knocked down, and Muslims expelled or forcibly converted. Jews, who had been identified with Ottoman rule, also suffered—so much so that, both in Romania and in Serbia, the Western Powers intervened with protests, again and again, until in 1878 civil equality for Jews was attained. In 1918, with the end of the First World War, Serbia and Greece gained further territory and larger Muslim minorities. Serbia, through the new Yugoslavia (the name in fact came only in 1929), gained Bosnia-Herzegovina, two-fifths of the population of which was Muslim. Greece also expanded, taking in many Muslims.

WHILE OUTCOMES varied, the losers in all of this were generally the European Muslims and ethnic Turks. In Greece, tension with Turkey in the early 1920s produced a war, and an exchange of minorities. Bulgaria, in the last days of communism, saw persecution of Muslims, who were forced to change their names. In communist Yugoslavia, an effort was made to keep down nationality problems by repressing everyone in sight. Bosnia-Herzegovina was therefore quite peaceful for nearly all of the time, and everyone to whom I have talked had especially fond memories of old Sarajevo. But tensions always kept going, even in a secular age. The Muslims, like other persecuted peoples, responded to it all by producing children. In Thrace, the Muslim minority has grown to the point at which emigration to Turkey is encouraged by the Greek government. In Bosnia, the Muslim share of the population, under two-fifths in 1908, is now roughly half (the calculations are not simple, because there has been intermarriage, and some Muslims describe themselves as "Yugoslav").

A further aspect of this concerns the

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Albanians. They had such a high birth rate that they effectively took over a whole province of southern Serbia-Kosovo. They make up 90 percent of the population. Under communism, they were allowed to form an autonomous region. Serbians, by then a minority in Kosovo, complained of discrimination and violence. In the 1980s, they appealed successfully to the Yugoslav government—then increasingly under pressure from nationalist Serbs—and a dictatorial regime was imposed, with a very large military and police presence. Further south, in Macedonia, there is another substantial Albanian minority. The world's fear is that these Muslims will face the same version of the "ethnic cleansing" that has occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina (and in parts of Croatia, to the north).

Hundreds of thousands of defenseless Muslim refugees may join the number who have already fled from Bosnia—250,000 in Germany, at least 600,000 in Croatia. If what happened in Bosnia is repeated in Kosovo, there will be another two million. In theory, they could go to Albania. But Albania is the poorest country in Europe, its economy shattered by isolationist communism of a peculiarly obstinate kind; it survives, for the moment, by dint of Italian aid. Greece, having problems with its own existing Albanian minority, is unlikely to help. All along Greece has been strongly opposed to the breakup of Yugoslavia. This opposition has led Greece to turn a blind eye to the laundering of Serbian money in Greek Cyprus.

Poisonous Clouds

UNDERNEATH ALL of this is the great explosive question—what will the Islamic states do, and especially Turkey? Turkey has its own close relationship with Europe—membership in NATO, application to join the EC—and that would take obvious precedence over Balkan questions. On the other hand, a substantial part of the Turkish population comes from the Balkans. The Bosnian emigration alone, for instance, accounts for 5 percent of Turkey's population; and it is one of those emigrations that does rather well in the host countries, where it accounts for more than its fair share of the elites. Turkish nationalism is also on the rise, because of events to the North, in the old Soviet Union: peoples speaking Turkic, who are Muslim by origin and sometimes in practice, cannot be ignored by Turkey. Turkish agents and traders (with, now, a growing economy to support them) are back in lands that used to know them well—the Caucasus, even the northern shores of the Black Sea and Central Asia.

It would be part of the historical pattern for Turkey now to take up a Balkan cause. In 1913, the Turks lost because its was a ramshackle empire, with its finances in a mess and its outlying provinces falling apart. But until the days of its nineteenth-century degeneracy, Ottoman Turkey represented the richest civilization between the West and China. That meant conscripting lesser fleas to bite little fleas, in the approved Imperial manner. Turkey had good relations with Jews, and mediated between Orthodoxy and Islam, between Western Europe and southern Russia. It mediated, even, in a way, between the Atlantic trade and the Middle East.

Medieval Islam was very grand, taking much of the best from Christianity, and passing it back with a transmogrification. It is a platitude to repeat how much the West owed to Arab mathematics, but sometimes truisms are true. Why this civilization then declined is a mystery. What went wrong is an excellent historical question. David Pryce-Jones, in his *The Hidden Circle*, offers a provocative account of the non-emergence, in the Arab world, of a nationalism that would replace the combination of universalism-plus-clan which he sees at the heart of Islam.

The Turks, today, may have answered that question, since they have a nation-state, plus a clan or two, plus a universal connection. Turkey is an efficient national state, and

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has adapted to modernity in ways that were unthinkable in the days when ragged levies plodded around bootless in the Balkan mud. Turkey could find itself in a ghostly version of the role that it used to play.

True, Turkey's own relationship with Islam is tense, and its response to calls for "Holy War" could hardly be enthusiastic. But it is very unlikely that Turkey can stand by, just waiting upon events on its own borders. Turkey's existing disputes with Greece over Cyprus and minority policies are notorious. If these are complicated by the sight of yet more millions of Turkish or Albanian or Muslim refugees, what happens then? The Turks may very well be pushed by events into picking up the cards that they dropped, way back in 1913, at the Treaty of Bucharest. Everything now depends on Turkey's response—and an interesting time is ahead.

The Balkan crisis, drifting on in poisonous clouds from Croatia to Bosnia to Kosovo and Cyprus, may therefore now affect the Middle East. It would have been agreeable to record that, in all of this, the West had behaved constructively over the Balkans. But these millions of refugees in the world's most sensitive region suggest otherwise. The sight of the good Monsieur Poos, Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, and representative of "Europe", suggesting to the Slovenes that their country was too small to deserve independence, said it all. □

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Reinventing Australia

Paul Kelly

IN DECEMBER 1941, faced with the prospect of the collapse of British power in Asia and invasion by a rampant Japan, Australia's Labor prime minister of the day, John Curtin, made a dramatic declaration:

> Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom...[We] shall exert all our energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy.

A great turning point in Australia's history—and there have not been many—this declaration was to shape the character of the country for the next fifty years.

Three months ago, in September 1992, Paul Keating, another Labor prime minister, made a speech during an official visit to Japan in which he declared that, if forced to make a choice between Japan and the United States concerning its economic destiny, Australia would choose Japan. It would be premature to nominate this statement as another major turning point in Australia's history, as it indicates not a choice made, but the choice that is likely to be made if events go in a certain way. But the statement is symptomatic of the great forces which are rapidly destroying Australia's past and creating its different future.

These currents are both international and domestic. They are symbolized in many ways: growing internal support for Australia to shed the monarchy and become a republic; a recognition that its economic future is inexorably associated with the Asia-Pacific; the fading of Australia's traditional links with Britain, and the downgrading of its more recent strategic and economic association with the United States. Finally, and most important, there is evidence of a deeper cultural change for a nation that has always relied upon imperial benefactors, those its longest serving prime minister, Sir Robert Menzies, loved to call its "great and powerful friends": the recognition that Australia must now take responsibility for its own fate.

For the last half-dozen years Australia has been undergoing a furious economic reassessment that has affected all its major institutions and industries—government, business, unions, and the media. This reappraisal, founded in self-criticism and a will to change traditional practice, has been driven by a sense of crisis. The stereotype offered by business leaders is that without deep-seated reform Australia's fate is to become "the poor white trash," the "Deep South," of Asia.

Paul Kelly is editor-in-chief of *The Australian* newspaper and a leading political analyst. His new book, *The End of Certainty*, on Australia in the 1980s, was published in November 1992.

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In 1986, the then-Treasurer Keating raised the specter of Australia becoming a "banana republic" if it failed to reshape not only its culture of government dependence and commodity-based exports, but its very national identity.

AUSTRALIA HAS often been characterized as "the lucky country," blessed with extraordinary advantages: a traditionally homogeneous nation occupying an entire continent whose surrounding oceans provide a natural defense and whose ancient land has vast mineral riches, spectacular tourist playgrounds and the Dreamtime secrets of the aboriginal inhabitants. But the emerging national reappraisal is that Australia's 18 million people must earn their future luck. As Australia begins to focus on January 1, 2001, its centenary as a nation, the forces driving its transformation are powerful and likely to endure.

First, there is the recognition that Australia's first world living standards are incompatible with its traditional third world export structure. The commodity price slump of the 1980s had alarming consequences for Australia's balance of payments, and it became a statistical fact that raw material exports could no longer sustain the Australian dream of continually expanding prosperity. Second, the transformation of Australia's neighborhood in the Asia-Pacific from a region of security threat to economic challenge has been a bracing cultural shock. Within one generation, the Australian stereotype of Asia has substituted the middle class tourist with money, confidence and education for the communist-inspired jungle fighter and peasant propagandist whom its troops fought in Vietnam.

Most important, despite the demoralizing impact of the early 1990s recession, there has been the emergence of a mature nationalism, one which suggests that Australia is developing both the intellectual confidence and unity of purpose to chart a new national direction in its own right, rather than as an adjunct of either British or American power.

The Historical Legacy

AT ITS INCEPTION as a Federation in 1901, Australia had no Bill of Rights or Declaration of Independence as a focus of national identity. The country was founded not in war, revolution, or national assertion, but by practical men striving for income, justice, employment and security. Much of the Federation idea was inspired by nothing more elevated than the calculation that a nation would be more effective than six colonies in extracting concessions from the imperial overlord, Britain.

It was a union achieved by pragmatic politicians who saw no necessary conflict between being British and being Australian. On the contrary, they sought to make Australia strong by enforcing the bond with Britain. A strong Empire meant a strong Australia; nationalism and Empire loyalism were bedfellows. One of Australia's most famous prime ministers, W.M. ("Billy") Hughes, declared in 1921: "We are a nation by the grace of God and the British Empire." The Royal navy was the guarantor of White Australia in the South Pacific. British finance and trade preferences underwrote Australian growth. Federation created a nation, but it could never create a full sense of national identity and purpose. Very few of today's Australians know the name of any of those politicians who inspired the Federation, testimony to its lack of inspiration as an event.

Australia was, then, a constitutional entity with a spiritual void at its core. It longed for a test of national character that would help fill that void, and the test came after fourteen years when, during World War I, Australian and New Zealand troops—the ANZACS—landed at Gallipoli on April 25, 1915 to prosecute one of the longest and least successful campaigns of the war. Its legacy was more than 7,500 Australian deaths—which became 60,000 for the entire war, out of a population of only 5 million.

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However it served the vital function of a "rite of passage" to national honor and pride. ANZAC Day became the "one day of the year"—the national day. But this left Australians with an unsolved problem, since a military tradition established through fighting in a distant country was too narrow a base to create a genuine national ethos. In being asked to define and sustain a national identity, Gallipoli was asked to do too much. That identity remained lost somewhere between the aspiration to independence and the comfortable dependence upon Britain.

The paradox of Australia's twentieth-century development has been the existence of an exaggerated, sometimes strident, nationalism alongside a chronic dependence upon "great and powerful friends"—first Britain, then the United States. This dependence has been a function of kinship, strategic necessity, and a sense of cultural inferiority. The European settlement in Australia, founded in 1788 on British and Irish stock, was conceived originally as mankind's greatest experiment in penal administration; it was a massive open-air jail whose legacies were to be strong governmental authority, a colonial-secretary mentality, and a convict and working man's spirit of mateship, egalitarianism, and skepticism towards elites. In strategic terms, Australia grew as a loyal constituent of the British Empire upon which it relied for capital, trade preference, and defense. Britain inevitably served as a role model for Australia's own national institutions.

Australia, unlike America, never staged a revolt against British rule. This was despite the influence of a strong Irish Catholic minority, which provided the emotional ballast for the formation of the Labor Party in the 1890s, and from which comes the current prime minister, Paul Keating. Australia needed Britain, and Britain, in turn, never offered serious provocation to revolt. Indeed, Britain had perfected the technique of enlightened colonialism which culminated in the twentieth-century invention of the British Commonwealth, the process by which the colonies of the former Empire combined national independence with loyalty to the British system, through the Crown.

EVENTUALLY history imposed its own adjustments—the Pacific War launched by Japan in 1941 and the fall of the British Fortress at Singapore soon after; the British entry into Europe in 1973. Australia's substitution of the United States for Britain as its principal strategic ally during World War II was originally something of a shotgun marriage dictated by necessity. But it inaugurated a lasting relationship, one which over the next generation flowered to install the United States as Australia's new imperial benefactor, for the purposes of defense, capital, and trade. Astute Australian diplomacy, spearheaded by the new conservative government of Robert Menzies, secured the 1951 ANZUS treaty, Australia's first formal security link with the United States, and one which became part of the worldwide U.S. alliance system during the Cold War era.

The treaty created a new set of benefits and obligations for Australia during a period of great turbulence in the Asia-Pacific region, a period dominated by the consequences of the communist revolution in China, the Sukarno period in Indonesia, the Indochina wars, and the Malayan insurgency. While the advantage of the treaty as an ultimate security guarantee has been debated—given geographical and strategic realities, was that security ever really under threat?—it was certainly a mechanism that gave Australia generous access and some influence in Washington, at a time when these were much-sought-after advantages.

Until the Vietnam War, Australia's attitude towards the United States was remarkably free from the neurosis displayed by many other nations who were beholden to America. (Perhaps it helped that, unlike both European and Third World countries, Australia was never the recipient of American aid.) Australia was genuine in its admission that it had been saved by the U.S. during the

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war, but it was also proud of its own contribution. Whatever reservations the rather timorous and anglicized cultural elites might have had, ordinary Australian men and women liked America and embraced with enthusiasm its popular culture. Many of them readily made the rather superficial judgment that they had more in common with the U.S. and its "down to earth" outlook than with Britain and its class system.

Australia's political elites were pragmatic enough to put self-interest before emotional bonds in their recognition that the United Sates would be more important to Australia than Britain. Such pragmatism was typified by Menzies, who firmly championed the U.S. alliance even while rhapsodizing about the Queen—in terms ("I did but see her passing by and yet I love her till I die") that sometimes mystified or embarrassed his countrymen, who are not given to extravagant displays of emotion.

The final echo of the British lobby in Australia had scarcely faded in the 1960s when history, in turn, began to demolish the foundations of America's own role as benefactor. The milestones are manifest: the U.S. defeat in Vietnam in 1975, the transformation of the U.S. from a creditor to a debtor power during the Reagan era, the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. These events have transformed the world. From the perspective of a remote South Pacific continental power such as Australia, they have had three direct consequences. First, there is an inevitable weakening of strategic bonds between Australia and the United States. The United States, liberated from the discipline imposed by an ideological superpower struggle of global dimensions, now has more freedom to pursue its newly defined national interests and to be selective in its commitments. Second, Australia perceives the U.S. as far weaker in relative economic terms, more preoccupied with its domestic problems, and increasingly unlikely to exercise global leadership in the 1990s, either in strategic or economic terms.

As well, at a time when economic issues are becoming of dominant importance, there are signs of a growing divergence of outlook and philosophy between Australia and the United States. Driven by its likely isolation from any potential trading bloc, Australia views with alarm the weakening support for GATT and its open trading system, and has directed much of its diplomacy during the past decade towards the maintenance and revival of that system through the Uruguay Round of negotiations. Australia's worst fear is that closed trading blocs will be the framework of the future—based upon the European Community and the possibility that the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) will represent an American retreat from the postwar "most-favored-nation" system.

While such forces are disturbing Australia's traditional outlook and associations, there are equally strong forces—notably markets, geography and a new vision of national self-interest—forging new ties.

The Challenge of Asia

THE PATTERN of Australia's economic development is set and unlikely to falter. Australia is being steadily sucked into the dynamo of East Asian economic growth, and this process is only likely to be accentuated during the 1990s. The structure of exports tells the story: in 1991 Northeast and Southeast Asia took just under 60 percent of Australia's exports, compared to only 12 percent each for North America and the European Community. The trend towards Asia will intensify, driven by the momentum of Asian economic growth—the fastest in the world—and a trade complementarity between Australia and the Asian region. This association is propelled by market forces whose intensity and longevity is likely to be immense. It is the genesis of a new competition among Australian political elites over the terms and

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conditions of Australia's involvement in its own region, and the consequences for its traditional values.

The magnitude and significance of the adjustment involved for Australia can be grasped only through an understanding of its national psyche. The most dynamic idea at the time of Federation in 1901 was White Australia. It was the unique basis for the nation and was established in the first substantive law passed by the new Federal Parliament. This was the Immigration Restriction Act which used a dictation test to impose a White Australia regime, the mark of national individuality and status in an Empire composed mainly of colored races, and in a region of the world where Europeans were vastly outnumbered.

White Australia was not just a policy; it was the creed that provided the essence of Australian nationalism and unity. It meant that Australian nationhood was conceived substantially in terms of a hostility towards its geographical location; it was inspired by fear of external domination and internal "contamination" of its workers and its British racial culture by the people of Asia. Australia worried about the poor economic standards of its northern neighbors, especially their cheap labor; but it was also worried about their ability, their numbers, and their potential capacity (represented particularly by Japan) to dominate the region.

White Australia fell victim to decolonization, the demise of Empire and the redefinition of Australia's national interests. At its 1965 national conference, the Labor Party—Australia's oldest and strongest party—abandoned its commitment to White Australia. In March 1966 the policy was abolished formally by the conservative coalition government headed by Harold Holt (a prime minister best known to Americans because of his rather mysterious disappearance while surfing). In 1973 the incoming Whitlam Labor government removed the final vestiges of racial discrimination.

But it was one thing to abolish the White Australia policy and another to find an alternative national idea. That emerged during the 1970s and 1980s under the governments of Malcolm Fraser and Bob Hawke, when Australia began to embrace a new national dynamic of multiculturalism and integration with the Asia-Pacific region. It was under Fraser that Australia supported a major influx of refugees from Indochina which signaled the start of a long-term change in the composition of its immigration program, so that for more than a decade now, about a third of Australia's annual intake has been Asian. (In Australia multiculturalism means official support for different cultures, but does not extend to applying quotas in social policy according to ethnicity.)

This represents the second wave of engineered national change in this century through the mechanism of immigration. The first came in the form of a massive injection of heavily subsidized British, Southern and Eastern European immigrants after World War II. Australians, driven by the "populate or perish" credo, backed efforts by their governments over three decades to bring several million new people to Australia. The success of this program—the remarkably smooth integration of the immigrants, and Australia's willingness to change its own ways to meet the new arrivals—mocked the image of Australian racial intolerance which had previously enjoyed much currency. In relative terms Israel and Australia ran the two most influential nation-building immigration programs in the decades after World War II.

The gradual "asianization" of the intake over the 1980s is a confluence of four factors—refugee policy; the middle classing of Asia with rising aspirations to migrate to America, Canada, or Australia; family reunion policy; and the decline of Europe as a traditional source for immigrants. In the 1980s, Vietnam and the Philippines became respectively the third and fourth largest sources of settlers, while the latter part of the decade saw significant intakes from Hong Kong and Malaysia. There has also been a

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significant lift in the proportion of immigrants from the Middle East.

The suburbs and cities of Australia now present a pattern of cultural and racial diversity. Multiculturalism is an official policy dogma, one that has provoked some resentment but has so far been generally accepted to a degree that confounds long-accepted stereotypes. The upshot is that today 23 percent of the population has been born overseas. The cultural changes have been immense, with immigrants and their descendants playing a notable role in big and small business, the arts, sport, education, fashion, and tourism. Cumulatively these changes are having a profound impact on Australia's identity, its outlook, and character. This in turn provides the key to progress in a long delayed reconciliation between Australia and its geography. The ongoing direction is set, and the absorption of Asian settlers represents the most basic aspect of Australia's response to its Asian challenge. The ultimate issue, however, will be the more difficult reconciliation facing future generations between the gradual asianization of Australia and the maintenance of the dominant Anglo-Saxon, Judeo-Christian value system.

The Economic Challenge

THE STORY of the 1980s in Australia has been the systematic attempt—led by prime ministers Bob Hawke and Paul Keating—to move from a closed to an open economy, to internationalize the Australian economy. This effort represents one of the more fascinating late twentieth-century experiments in reinventing a political and economic tradition.

Australia's political tradition, fashioned in the aftermath of the French Revolution and during much of the Industrial Revolution, is the uncomplicated and familiar one of demanding political rights and economic benefits from the state. It was a tradition facilitated in Australia's case by the absence of a property-owning aristocracy and an entrenched ruling class. The triumph of democracy in late nineteenth-century Australia was as comprehensive as anywhere in the world. It was in Australia that the first Labor government was formed; it was Australia that pioneered political advances in the early twentieth century, causing it to become something of a laboratory for European and American students of social democracy. Australia was a champion of minimum wages, factory acts, adult suffrage, and the secret ballot. When in 1930 one of Australia's great historians, W.H. Hancock, sought to capture Australia's political tradition he wrote: "To the Australian the State means collective power at the service of individualistic 'rights.' Therefore he sees no opposition between his individualism and his reliance on government."

After Federation, the idea on which Australian development was premised was Protection. It was a policy designed to make Australia powerful, secure its prosperity, and assuage its insecurity. For its disciples, Protection was a policy for both war and peace. The assumption was the familiar one that Australia could pay for its way in the world by commodity exports, while using the tariff to establish a powerful industrial base that would deliver employment growth to an expanding population.

Protection did not exist alone. Its influence was reinforced by its alliance with a unique Australian institution—Wage Arbitration, a method of centralized and judicial wage fixation. Arbitration was based on that most distinctive of all Australian ideas, the "fair go" principle. It was a monument to Australian egalitarianism and quest for social order. It was an heroic endeavor, founded on the optimism that man could defy the anarchy of the marketplace and erect a system of just prices to secure his material dignity.

These institutions of Protection and Arbitration were the pillars of the economic politics of the old Australia, as basic in their

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way as the commitment to White Australia. They were bipartisan, embraced by the Labor and Liberal parties, unions, and employers. Legislated in the decade before 1914, they were meant to deny the class war which their architects accurately believed was threatening Europe, and which had in fact nearly erupted in a serious way in Australia during the earlier depression of the 1890s.

Protection and Arbitration were joined by a tradition of government Paternalism. The frontier ethos never assumed the political weight in Australia that it did in the United States. The dry Australian outback was unable to sustain the pattern of land settlement and inland development that enabled America to conquer its tyranny of distance, build a network of inland towns and cities, and provide for a massive population expansion. In America, the spirit of private endeavor triumphed, while in Australia the combination of desert, capital shortage, and occasional despair dictated a dependence on government authority.

The benefit from this institutional legacy of Protection, Arbitration, and state Paternalism has been a remarkable social and political stability. Its cost has been a declining economic performance whose magnitude has only recently been fully and generally recognized.

In the late nineteenth century, Australia's per capita income was the highest in the world. During the nineteenth century, wool made Australia solvent and free, while gold made it populous and democratic. During the twentieth century, however, Australia's GDP growth per head has been the worst of any industrial country, New Zealand apart. World Bank statistics show that from the late nineteenth century to 1980 Australia fell from first place to fourteenth in terms of GDP per head. In a recent analysis, *The Economist* pointed out that, "On recent performance Singapore will overtake Australia within 10 years, followed by Malaysia, Taiwan and South Korea within a generation." The generation after World War II saw the greatest explosion of wealth in human history, driven by the expansion of world trade, but Australia participated as a half-member, not a full member. It was heavily handicapped by its protectionist tradition and its reliance on commodity exports. New Zealand apart, Australia was until recently the most protected industrial economy within the OECD.

While Australia thrived, first as a great agricultural exporter and more recently, during the 1960s, as a great mineral exporter, its people clung to a series of cities around its coastline. Australia invested too much of its wealth into suburban quarter-acre blocks, which provided the basis of a post-World War II, middle-class, home-owning prosperity, but which also diverted scarce savings from an urgently needed industrial modernization. In one sense the 1960s mining boom, established on the nexus of Australia's resources and Japan's industrial miracle, only delayed the necessary adjustment by providing the "lucky country" with another surge of national income.

The 1980s finally saw a recognition of the central national challenge: that Australia's first world living standards are incompatible with its third world export structure. Australia's export revenue was dependent upon rural and mining products, at a time when commodity prices were declining relative to more sophisticated manufactured, technological, and service exports. The solution for Australia was twofold—a restructuring of its economy, and, even more fundamental, a change in its enterprise culture to improve productivity.

The last decade has witnessed the beginning of a campaign to reinvent the Australian political tradition, driven by an economic crisis made evident by a severe balance of payments deficit and a net foreign debt which by 1992 had reached $150 billion, requiring the equivalent of 15 percent of export revenue to service. The process of reinvention began in 1983 with the float of the Australian dollar, the deregulation of its financial system, and

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the abolition of exchange controls. This exposed Australia to the demands of the international market in an unprecedented way and shattered forever the bedrock idea of the Australian Federation—namely, that Australia could protect and insulate itself from the competitive pressures in overseas markets.

The second historic step was the decision to dismantle the edifice of industry protection. Major decisions taken by Hawke and Keating have established a timetable for industrial protection to be reduced to an average nominal rate of assistance of three percent overall by the year 2000. As should be clear by now, these measures attack not just an economic policy but a national philosophy.

Australia, like other Anglo-Saxon democracies, fell victim in the late 1980s to misjudgments in the conduct of economic policy in a deregulated financial environment and succumbed to its most prolonged recession in sixty years. The recession has imposed hardship, social divisions and a search for national scapegoats. The superficial judgment is that failure was a result of greed, blunders, and excess. Certainly, some of Australia's leading entrepreneurs and businessmen—America's Cup hero Alan Bond, former Liberal Party President John Elliott—reached for the stars only to have their businesses and their reputations burnt by excessive debt and the asset price collapse. The national pessimism in the trough of the recession is profound.

BUT IT OBSCURES the real message. Beneath the short-term failure and the pessimism accompanying it, the trend is towards progress and far-reaching change: the internationalization of the economy, a turning away from government paternalism, a shift towards reliance upon market forces and deregulation to varying degrees, efforts to secure better enterprise productivity and workplace reform, a deeper sense of national self-reliance, a reappraisal of welfare as a need not a right, and an emphasis on individual responsibility as well as individual entitlement. All this, as well as the substantive strengthening of ties to the Asia-Pacific region and an advance towards a genuinely multiracial society.

One obvious social manifestation of change is the decline of the trade union movement, hitherto one of the strongest in the world. Union membership is falling significantly, and the next few years will witness the dismantling of the craft-based trade union system, as well as of centralized wage fixation, and the embrace of a far more flexible approach to industrial relations. Over the past decade, union membership has fallen from more than 55 percent of the workforce to below 45 percent. The Liberal party has declared its intention to dismantle the old system, and the Labor government in office is now moving rapidly towards a new system based on enterprise bargaining.

The middle-classing of Asia offers a unique opportunity for Australia. It has already produced a significant growth in trade and opened up new markets for Australia's education and medical services. It has also made Australia a favorite tourist destination for newly affluent Asians, and tourism is now one of Australia's top industries. These demands in turn are driving domestic aviation deregulation and assisting in the campaign to improve the efficiencies of the vast transport infrastructure. The 1990s will see more Australian-Asian joint ventures, a rise in investment in Australia from the surplus nations of Northeast Asia, and a diversification of Australia's exports into the region.

The coming decade will certainly witness a deepening of the Australia-Japan relationship in both its economic and political dimensions, a process that has been evolving since the pathbreaking 1957 trade agreement between the two nations. Australia, unlike the U.S., still runs a trade surplus with Japan, its largest trade partner, and is developing a broader basis of political and economic col-

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laboration. Lingering sensitivity from the Pacific War and more recent friction arising from Japanese land purchases within Australia are being contained, in the wider interests of this relationship.

Australia's location as a springboard into the regional market and its experience in the region are already influencing the corporate strategies of a number of multinationals. IBM, Du Pont, Kodak, Kellogg, and Kraft are the spearheads in this process, which in turn is an incentive for Australian-owned companies to lift their horizons beyond the domestic market and exploit the opportunities to the north. Ultimately, Australia will only become a competitive economy with a remaking of its political and corporate culture. Over the years Australians have accumulated an impressive international record as individual achievers in sport, literature, science, films, medicine, and music—but rarely as business entrepreneurs. In the new Australia that is now in the process of being invented, that is an omission that will have to be fixed.

A former adviser to the Hawke government and ambassador to China, Professor Ross Garnaut, recently predicted that "Australian industrial transformation can be expected to proceed rapidly over this decade—at a pace that surprises most Australians....I expect the emergence of an internationally oriented Australian economy over the 1990s with strong specialization in a range of services and manufactured exports." Asia's continuing economic success, Garnaut says, is forcing Australia to decide on the place it wants in the emerging western Pacific division of labor—a worthwhile role aspiring to excellence—or mediocrity, a couple of rungs below Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and destined to fall further. The question thus becomes whether the Australian community, shell-shocked from the early 1990s recession and searching for stability, will be sufficiently resilient to stay the course and to absorb the agenda of economic reform which its political leaders seek to impose.

The Political Market

IT IS POLITICS that will determine whether Australia, as it emerges from recession, will maintain its momentum towards fundamental change or will settle for a less strenuous and challenging future . The truth of Australian politics today is that both major parties, Labor and Liberal, have been substantially transformed in the 1980s, with both their leaders accepting the new agenda sketched above. The real division in politics is now not between the parties. It is between the international rationalists and sentimental traditionalists, between those who know the old Australia is finished and those who still try to uphold it. It is a division that runs through both parties.

This is disguised because of the robust and vituperative nature of Australian party politics. Labor, which has governed since 1983, will seek next year to win its fifth successive election, after being narrowly reelected at the last two polls in 1987 and 1990. This election is set to become one of the most intense and bitter in recent times (and the competition in that respect is not negligible). It is a deeply personal contest between two young leaders: the new prime minister, Paul Keating, 48, a political veteran who as treasurer was the driving force behind the economic reforms of the 1980s; and the new Liberal leader, Dr. John Hewson, 45, an academic economist by training, and comparative political novice who became leader of Australia's main conservative party after the 1990 election. Hewson is favored to win the next election on the back of the economic downturn. The backdrop to the election is an unemployment rate that recently topped 11 percent and will still be above 10 percent on polling day, despite the fiscal stimulus contained in Labor's recent August budget.

Both Keating and Hewson are fully aware of the national challenge that faces Australia. They have been leading participants in the passionate debate conducted over the last half-dozen years. While they are

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ferocious opponents, the extent of overlap in both their backgrounds and their prescriptions for Australia is significant. Both hail from Sydney's sprawling working-class and lower middle-class western suburbs, and they are self-made men—intellectually arrogant, economically sophisticated, and politically ruthless.

Keating, a pile driver of a politician, is shaped by the Labor politics which he has practiced since adolescence, by the Catholic church, and by an entrepreneurial, risk-taking instinct. He left school at 15, entered federal parliament at 25, became a minister at 31, and finally achieved his ambition last year when he became prime minister after deposing Bob Hawke in a party room coup.

Hewson is an outsider as far as the old Liberal (i.e. conservative) Party establishment is concerned. He is contemptuous of its outlook, a critic of the performance of the former Liberal Government of Malcolm Fraser, and says that he entered politics to pursue correct policies, not to be popular. An academic with a doctorate in economics, Hewson has experimented with a mixture of careers—a stint at the IMF, economics professor, former Liberal government adviser, merchant banker—before being elected to federal parliament in 1987. Hewson's values reflect his own career path—a faith in individual advancement and belief in the market. He became wealthy in the 1980s after financial deregulation.

Hewson has pledged to introduce a goods and services tax, a lower two step personal tax scale, a deregulation of the labor market, a massive privatization program (including the sale of Telecom, the largest public authority), a change to the charter of the central bank to ensure that monetary policy is conducted with the overriding objective of price stability, and major cuts in government spending. It is an ambitious effort to "redesign" the archetypal Australia—famous for a complacent "she'll be right" outlook—into a lean and creative economic athlete, and to do it in quick time.

Keating, by contrast, is trying to synthesize a new position for the Labor Party—one that maintains support for the market-oriented polices he pioneered as treasurer during the 1980s, but involves also a revival of the role of government, in order to save Australian egalitarianism and create as many jobs as possible before the election. His political opponents see this as political opportunism and a loss of nerve. For his supporters, it represents a wise attempt to temper the pain of radical reform and to combine the best of the old with the new.

The optimal goal for Australian leadership is to internationalize the economy within a framework of social justice and equity, thereby retaining the deepest Australian values. This is what the public expects; it is far from certain that it is achievable. If there has to be a choice, the first priority must be to secure a new path to national prosperity within the Asia-Pacific region, along with the domestic transformation this necessitates. A failure to achieve this will see Australia sink into a deeper national pessimism, redolent of a latter-day Argentina, with huge disparities in wealth and ever-deepening demoralization. This is the alternative if Australia cannot make a successful transition from being a protected European nation in the shadow of the new Asia, to a multiracial, open economy that exploits its educational, technological, and natural assets to the full, in order to reinvent its national destiny. □

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Hawkeye as a Moral Hermaphrodite

From Jean-Jacques Rousseau to "Last of the Mohicans"

Richard Grenier

THIS BRIEF transcultural study will reflect the thinking of six men:

(1) Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Swiss, born 1712, one of the Enlightenment's great *philosophes*, originator among much else of the concept of the "natural man" and of that most natural of men, the Noble Savage.

(2) François René, Viscount of Chateaubriand, French, born 1768, the father of French romanticism. As a young man he had a mystic experience in the untouched "forests of the New World" (actually near Albany, N.Y.), encountering, in addition to trees, natural men unsullied by civilization. When our viscount returned to real life in France, he became one of Napoleon's minister and, later, foreign minister under the Bourbon Restoration, in which capacity he sent a French army to crush a democratic revolt against a reactionary Spanish king, Ferdinand VII.

(3) Louis-Philippe, Duke of Valois, Duke of Chartres, and Duke of Orléans, French, born 1773. His governess was a fervent disciple of Rousseau and so impregnated the young duke with Rousseau's love of the natural man that Louis-Philippe, fleeing the French Revolution and courteously received at Mount Vernon by George Washington, felt the "Father of his Country" worthy of only the most summary visit. He recorded in his diary not the slightest detail of their conversation, and displayed far greater interest in Washington's slaves, whom he apparently felt to be more natural creatures, before departing westward, fascinated above all by the American Indian, whom he found to be most natural of all. On his return to France after the Revolutionary turmoil, Louis-Philippe entered politics and, altering his political thinking to a degree, became France's last king, the so-called *roi bourgeois* (the bourgeois king), best remembered—having ardently sided with the growing merchant class—for the watchword, *Enrichissez-vous*! ("Enrich yourselves!")

(4) James Fenimore Cooper, American, born 1789 to a propertied family, also an admirer of Rousseau's Noble Savage. Cooper was expelled from Yale, served as a midshipman in the U.S. Navy, then took to literature and became America's first major novelist, writing most famously *The Leatherstocking Tales*, the best known of which, *Last of the Mohicans*, has just been brought to the screen for the third time. With no major stars, it held a leading position at American box offices for the entire month of October 1992. Although the hero of *The Leatherstocking Tales* is the American backwoodsman Natty

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Bumpo (also known as "Leatherstocking" and "Hawkeye," this last always preferred by Hollywood), James Fenimore Cooper had a heavy dose of the aristocratic French infatuation with the natural "red man." Rewarded by John Quincy Adams for his literary achievement by appointment as U.S. consul in Lyons, France's second city, Cooper spent some years in Europe, returning to America to find Andrew Jackson president of the United States. Before long, Cooper declared himself a fervent opponent of this new "Jacksonian Democracy," maintaining, in a whole series of polemical essays, the need of the U.S. for a landed, propertied gentry to balance the rabble which seemed to be running the country under Andrew Jackson.

(5) Honoré de Balzac, French, born 1799, author of *La Comédie Humaine*, considered Cooper's Hawkeye a "magnificent moral hermaphrodite," being, Balzac thought, the mixed product of both the Noble Savage and Christian-European cultures. It is the view of the present writer that Balzac was wrong, not realizing that Hawkeye, raised by Indians completely outside the American social system, had very little of Christian Europe about him and was as close to Rousseau's natural man as the genteel thinking of James Fenimore Cooper would allow him to get. And it remained for America's twentieth century entertainment industry, in its melding of incompatible components, to make of Hawkeye a moral hermaphrodite.

(6) Michael Mann, American, born 1943, who, having explored the outer reaches of the human experience in a television series known as "Miami Vice," has now returned to his first love, the cinema, as director and co-screenwriter of the latest film adaptation of *Last of the Mohicans*. From interviews, Mann's most important cultural experience seems to have been seeing as a boy an earlier black-and-white movie version of *Last of the Mohicans*, starring Randolph Scott and Bruce Cabot (who was, ironically, the rakish grandson of a French ambassador to Washington, his real name Jacques Etienne de Bujac).

The first four of the writers mentioned above—Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the two French noblemen, and James Fenimore Cooper—were all children of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. By the time the Noble Savage arrives in the hands of a member of the modern American show-business establishment (and a very opinionated member at that), he has become a rather different sort of savage. For Michael Mann, a king of France and the Viscount of Chateaubriand have been replaced as the most socially eminent explorers of man in his natural state by Randolph Scott, and, as *maître penseur* of this spiritual exploration, Jean-Jacques Rousseau has been replaced by Kevin Costner. In Costner's "Dances With Wolves," it will be remembered, there are no good white men, except for the hero, an officer in the Union Army who defects in the middle of the Civil War to the Sioux. All Costner's Sioux, on the other hand, are peace-loving, benign, and environmentally responsible. Costner's sweeping condemnation of the white man far exceeds anything to be found in even Rousseau, who explains in The *Social Contract* that men (meaning Europeans), if they live in small communities with "direct democracy," may be quite harmless. Warfare between different peoples, however, he considered perfectly normal.

As might be suspected from even this brief summary, infatuation with the Noble Savage—a naked, pure, unspoiled creature from a simpler world, unsullied by such modern social ills as greed, envy, competitiveness, selfishness, or pointless labor—has historically carried with it no necessary sympathy for the common people, particularly the poorest people, of one's own society. At a period when those two great *philosophes*, Voltaire and Rousseau, were both living in Geneva, crossing swords at every opportunity, a terrible earthquake occurred in Lisbon. Voltaire took it as proof that, if there were a God, He did not concern himself much with the affairs of this world—because if He did

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He would not allow earthquakes. Rousseau was more blasé. Examining his feelings and illumined by some sort of inner light, Rousseau definitely believed in a Supreme Being. But, after all, what difference did it make if a few thousand Portuguese were killed in an earthquake? Furthermore, it served those Lisbon people right for living in seven-story buildings, which had collapsed. If they'd only been living naturally in the woods like Noble Savages, nothing would have happened to them at all. In his entire life, of course, Rousseau never met a Noble Savage, nor did he bother to read much of the already copious literature on the Indians of the Americas. He merely proceeded from some inner intuition as to what he thought the natural man should be. For a writer whose thinking on democracy, equality, and freedom has been so hugely influential, and still finds adherents today, Rousseau throughout his entire life displayed a remarkable indifference to human suffering.

Belief in the virtues of man in his natural state, naturally good, uncorrupted by the institutions of modern society, was extremely widespread in the eighteenth century—being an extension of the general repudiation by the *philosophes*, despite their differences, of the Church's doctrine of Original Sin. Man, as anyone could see, was highly imperfect, often a quite nasty piece of work. If he wasn't born that way, somebody must have done it to him. It must be somebody's fault. Rousseau's conclusion was that the fault lay with the institutions of conventional "society"—which social revolutionaries, following in his footsteps, have since felt it their duty to destroy.

Rousseau retained a vague belief in the people as they expressed themselves in what he called the *volonté générale*, but this General Will was not revealed to the world by universal suffrage in representative democracies (which Rousseau called "elective aristocracies," a phrase whose time has perhaps come again). Literally hundreds of books have been written as to just what Rousseau meant by a people's General Will, and who was to determine its true expression. Robespierre, the first of Rousseau's disciples to attain political power and the principal author of the Terror (in which Louis-Philippe's father was guillotined), was certain he knew the French people's General Will and acted accordingly. Hegel felt he learned much from Rousseau, a sentiment shared by many democratic leaders. But Bertrand Russell, for one, felt that by providing a rationale for the mystic identification of a leader with his people, with no need for confirmation by anything so mundane as a ballot box, Rousseau's teaching was at least partly responsible for the totalitarian systems of Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler. In any event, lovers of that splendid innocent, the Noble Savage, and others who act in the name of the natural man, are not necessarily compassionate lovers of all humankind. They may be, or they may not be. The historical record is very mixed, and there are many dark examples.

James Fenimore Cooper, although always ambivalent about these Indians on the frontier (and, unlike a number of Americans of his period, never having lived among them), was nonetheless strongly drawn to the romantic image of America's forest lands and forest peoples handed down to him, as to others, by a whole series of European noblemen, brief visitors to this strange and wonderful New World. Other noblemen who didn't even visit America, but had vivid opinions on Indians, were the Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, revered in the U.S. for his doctrine of the separation of powers in *The Spirit of the Laws* (a work ignored for a century and not inordinately admired in France even to this day), and the Marquis de Condorcet, a great mathematician, powerfully influenced by Rousseau in his political thinking, who died in prison under Robespierre during the Terror.

It must be remembered that the United States was at the time a new, tiny country with little artistic prestige, and that these

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French noblemen (and there were many such), and especially a germinal thinker like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, were considered giants. It should also be recalled that while *Last of the Mohicans* was published in 1826, when the Indians of the Atlantic seaboard were no longer a military threat, the novel's events take place some seventy years earlier, during the French and Indian War (the Seven Years War for the English), when England and France were contending for control of the North American continent, a period already part of the romantic past. It was often remarked by skeptics in the coming years that fanciful notions about Indians (called by Thomas Jefferson "merciless savages") were best sustained when the Indians in question were at some remove in time or place—commonly when the observer was separated from the actual Indian frontier by at least two states.

The Social Ascent of the Natural Man

JAMES FENIMORE Cooper's Indians, obviously, are outside the American class system. But, more interesting, as stressed by Henry Nash Smith in *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth*,[1] daring frontiersmen such as Hawkeye were themselves outside the American class system. While, on the one hand, partaking of the Noble Savage virtues of their friend the Indian, when they came in contact with the conventional American social structure they were assigned such a low social status that they could never aspire to the hand of a young lady of gentle birth. This is made absolutely clear in one of the last volumes of the Leatherstocking series, *The Pathfinder*, when Hawkeye nobly tells the young lady he loves, only a sergeant's daughter but adopted by an officer's family, that he must give her up because if she were to accept him she would be marrying beneath her station. Says Hawkeye humbly: "I am but a poor hunter, and Mabel, I see, is fit to be an officer's lady." And, lonely, bravely, wearing his coonskin cap, but decently respectful of society's gradations, he tramps off alone into the untracked wilderness to hunt deer or whatever with his *longue carabine*. Indeed, in American popular fiction, it took another fifty years after *Last of the Mohicans*, until well into the last quarter of the nineteenth century (when frontiersmen had for all practical purposes disappeared), before the bold woodsman of myth and legend had risen sufficiently in social standing to be considered a permissible match for a novel's heroine. However white, these dashing frontiersmen were far too gamy for polite society. They were romantic, of course, but in the phrasing of a slightly later period, you wouldn't want your daughter to marry one.

That James Fenimore Cooper had transferred Rousseau's thinking about the Noble Savage to his idealized American frontiersman is evident enough from his own description of his most celebrated character. Hawkeye, writes Cooper, is an example

> of what a just minded and pure man might be, while untempted by unruly or ambitious desires, and left to follow the bias of his feelings amid the solitary grandeur and ennobling influences of a sublime nature; (not) led aside by inducements which induce all to do evil amid the incentives of civilization...

Cooper was not the only man of letters to make such a transfer from the Noble Savage to the mythic American frontiersman. No less a figure than Lord Byron, in the middle of the eighth canto of Don Juan, suddenly veers off for seven stanzas to celebrate, of all people, Daniel Boone:

> Of the great names which in our faces stare,
> The General Boon (sic), backwoodsman
> of Kentucky,
> Was happiest among mortals anywhere...
> 'Tis true he shrank from men even of his
> nation;

[1]Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.

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When they built up unto his darling trees.
He moved some hundred miles off for
a station
Where there were fewer houses and more
ease.

Cooper himself called his *Last of the Mohicans*, popular now for well over 160 years, a "romance." He used the word in the sense general in his period, meaning a tale removed from ordinary life, set in an atmosphere of strangeness and adventure. He definitely did not mean it to be a love story, for Hawkeye has no romantic attachment in *Mohicans* to any "gentle one" (Cooper's expression). The story centers around a minor episode of the French and Indian War, the siege of Fort William Henry by the French under Montcalm. Hawkeye, a hardy, noble, frontier scout, in a series of episodes many of whose details were lifted whole from the real-life adventures of none other than Daniel Boone, befriends a young English officer, Major Heywood, who is escorting two young English ladies, daughters of the fort's commander, to the fort.

Hawkeye's faithful companions are two remarkably "good" Indians, brave, loyal, noble, taciturn, the "last" of the Mohican tribe: Uncas and his father. But there are also many "bad" Indians, allies of the French, and one especially bad Indian named Magua, who, adopted by the Mohicans, remains at heart a treacherous Huron. Hawkeye's party is ambushed by an Indian band led by the treasonous Magua and, although Hawkeye and his Mohicans escape, the two young ladies are captured, and must be freed, particularly since the horrid Magua wants to take one of them as his squaw. Hawkeye and his friends steal up silently on Magua's band, attack, and free the two gentle ones.

And the story proceeds in this fashion, with Hawkeye and his good Indians chasing bad Indians, and bad Indians chasing Hawkeye and his good Indians, with, adding a baleful glimmer, the dread possibility that something awful might be done at some point to one of our lovely, young English ladies. Fort William Henry is besieged but surrenders honorably. The French behave themselves in every way as gentlemen, but the Indians under Montcalm's command carry out a terrible massacre. (This is a historic event, Indians slaughtering and scalping some 250 people, including many women and children.) Our two young English ladies escape the massacre unharmed, but are again captured, and Hawkeye must once again free them. This time things don't go so smoothly.

From one end of the book to the other, please note, Hawkeye has no "love interest" whatever. The young ladies don't love him, and he doesn't love them. Perhaps the most daring detail of the entire book is the possession by one of the young English ladies of a hint of "Creole" blood, just the tiniest touch of the tarbrush, which, in an age when women of gentle birth were supposed to be all weak and helpless, is perhaps why she is more bold than her pale half-sister, more independent, and, being of coarser stuff, bears up so well under the strain of capture and even massacre.

Those corpuscles of non-white blood seeking each other out in obedience to the dictates of the novelist might also be why Uncas, a good Mohican, is allowed to fall in love with her. Unfortunately, Magua, our very bad Huron, takes a most determined fancy to this same gentle one and demands her once again as his squaw. When she refuses him, Magua takes it very ill and she is knifed to death, ending the novel's daring hint of semi-miscegenation. Magua kills Uncas, then, defying Hawkeye, dies himself, falling off a cliff. The pallid sister marries Major Heyward. And Hawkeye, with Uncas's father, the "last of the Mohicans," plunges again into the forest primeval, moving ever westward. This is the end of a clumsily written novel, with stilted dialogue and childish characters, but which has maintained its

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popularity for over a century and a half, and, as adapted, seems to be with us still.

By 1936, when *Last of the Mohicans* was brought to the screen for the first time with a screenplay by Philip Dunne (son of Finley Peter Dunne, the famous "Mr. Dooley"), America was of course a very different place. Modern American popular culture was now in the saddle, and Hawkeye, played by one of the film world's most durable leading men, Randolph Scott, gets the girl, to say the least. Hollywood belonged to the common man, class distinctions had been swept away, and the girl (Binnie Barnes), was indeed lucky to get such a glamorous, handsome frontiersman as Randolph Scott. Her drop or two of Creole blood are now gone, of course. Uncas, still has this sad, unrequitable yearning for white women, but he's enamored this time of the pallid sister, who takes pity on him. The vicious Magua (rather well played by Bruce Cabot) has also switched his cravings to the pallid sister (Heather Angel), who, when he moves to take possession of her, throws herself off a cliff. So, in response perhaps to changing taste, the frail sister dies instead of the plucky one, Hawkeye gets the girl, and it's Major Heyward who has to go off by himself, which seems only right because he's an Englishman.

For in addition to the dazzling rise in Hawkeye's social position, and his discreet love affair with Binnie Barnes, another novelty in the 1936 movie—entirely absent in the novel—is a decided strain of Anglophobia. A wholly new subplot is introduced, with American colonials put upon by British authorities, resulting in substantial antagonism between the two parties. As presented in the movie, this seems a tatty pandering to American Know-Nothing populism, but although the film's incidents are fictitious they have some historical grounding, as the role played by the American colonial militia in the French and Indian War is thought to have done much to establish an American national identity. The end of that war preceded the Boston Massacre by only seven years.

The Malibu Movement

WE ARRIVE, thus, in 1992. Michael Mann is the sort of director who lavishes attention on spectacular shots—roaring waterfalls, Indian canoes shooting through white-water rapids, bodies falling off cliffs in magnificent landscapes—without these shots contributing at all to the dramatic coherence of the story. The original novel is a loosely stitched string of adventures, and they remain as loosely stitched in this movie. Interestingly, Mann (quoting Mark Twain's disdainful remarks on Cooper's gifts as a novelist), chooses to follow the plot line of the Randolph Scott movie rather than that of what is, after all, a classic novel. Hawkeye (Daniel Day-Lewis), as in the 1930s movie, still gets the plucky, dark-haired girl (Madeleine Stowe). Her Creole blood is still gone. Her blonde sister (Jodhi May) still considers it a fate worse than death to become the squaw of Magua (now played by an excellent Indian actor named Wes Studi), and still throws herself off a cliff. There is still antagonism between British authorities and American colonial militia. And an American is still worth any ten snotty Englishmen. An interesting novelty is Indian activist Russell Means in the role of Uncas's father, still claimed by the movie to be the "last of the Mohicans," even though there are Mohicans (Mohegans) still alive and well today in Connecticut.

The new film, of course, is in living color. The photography is superb, the costumes excellent, the directing skillful, shot by shot, the acting an immense improvement throughout. And we are still left with a childish adventure story, quite pathetic in comparison with Bruce Beresford's recent "Black Robe"—in my view the most remarkable film, by any serious measure, ever made about the encounter of Europeans and Indians in North America.

Michael Mann has said in interviews that he deliberately spurned James Fenimore Cooper's version of the story, finding his

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inspiration instead in: (1) the Randolph Scott movie, and (2) history. Michael Mann's view of history is that an eighteenth century American settler in the vicinity of the Mohawks (Mohicans?) would quite naturally have considered these Mohawks to be his "rich neighbors," and that, unless stirred up by such transparent villainy as the struggle between European powers for the North American continent, such a settler would have treated these Mohawks with all the deference due to persons of means. Michael Mann cannot have read much history, as why settlers from an advanced European civilization should have considered naked stone-age primitives who knew neither the wheel, metals, nor even the weaving of cloth, as their "rich neighbors" is by no means apparent. It is rather hard to reconcile Mann's passion for the 1930s film with a devotion to "history," as the Randolph Scott movie is obviously far worse history than, with all its faults, the James Fenimore Cooper novel. And it is finally not Cooper, and not Randolph Scott, but Michael Mann who has turned Hawkeye into Balzac's "moral hermaphrodite."

For Americans up until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there were really two quite distinct Wests, which Mann has managed to confuse. There is first the mythic "Wild West," an exhilarating region of adventure, whose inhabitants were fearless roamers of a limitless wilderness and not members of American society at all. As these brave adventurers settled down, became domesticated, and tilled the land, thus crossing the agricultural frontier, they were seen by America's common people as part of the country's great westward movement, the triumph of progress over barbarism. But in the view of many of the more educated, socially elevated Americans—the cultivated Easterners who read books—these same frontier farmers became boring, coarse, gross. They were now members of organized society, indeed, but of a despised social class. Historian Francis Parkman, heir to a great Boston fortune (the same Francis Parkman who so adored the Wild West in his *The Oregon Trail*), visited the shores of Lake George in 1842 following his sophomore year at Harvard and wrote that the region was now occupied by "a race of boors about as uncouth, mean, and stupid as the hogs they seem chiefly to delight in." So if Hawkeye was unacceptable to polite society as being too savage, his tamer descendants—whom Thomas Jefferson believed marked an "advance of civilization"—had admittedly achieved membership in American society, but on its very lowest rung. Hawkeye was a figure of myth. These hog farmers were real people, and Jefferson might have admired them, but James Fenimore Cooper, Francis Parkman, and most of the long list of European aristocrats given earlier, both Byron and the French, did not. In *The Prairie* (1827), Cooper describes a frontier farmer as clad in "the coarsest vestments of a husbandman." The lower part of his face is "coarse, extended, and vacant." The upper part is "low, receding, and mean." Half-man, half-beast, it is not a flattering picture.

In his essay "On Universal Suffrage" in *The American Democrat* (1838), Cooper is distinctly uneasy about the lower elements of the populations of the Eastern towns and villages as well, and speaks of the "peculiar propriety" of excluding persons without property from the governance of these towns. He cites the "undue proportion of dissolute, unsettled, vicious and disorganizing" persons who collect specifically in towns, and is very distressed at leaving "the power to control their governments, under a suffrage that is universal, in the hands of the worst part of the community." The great immigration of "foreigners," and their practice of assembling in large towns, renders universal suffrage in these towns "doubly oppressive," he adds.

> It is a painful and humiliating fact that several of the principal places of this country are virtually under the control of people of this class....Whatever may be said, on general principles, of the necessity of giving to a govern-

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ment the broadest possible base, few will contend that circumstances like these ought not to qualify the regulation in practice....Universal suffrage, in the more extended sense, cannot be received as a naked proposition without reference to fact....The transitory nature of the American population renders universal suffrage less advantageous and more injurious than it would prove to be in a less vacillating condition of society.

There many points where Cooper extends his low opinion of the Western farmer, and of the humble elements in Eastern towns, to almost the entire American population, which he considers "deficient on many points of civilization" and "wanting in most of the high tastes." In his essay "On Civilization," also in *The American Democrat*, he even expresses his disdain for American eating habits. "The Americans," he writes, "are the grossest feeders of any civilized nation known. As a nation their food is heavy, coarse, ill-prepared and indigestible, while it is taken in the least artificial [artful] forms that cookery will allow. The predominance of grease in the American kitchen, coupled with the habits of hasty eating and of constant expectoration...."

And so on. Cooper affirms that such vulgarity is not found among America's "polished and cultivated classes, and feels, regarding the American common people, that "there is not perhaps on the face of the globe the same number of people among whom the good things of the earth are so much abused, or ignorantly wasted, as among the people of the United States." James Fenimore Cooper did not go on for mere pages in this vein. He went on for book after book. His views, moreover, especially among the "polished and cultivated" classes, were widely shared.

The plain fact is that the equalitarian vision of Thomas Jefferson and others of the Founding Fathers did not take hold in the American population at large for generations. The beliefs and habits associated with a stratified society were deep. As Henry Nash Smith writes, "Equalitarianism, especially social and economic equalitarianism, was a recent and perhaps transient notion deriving in large part from French radical thought of the eighteenth century. The ideal of social subordination, of a hierarchy of classes, had the weight of centuries behind it." Cooper was a strong and extremely assertive defender of a stratified society, feeling as he did that a propertied, leisure class was absolutely necessary for the preservation both of democracy, as he defined it, and of culture. His attribution to the mythic Hawkeye of the virtues of Rousseau's Noble Savage was a neat trick, but, once again, it was a "romance."

By contrast, what Michael Mann seems to be telling us portentously—with his compression of 1750s history, 1820s romance, 1930s Hollywood popular culture, and sanctimonious 1990s multiculturalism—is that he is able to fuse the conflicting social attitudes of many centuries into a single moment. I submit that this is the Malibu Moment, Malibuism being a branch of social thought that has to date been insufficiently investigated. And moral hermaphroditism itself has been insufficiently investigated. The moral hermaphrodite for our time, like Michael Mann, does not fuse merely two sexes, or two cultures, but fuses the divergent attitudes of all sexes, all cultures, all historical periods, all civilizations. The moral hermaphrodite, in this instance, is supremely confident that people are equalitarian and lovers of the common man because they have romantic notions about members of strange societies, wild and free denizens of a remote wilderness (or perhaps denizens of America's inner cities, for some observers equally remote). Such a moral hermaphrodite is confident that infatuation with strange peoples by dreamers of this sort means that they have a comparable devotion to the more ordinary common people of their own society. This was a fallacy in James Fenimore Cooper's time, and it is a fallacy today. □

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Sharing the Red Carpet
A Visit to Bonn

Amitai Etzioni

THE IMPECCABLY proper German official is visibly impatient. Holding open the door to the nearest of a fleet of black Mercedes that were waiting, he rushes us in—"Surely we do not want to keep the president waiting." We are leaving Petersberg, the official guest house of the German government in Bonn—a group of eleven Americans invited to Germany as the personal guests of Chancellor Helmut Kohl.[1]

Just before we leave, Professor Werner Weidenfeld, who greets us in the name of the Chancellor, shares with us an anecdote that foretells much that is to come. After World War II the Allied High Commissioner, representing the occupational powers, had his seat in Petersberg. The new German government, headed by Konrad Adenauer had come to call on him. Protocol called for the High Commissioner to stand on the red carpet and for the Germans to stay off it. Adenauer, however, deliberately mounted the carpet; and did so in front of the press. The American High Commissioner acquiesced.

Our first official visit is with the President of Germany, Richard von Weizsäcker, a gray-haired gentleman who looks like a most distinguished professor. A gracious host, he speaks English for his American guests, although his command of it is somewhat less than complete. The President gently teases the U.S. Ambassador to Germany, Robert M. Kimmitt, who together with the new German Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Immo Stabreit, accompanies us during much of the visit. The subject at hand is the "Euro-corps," the German-French agreement to form a joint military force. The United States is concerned because the German troops to be assigned to this force are to be taken from those that are supposed to be available for NATO. The Germans maintain that in the case of war the Euro-corps would coordinate with NATO; the French, more independent, resist this notion. With this in mind, I can follow Weizsäcker's comment to Kimmitt: "I would not worry about Euro-corps," and Kimmitt's quick retort: "We are not worried about *the German side*." It seems to me that if

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[1]The group included three CEOs of giant American corporations (Boeing, Proctor and Gamble, and California Edison Company); three top officials from leading universities (the Presidents of Rice and Boston University and a Vice President of Duke University); the head of the Council on Foreign Relations; the Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard; the head of the Kennedy Center; a member of the Federal Reserve system; and myself (possibly German media reports about my role as the "guru" of the new communitarian movement put me on the invitation list).

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the United States and France both court Germany, and if we insist that they should be less involved with France, we are increasing Germany's leverage over both sides.

During the discussion that follows in Weizsäcker's office, I tell the President that although I am a Jew, born in nearby Cologne and forced to leave Germany at the age of five, I do not believe that one should hold what happened fifty years ago against contemporary Germany; one need not forget history to be able to put it aside and judge Germany by its current actions. Later, a Jewish member of our group takes me aside to express misgivings: the past is too horrible to be set aside. I look at the young German guide assigned to me, whose *parents* were small children when the Nazi regime ended, and I cannot feel any animosity towards him or hold his Germany responsible for the atrocities committed by his grandparents' generation.

The distance from the President's office to the German State Department is short but we find a rather different climate. Soft-spoken is not exactly a term that would apply to the new Foreign Minister, Dr. Klaus Kinkel (he is a young 55 while the President is a full 72). Kinkel chooses to speak German, "for the sake of accuracy." Referring to the situation in Yugoslavia as of September 1992, he indicates that the West is close to having exhausted all peaceful options and that military options, such as bombing the Serbian forces, will have to be seriously considered. Kinkel explains that Germany is seeking to modify its constitution to allow it to send its armed forces outside its borders, in the first instance as part of UN peace-keeping forces. Noting that Germany is being called upon to help pay for United Nations "blue helmet" operations, the Foreign Minister adds, with considerable emotion, that "Germany is tired of paying for the fire brigade, but not being on the ladder."

In a discussion concerning the long-term future of Germany, Dr. Kinkel asserts that Germany should gain a seat on the UN Security Council, should sit at the table with the big powers. He explains that at first Germany was not particularly keen on pushing its way in, but now that "Japan is running around seeking a seat and suggesting that this is not a problem because Germany is not interested, it is time to clarify our position." As he sees it "the UN was set up at the end of World War II by the victorious nations. Since then the reality changed drastically and the time is ripe for the UN to adjust." Kinkel says this would also entail including some Third World powers like Brazil on the Security Council, along with Japan and Germany.

Before I have a chance to figure out whether the difference between the two leading Germans we have met is best interpreted as one of personalities or of generations, we are ushered into Chancellor Kohl's conference room. He marches in surrounded by aides. He is an immense man who visibly has more important things to worry about than dieting. In manner as well as age, we find him, at 62, somewhere in between the somewhat assertive Kinkel and the restrained Weizsäcker. For three hours Kohl answers each of our questions with twenty minutes or so of rambling exposition, adding little to what can be read in the daily press. Next, we are served dinner in his pleasant and rather modest home, called a "bungalow," without any of the highly visible security you see around and inside the White House.

The Chancellor repeatedly stresses the need to sustain close German-American relations. He refers several times to his two pairs of eyes on America, his two sons, one a Harvard graduate and the other a former student at MIT. Kohl never explicitly states that he sees America and Germany as the pillars of the new world order, but he scoffs repeatedly at the other powers, especially Japan and Britain. I will not repeat the cracks he made at their expense, because the Chancellor warned us (though, it seems, half in jest), "I would be in trouble if you repeat what I just said." It is, though, fair to report that he is

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not overwhelmed by Japan's readiness to assume international responsibilities or by the stature of British leadership. About the French, Kohl speaks in what can at best be described as bemusement. At one point he observes rather tartly that the French were still "marching up and down the Champs Elysées, celebrating their victory over Germany, while if anyone visited a museum they would soon discover that actually it was the Americans who won the wars." He adds, "If it were us, we would have long ago stopped such merriment, but one has to live and let live." Perhaps Kohl's comments are best interpreted as light ribbing, the kind that occurs among people who work closely together.

Chancellor Kohl, as one would expect, says he subscribes to the idea of political unification. Still, the statement that Germany will blend into Europe is heard much more often in Britain and France than in Germany itself. On the other hand, at one point a German colleague who is escorting us leans over and says to me quietly, "Germany is best when it is not in isolation; when it is involved with someone who holds it back." (He may have said "down.")

It seems quite evident—as Kinkel's comments about Germany's role suggest, and Kohl's aside helps to confirm—that the pace at which Germany seeks to follow its own course, build up its national strength and pride, and overcome hesitation due to its history (a process that is commonly referred to in the press as "the normalization of Germany"), is likely to outpace European political unification. If anybody is taking bets, I'll wager that ten years from now, Germany will be a full-blown, independent world power, not the Texas or California of a United Europe. As I see it, to ask how one may hold Germany down, which implicitly assumes that it is by nature dangerous, is the wrong question. One cannot restrain Germany's ambitions much longer; moreover, on the face of it German aspirations are not illegitimate. The correct question is: Where is the new Germany headed and how can we encourage its constructive tendencies.

With this question in mind, I listen with particular attention when the Chancellor turns to a subject that many people believe casts light on the nature of the new Germany—the treatment of the asylum-seekers. Kohl explains that Germany is flooded by a huge number of immigrants, legal and otherwise (in the first nine months of 1992, 280,000 refugees entered Germany following about one million immigrants in 1991). By comparison, immigration to the United States—already very high—would have to *triple* to reach the same level proportionally. The influx of refugees and immigrants, coming on top of several millions of "ethnic Germans" returning from Eastern Europe, Kohl elaborates, seriously strains Germany's facilities. They also add to the already existing cultural strains caused by the numerous *Gastarbeiter*, the Turks and other foreign workers. Kohl adds that special problems are caused because asylum-seekers are concentrated in eastern Germany, where unemployment is rampant.

We face similar problems with Haitian refugees, and prevent them from entering the United States. I see nothing evil in Germany's plan to prevent refugees from certain countries, where there is presently no political persecution, from being admitted, housed and subsidized for months on end, until a hearing is held to determine whether they are political or economic refugees. But when German leaders trot these explanations out one after the other, spend only the briefest time expressing concern about the ways young Germans articulate their objections, and treat the rioters relatively gently, one cannot help but be troubled. After debating the asylum issue for over two years, the German government is tightening asylum requirements only now, in direct response to fire bombings. This cannot but send the message that violence is being rewarded. (A colleague later explains that Kohl and his party, the Christian Democratic

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Union (CDU), are careful not to antagonize the fair number of Germans who oppose immigration; otherwise, those Germans might lend their support to right-wing parties that make opposition to immigration one of the their leading issues, thereby undermining the CDU-led coalition government which, as it is, is only narrowly holding on.)[2]

After our meeting with Chancellor Kohl, there is no doubt in my mind that Germany will successfully emerge from the current economic difficulties, successfully complete the reconstruction of eastern Germany, and become a major European power. I am confident that eventually Germany will become a member of the UN Security Council. None of this troubles me in spite of Germany's past.

It is the direction that Germany will cast its power in the future about which I wonder. As the visit to Germany draws to its conclusion, I mull hopefully over an answer Kohl gave to a question I raised during our meeting in Bonn. I had wondered: "Would Germany take the lead in pushing for a foreign policy and a world that is morally ennobling rather than join a world of *realpolitik*; one in which each nation is preoccupied with its own national interest and little else? For instance, would Germany take the lead and reduce the world-wide trade in arms, starting with chemical and nuclear weapons?"

The Chancellor, probably aware that I grew up in Israel (it was clear that he had been carefully briefed about us), began his answer by referring to the Middle East: "We are blamed for the arming of Iraq although at most we were number five or six in the queue." He insists Germany is a "very free country," and "we do not monitor exports." He then noted that Germany had destroyed arms found in the eastern provinces rather than sell them. In fact, he added, Germany has refused to sell arms on several occasions, including a sophisticated tank which the Arabs wanted, and submarines. To me, Kohl's answers hold out some hope that the new Germany may lead in the true sense of the term: that it will not just throw its weight around or exact a new place at the top of world councils, but also offer new directions for a more benign and peaceful world. □

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[2] Kohl's support is about as low as that of Bush on entering the 1992 Republican National Convention, and like Bush he is trying to bring back into the tent those who might otherwise join the German equivalent of the followers of David Duke or those of Pat Buchanan—the *Republikaner* or the *Deutsche Volks-Union*.

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The Intelligentsia Adjust

Jean-Claude Casanova

Le communisme restitue à l'individu sa fertilité.

-André Malraux, 1935

FROM THE 1920s to the 1950s, a large number of France's most celebrated intellectuals were, for at least some of their lives, either Communists (Malraux, Aragon, Eluard, Claude Roy) or fellow-travelers (Breton, Gide, Romain Rolland, Sartre). Even greater numbers of thinkers in the universities, the sciences, publishing, the press, and the arts made Paris the European capital where intellectuals and artists listened most eagerly to the siren song of Moscow—they were as rapturous about Stalin as Diderot was about Catherine the Great.

The reasons for this state of affairs are familiar and the story of these years has to some extent been written. As Raymond Aron once explained: In 1794, 1848, and 1871, the revolutionary, egalitarian, idealist tradition had been defeated; then, to make things worse, social democracy had renounced its principles and rallied to nationalism in 1914. Bolshevism offered a chance for renunciation. Unlike its forerunners, it had won a lasting victory. It had continued to govern. It had partaken in the Allied triumph in 1945 and amassed terrifying might. In their gratitude to communism for having erased their defeat complexes, our intellectuals were willing to praise the police state, force, and terror all the more blithely for never having suffered under them. That was all far away in a part of Europe that effusively welcomed and honored them.

This renunciation of critical thought had a simple ideological recipe to justify it: a pinch of Christianity (the elevation of the downtrodden and the proletariat), an ounce of messianism (the glowing future), a dusting of rationalism (central planning's superiority over the market, the rule of science) and a dash of equality (public ownership of the means of production). The morals of revolution made it possible to disregard two duties—respect for universal truth and loyalty to one's country. The significance of events outweighed the events themselves. The 1917 putsch was labeled "the proletarian revolution"; the forced labor camps were looked on as temporary tools for reorganizing and reeducating the people. The most blatant facts were ignored. None of the French history manuals published from 1930 to 1970 contains a line on the Gulags.

Nothing of this remains today. It is impossible to name a single reputable communist intellectual. The "progressives" in the upper, middle and lower reaches of the intelligentsia have all discarded their illusions and drifted to the moderate left or liberal right. A sardonic or grimly outraged historian has huge piles of books and articles to work on. But the main players are still alive and attempting a last change of costume before making their exit.

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Apart from the few who broke away from communism to form an anti-Red battle group (Annie Kriegel, Alain Besançon, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, François Furet), the era of breast-beating ex-communists leaving the Party to find redemption and expiation in the camp of freedom is over. Without a crusade, there can be no crusaders.

What we have now, after Gorbachev and the fall of communism, are indulgent amnesia, ambiguous regrets, low-noise nostalgia. The retired fellow-travelers and former communists are rewriting their history—or, more precisely, the history of how they interpreted history. They are revamping their past, revisiting their younger selves, rubbing out this line, accentuating that one, and generally equipping themselves with a presentable background.

The technique is familiar and the framework is simple. We can enumerate the new vulgate in seven hard-and-fast propositions:

•The USSR and communism were not all that dangerous (since they have disappeared).

• In any case, leftist intellectuals had foreseen this outcome (since it came to pass).

•They were even instrumental in bringing it about (since the disintegration of communism began at the top).

•The anticommunists overstated their case and were mistaken (since the hated *ideology* blew apart, and the police-state terrorism essential to the *totalitarian regime* was inept, the cornerstone of the edifice, the *Party*, was what engendered its collapse).

•The Cold War was a delusion (since communism was technically inefficient and the Red Army was no better than the Soviet economy).

•The expansion of the Soviet Empire was, in fact, a good thing (since its size was responsible for its decline). Yalta was a Pyrrhic victory for Stalin.

•Fascism is the historical crux of the twentieth century and communism has to be left in shadow. (The accomplices of Fascism are a growing army; its foes, who had always included the leftist intellectuals, are increasingly credited with virtue and prescience.)

Today's world is a fine place, in other words, and it even fulfills these intellectuals' hopes. They always preached equality (democracy has won). Science and technological progress are the forces which drive history (Condorcet lives!). The real evils (nationalism and Fascism) are with us still and gaining strength. The earthly paradise has faded from view (Cuba and China are old hat), but there are millions of victims on whose behalf one can agitate (the Third World).

Are they telling us that they were right all along? No, that would be too much. What they are saying is that they deserve to be excused and were not entirely wrong. They want the lighting changed so that they can blur their life stories, blot out the blood, soften the hard lines, tone down the violence of their words. They want a spotlight trained on a small area of the backcloth of European history, which will harshly illuminate the incorrupt and the corrupt, the good guys and the baddies, the wolves and the lambs.

What if the archives are proving that the anti-communists were right? The Rosenbergs were undoubtedly spies. Kondrat'ev and Andrés Nin were murdered and millions along with them. Everything written by our dead companions (Koestler, Silone, Aron, Souvarine) was true. But who will remember them? Who wants history founded on truth? Are there any victors who have gained from their victory? □

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Uneasy Triumph

Kenneth Minogue

IT ISN'T just generals, and politicians, who fight the last war. Intellectuals do it too. Indeed, in Berlin in October, a distinguished and triumphant group of intellectuals gathered together not merely to fight the last war, but to celebrate it, and enjoy some of the pleasures of triumph. Mel Lasky the king, Conquest the chronicler, Urban the broadcaster, Levin the prophet, Labedz, Kristol, Coleman, Bondy—editors all—were in flowing cups freshly remembering. It was a distinguished lot. And what was clear was that the past has its uncertainties, no less than the future.

Indeed, past and future are the terms by which alone we can understand the present. Consider the simple question: Did the West defeat communism? At the Berlin gathering, we had no doubt of the truth of this proposition, but little understanding of what it actually meant. Several speakers from the East, including Helena Bonner, *blamed* the West for sundry sins, especially of omission. But what is the West?

The West is a set of values, practices, and institutions, and they have proven, so far, to be a great deal more successful than anything that competes with them. Like all things human, it has enemies, and the grand drama of the twentieth century was the sequence of powerful attempts to destroy and supersede it. The Nazis tried it in one way, the communists in another. The stakes of this contest, like those of earlier religious wars, were in the highest degree spiritual, and therefore required that new types of combatants should appear on the scene. It is this change which the Berlin conference represented. The participants were, in one sense, the Jesuits or Saints of the West.

They were the "Cold Warriors," a contemptuous expression adopted as a badge of honor, like "Old Contemptibles" or the "Rats of Tobruk." The scars suffered by these warriors, as Robert Conquest observed, were the cuts of denigration—sneers about *professional* cold warriors and suchlike. "Cold War" is another of those oddities of language generated by this grand drama—a curious mixed metaphor, since what it denoted was neither a war, nor literally cold.

"Cold War" had to refer, then, to something over and above the hostility between the post-1945 victors. Those powers did not fight a war, but violence did explode in such peripheries as Korea and Vietnam, and proxies were certainly violent enough. The real location of the Cold War, however, was in the mind.

For unlike the typical wars of earlier times, modern conflicts depend on loyalty, and it is a loyalty focussed much less on symbols like king and country than on complex bodies of ideas. Such self-consciousness about the values and ideas involved in a way of life is the West's own creation. Ultimately, of course, it emerges from the peculiarity of

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religions of the book. These are religions not of natural communities but of those who have accepted a revelation and the ideas involved in it. In the Christian civilization of the West, any challenge must necessarily take the form of a new revelation, and it is this evident character of Marxism which justified describing it as a kind of religion, in spite of many features which seemed to obscure this character.

COMMUNISM WAS therefore a challenge to the loyalty of Western populations, and especially to the educated. Once it had acquired a territorial base in the Soviet Union, it could call upon the allegiance of those in liberal democracies persuaded of the truth of its ideas. Twentieth-century conflict has thus had to be fought at two levels, one political, the other intellectual.

One remarkable feature of the intellectual conflict was the abstract level at which it had to be fought. Ordinary practical considerations seemed to have very little influence on many educated people. From very early on, for example, it was clear that communist states were murderous and repressive. A stream of refugees from East to West, but never from West to East, made it clear that anyone with a choice actually preferred to live in a free rather than a communist society.

The conclusiveness of this practical judgement was undermined among liberals and socialists in the West partly by a vast apparatus of deceit and disinformation, and partly by communist success in disseminating a form of historicism in which every defect of a communist state might just conceivably be construed as the growing pains of a new order—for historical forces trample down many a flower, as Hegel had observed long before. It is perhaps a paradox that in this, as in much else, the virtue of being reasonable and not jumping to conclusions made many people the gullible victims of trickery.

It is no business of the educated to use ideas as weapons; that is a corruption belonging to people called "intellectuals," an intellectual being more often than not an academic who has been mobilized for war. In war, as Thomas Hobbes noted, force and fraud are the cardinal virtues. In this case, however, truth itself could, without absurdity, be said to be a weapon. As Conquest observed, this was not truth in any very complicated sense: it was merely the putting together of simple facts, as he had himself done, most notably in *The Great Terror*. If Conquest dealt with the tragedy of communism, Paul Hollander, also in attendance in Berlin, was the chronicler of its farce, by virtue of his account in *Political Pilgrims* of gullible Western fellow travellers discovering utopia in gulags.

This version of the Cold War—as an encounter between truth and falsity—is a satisfying inversion of the communist melodrama which pits progressive forces against bourgeois reaction. There is no doubt that within its limits, this version corresponds to reality, but it induces a certain uneasiness among rhetorically acute intellectuals, for whom it is an article of faith that in real conflicts virtue is seldom the monopoly of either side. To combine a clear-cut position with this element of salutary self-doubt is difficult, and many educated people in the West fell victim to the idea of a basic moral equivalence between the two sides in the Cold War.

At the Berlin conference, this uneasiness surfaced in the form of reminders that wars are seldom won with clean hands. Peregrine Worsthorne argued that success in holding the political line of anticommunism had not been achieved entirely by truth and rosewater, but also by the intensification of long-entrenched gut feelings in the population at large. Was it not now time, he maliciously suggested, to enroll Senator Joseph McCarthy on anticommunism's board of honor? Norman Podhoretz and Ed Shils were on hand to argue that the appalling McCarthy had in fact been a dangerous distraction from the real issues.

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This basic question was raised in a different form by Irving Kristol, who thought that the real moral weight in Western societies blocking a collapse into communism had been provided by religion. This was especially true of the United States, which had supplied not only the military power but also the will to resist communism, something which in Europe had been notably less significant. Richard Pipes had earlier made a similar suggestion, attributing the fall of communism to the fact that it defied some of the basic ends of human nature—religious belief, property, and free self-expression. The intellectuals at Berlin were mostly liberal secular humanists who tended to regard religious beliefs as of little significance.

It was in pursing this argument that Kristol articulated a sense of gloom more real among the participants than any sense of triumph. He observed that as recently as the middle of the century, nearly all Americans held the view that an atheist ought not to hold public offices. These days, perhaps half the population still holds that view, and before long America would be just like Europe—uniformly liberal in its prejudices and without the solidity that had given it the strength to win the Cold War.

Speaker after speaker found no trouble in discerning present and future threats to freedom: the temptations of utopianism (Joachim Fest), Western self-hatred (Anthony Hartley), a venomous hatred of the West in the rest of the world (Ferdinand Mount), and much else. Reflecting on these suggestions could not but lead one to an overwhelming conclusion that was not drawn at the time. Hot wars are clear and unambiguous: there is an enemy to defeat and resources to mobilize. Cold wars are much more amorphous, but in the contest with communism just ended there had been a clear doctrine and a clear set of enemies: Karl Marx and the followers who had developed his doctrine in responding to events. But the new threats to freedom had the character of a miasma. Gertrude Himmelfarb was eloquent on the threat to academic objectivity of political correctness and deconstructionism, and Sam Lipman talked of the commercialization of culture in the West. These threats are all the more serious because they lack a Mecca, a Geneva, a Rome, or a Moscow. They hover in the air around us. How does one defeat a miasma?

For political correctness is less a doctrine than a kind of distilled essence of all the ideological dottinesses that have surfaced in our century: it has bits of communism, nationalism, feminism, anarchism, and all the rest. But as a distilled essence, it is hardly at all a doctrine, but rather the diffusion of a muffling sensibility. Marxism incorporated the contradiction that a class attitude had an individualistic hero in Marx himself, not to mention others who created a cult of personality. Political correctness, which is sensitivity codified and turned into a cult, is the real thing—an attitudinal package for people whose mediocrity and collectivism are uncompromised by any tinge of original thought. The very word "correctness" is for cold warriors an absurdity conjuring up the dogmatism of dim communist exponents of agitprop, a term too comic to take seriously. And yet here in this post-Orwellian world it advances relentlessly, swirling around us like a fog. How does one defeat a miasma? □

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On the Silk Road

Mark Katz

A BUS STILL identified as belonging to Intourist, the official tour agency of the former USSR, took eight of us—all American scholars—from Tashkent, the Uzbek capital, to Samarkand on a Saturday morning. When we arrived at our hotel (a former Communist Party guest house which, having been "privatized," was being run by the former communists), we were greeted and welcomed effusively by an official of the Samarkand government. He described the program which had been arranged for our two-day visit to his city: lots of sightseeing and meetings with various officials.

"But of course," he added with a cheerful smile, "if there is anything else that you want to do, just let us know and we'll be glad to arrange it."

As a matter of fact, one of our number happened to have a couple of contacts in Samarkand whom we wanted to see. One was the head of the local chapter of *Birlik*, an opposition group that the Uzbek government allowed to register as a society but not as a political party. The other was the head of the local Tajik community association, which the authorities had not yet allowed to register in any form (the Tajiks are a minority in Uzbekistan but there are large numbers of them in places such as Samarkand).

Our host became considerably less hospitable once we mentioned our desire to meet with these two individuals. "The schedule is already too full," he informed us.

We'd be happy to drop some of the meetings that he had arranged, we told him.

"Impossible!" he stated, smiling broadly. "The people here are looking so forward to seeing you. You wouldn't want to disappoint them now, would you?"

When it became evident that we would, he changed his line. "All right, give me their names and telephone numbers. I'll call them up to see if they can fit into your schedule."

We thought that if our guide made the phone calls, he would undoubtedly discover that these people were somehow unavailable. So the professor who had the two phone numbers said he didn't want to put our guide to any trouble; he would make the phone calls himself.

Our guide's smile disappeared. The professor went up to his room to make the phone calls. When he got there, he discovered that his phone, for some reason or other, was not working. He quickly went to someone else's room where the phone was working and made the calls. He was able to inform our guide that both gentlemen would be delighted to meet with us.

We spent the rest of the day seeing the sights of Samarkand (overwhelming!) and meeting various officially sanctioned individuals (underwhelming), including one of the official *imams* appointed during communist times. He spent over an hour in verbosely avoiding all of our questions about the status

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of Islam and reports about increasing Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan.

We returned to our hotel for dinner. We had invited the *Birlik* representative to join us. Our guide insisted that the *Birlik* man could not come into the restaurant for dinner with us, but we brought him in anyway. The guide then insisted on sitting at the same table with the *Birlik* man.

Our guest talked to us about several subjects: tension between the Uzbek majority and the Tajik minority, the absence of a free press, *Birlik*'s relations with the other main opposition group (*Erkh*), and the general repressiveness of the regime.

Our guide was becoming extremely upset about the discussion and wanted to bring it to a halt. He did not, however, want to appear to be suppressing freedom of speech. So he hit upon the expedient of standing up to make long, loud toasts to Uzbek-American friendship as a way of halting the conversation. The first toast we listened to, but when he tried to make others we just told him to shut up. But he still kept trying.

Continuing the conversation, though, became impossible when the evening's floor show began. Like many hotel restaurants in the former USSR, this one attempted to entertain its patrons with a program featuring young women dancing to the beat of extremely loud music while wearing few clothes and a lot of make-up (they would have looked much better wearing the reverse).

At a dinner in Tashkent a few nights before, one of our group had offered twenty American dollars to the restaurant band to cease playing its ear-shattering music while we were there. Much to the chagrin of the restaurant's other patrons, the band accepted. Unfortunately, this offer did not work for us in Samarkand. So we decided to quit the restaurant and go up to one of our rooms in order to resume our conversation.

When our guide realized what we were doing, he got up and actually tried to push us back into our seats. When this failed, he insisted on coming with us, uninvited, to the room.

Once there, we tried to pin down the *Birlik* man on how his party's policies differed from those of the government. He indicated that *Birlik* would pursue many of the same policies.

Our guide then broke into the conversation, "But if your policies are similar to the government's, then why do you have to have a separate party?"

We responded that it made a difference whether a government decided on its policies democratically or dictatorially.

"Oh," said our guide.

Although the guide was ostentatiously taking notes, the conversation proceeded freely. The *Birlik* representative made a point of emphasizing the extraordinary boorishness of Samarkand officialdom.

THE NEXT day, our group was looking forward to meeting the Tajik gentleman, since he had invited all of us to attend the second day of a wedding in his neighborhood. Our guide, however, showed up at our hotel with eight of his assistants and immediately launched into a statement about how we could not possibly attend the wedding since our schedule was already so full.

The first item on his agenda was a visit to another official *imam* at a mosque outside of town. This one managed to say even less than the previous one, in about the same period of time. Afterward we told our guide (by now dubbed "Sleaze Ball") that we did not intend wasting time with boring officials. It was now late morning and we decided to proceed directly to the wedding.

Our guide smiled serenely and said, "Okay." We soon learned why. As our bus proceeded back to Samarkand, we were stopped by a police car. An official came onto our bus and announced that the *hakkim* (governor) of the province had agreed to meet with us and that we must proceed to his office immediately.

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We then had it out with our guide. We told him to either take us to the Tajik wedding now on the bus or we would get there on our own and bring the matter up later with his superiors in Tashkent.

He decided to take us to the wedding. But when we got there, he and his eight assistants insisted on coming in with us although they had not been invited. Some of them sat down at the table reserved for us, displacing several Americans.

The wedding celebration was taking place in an open air courtyard. Men and women were separated by a barrier, although we occasionally saw some of the Tajik women as they delivered food or communicated with the Tajik men. A seemingly never-ending stream of delicious food was delivered to the hundred or so men in the courtyard.

After about an hour, our Tajik host and the American professor who had telephoned him went off to have a private talk. Sleaze Ball followed them into our Tajik host's home, insisted that the doors to the room where they were talking be closed (the host did not comply), and without asking permission made use of the telephone to report to his superiors where he was and who was involved in the discussion.

The guide's behavior, however, did not deter our Tajik host from handing over to the American professor some papers and other documents concerning the Tajik community's treatment by the Uzbek government. The professor did not ever let these papers out of his grasp for the remainder of our visit to the former USSR.

After we left the wedding, our guide insisted that we attend one last meeting with a group of local officials and professors who were waiting for us, for some reason, at the town museum. We agreed to go, but without telling our guide we invited our Tajik host to come along with us.

By the time we arrived at the museum, our guide realized what we had done. He told us then that our Tajik friend could not come into the meeting with us, "because he was not invited."

We pointed out that since he, the guide, had come to the wedding uninvited, we did not see why our Tajik friend could not come to this meeting uninvited too. We also stated that if the Tajik was not allowed to participate in the meeting, we would not attend either. Sleaze Ball relented.

After listening to several unenlightening speeches from the officials and professors at the museum, we asked whether there was any tension between the Uzbek and Tajik communities in Samarkand. Our officially sanctioned interlocutors claimed that there were no serious problems. Our Tajik friend, however, spoke up to say that the local authorities had refused to allow the community association he headed to register. The officials responded indignantly that another Tajik community association had already registered which he was free to join. Our friend responded that that association was dominated by former communists.

Soon thereafter, our guide insisted that the meeting had to come to an end since we had to take the bus back to Tashkent. After we got back on the bus, the guide came on board briefly to say good-bye. He said he was sorry that there had been differences of opinion between him and us about our program in Samarkand. "But what I was trying to do," he explained, "was to protect you from meeting the kind of people in Samarkand and Uzbekistan who would give you a negative impression." □

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Idylls of the Twilight

Michael Lind

Walter B. Wriston, *The Twilight of Sovereignty* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992). 194 pp., $25.00.

IN THE EARLY 1980s, Buckminster Fuller—designer of the geodesic house, the three-wheeled car, and other consumer durables that have yet to catch on—announced his solution to the Cold War, then in a final cold snap. Electric cables would be laid across the North Pole, connecting the Soviet Union and North America. As the earth rotated, differences in temperature between the night and day sides would send electric currents to and fro. The United States and the USSR, each dependent on the other for energy, would soon realize what a silly misunderstanding the Cold War had been all along. I think of Bucky's geotechnical solution to a geo-political problem whenever I read paeans to "interdependence" like Walter B. Wriston's *The Twilight of Sovereignty*, which rehearses most of this school's wilder claims.

The present interregnum between major world conflicts has predictably inspired a resurgence of the optimism that has always appeared during lulls in the chopping on what Hegel called the slaughter-bench of history. Of the various schools of optimism—world federalism, the end of history, interdependence—the last is simultaneously the most deterministic and the most hopeful. World federalists believe that things very well may not turn out for the best, world federation being necessary to avert not unlikely world conflagration. The end of history or democratist school makes peace and harmony contingent on global democratization, which is the product of factors other than mere technological advance, such as the individual need for recognition, or the active efforts of democratic crusaders. World federalists and democratists are glum pessimists compared to *interdependencia* theorists like Wriston. A banker looting the corpse of a socialist, Wriston pries technological determinism from the dead hand of Marx and makes it the basis for his grand theory of history.

What the factory and "capital" were to Marx, the computer and "information" are to Wriston. What Wriston means by "information" is never quite clear, despite labored attempts to explain it as the amount of expertise that goes into the making of things. Also like Marx, Wriston sets great store on periodization. There is nothing wrong with that—one cannot talk sensibly about history without labels—but Wriston's periods are unconvincing.

According to him, we are living in the midst of an "information revolution" as different in kind from the "industrial revolution" as that was from the previous agrarian age. It is not at all clear, however, that the information revolution is anything more than part of a "third industrial revolution" of the late twentieth century, following the "second industrial revolution" of the late nineteenth century (the internal combustion engine, railroads, steel and chemicals) and the first industrial revolution (steam power). The first industrial revolution, replacing animal and man-power with machine-power, was as enormous a break with eight thousand years of agrarian civilization as the earlier agricultural revolution was with millions of years of hunter-gatherer nomadism. By comparison,

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the progress from intercontinental telephone cables (the second industrial revolution) to intercontinental fax machines and satellite dishes (the third industrial revolution) is small change. An American from 1893—already acquainted with factories, big cities, skyscrapers, steamships, the first cars, trains, telephones, and speculation about air- and spaceflight—would not be completely disoriented in 1993. An American of 1793 would have been utterly dumbfounded in 1893.

From Multinational to Global Corporations

IF THIS IS right, if the much-hyped "information revolution" is simply the latest aftershock of that first great civilizational earthquake, there is reason to be skeptical about the claim that it will engender economic and political institutions radically different from those of the present and recent past. Nevertheless, Wriston claims that as a result of this information revolution, today's "multinational" economy will become a "truly global" economy, and the old-fashioned notion of state sovereignty will give way.

Wriston admits that the present world economy is not global, but multinational, that is, it consists of interlocking national economies. He argues, however, that a single global economy is being created through the erosion of national government controls by freely-flowing "information" or "intellectual capital." The term "intellectual capital" deserves close scrutiny, and when it gets it Wriston's claims look either banal, or mistaken. There is a fairly fluid, but not yet completely de-nationalized and de-regulated, global market in investment capital. There is no similarly fluid market in expertise. Computer scientists and physicists—to say nothing of other professionals—do not, like marks and yen, migrate in vast waves continually from country to country around the globe. There is a small brain drain, from poorer countries to richer, but most western countries make it difficult for foreign nationals to get jobs or become naturalized (the U.S. is extremely liberal in this respect).

As for cheap, unskilled labor, its immobility is an unacknowledged precondition for the interdependent capitalist world that Wriston celebrates. Wriston sets great store on the expatriation of industry as proof that the information revolution is "globalizing" the economy. For example, he writes cheerfully: "The most mobile of all forms of capital will be increasingly intolerant of nationalist restrictions because it is inherently global." This sounds wonderful—until one remembers that among the "nationalist restrictions" that discourage investment capital are minimum-wage laws, worker-safety standards, workmen's compensation, welfare provisions, health insurance, taxes for public infrastructure, public schools and public amenities, environmental standards, and on and on. Translated from Interdependencese into English, all that this former chairman of Citicorp is saying is that, if non-unionized, politically powerless Mexican workers in a shanty-town without running water or electricity or proper sanitation will do the same job as American workers for an eighth of the wage, why not move your factory to Mexico? Mexico has fewer of those outmoded "nationalist restrictions."

In the nineteenth century, corporations in European lands of settlement would actually import coolie labor from China and India by the thousands to compete with home-country nationals for jobs, driving down wage rates. In the twenty-first century, corporations may take the jobs to the coolies, as it were, rather than bringing the coolies to the jobs. The result is the same—the lowering of developed-country wage costs towards Third World levels—only the rhetoric is new. (One pictures the striking white miners in California or Colorado in 1875 glumly viewing the Chinese coolies marching past: "The management told us the company was going global.")

The continuities in cheap-labor business

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strategies can be disguised, if, like Wriston, one consistently personifies technology:

> When steel mills can move to more hospitable climates, they no longer present a stationary target for government or union control. The more than sixty minimills in the United States moved not toward the coal and iron deposits in the ground but toward the source of scrap and cheap electricity. The new technology moved them into the information economy...

What a pretty picture this is, of mills (rather than jobs) actually lifting up from the ground and flying from state to state and country to country, of animated factories in a Walt Disney cartoon roving hungrily in search of nourishment from "scrap and cheap electricity." This is a much more pleasant vision than the reality of corporations trying to raise their profit margins by moving operations from states with strong unions and high environmental standards to states and countries where the workers are poor and unorganized and government inspectors are willing to overlook puddles of carcinogenic effluvia. The phrase "more hospitable climates" summons up visions of blue skies and warm breezes, when Wriston means of course less rigorous *regulatory* climates, which are not produced by kindly nature, but by lobby-pressured state legislators in the U.S. and harsh or indifferent governments in most of the world. How pleasant, to believe that cars really did make Detroit, and that cotton, picked without human agency, made the South.

Increasing expatriation of production to cheap-labor havens by multinational corporations does not equal genuine globalization—at least not as long as corporate ownership and management, worldwide, continue to be distinctly associated with nationality.[1] This is not as evident in the United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries as it is in continental Europe and Japan. In the United States, because of the laissez-faire attitude of government and heavy reliance of corporations on the stock market as a source of financing, a fairly free market in corporate control has developed. In many cases it is relatively easy for foreign investors to buy controlling shares of an American corporation. There is no comparable market for corporate control in the other two leading capitalist economies. In Japan, interlocking ownership within great corporate groups or *keiretsu*, along with government regulations, effectively prevents non-nationals from purchasing control over key Japanese corporations. The network of close connections between German firms and German banks has a similar effect. A few years ago, for example, the Deutsche Bank intervened to prevent Arabs from buying a controlling interest in Daimler Benz.

Even in the U.S., the government must approve the purchase of some key defense contracting firms by foreigners. Evidently even the U.S. government believes that it can tell what is an "American" corporation and what is not. Perhaps one day there will be a highly-developed global market for corporate control, and Daimler Benz will be owned by Arabs one day, and Taiwanese the next, and Canadians the next, and managed, via interactive video, by individuals in many countries other than Germany. Until this becomes the norm (and it seems doubtful that it ever will), talk of the truly global corporation is premature, no matter how much multinationals shift specialized aspects of production around the world.

Wriston's theory of the inevitable globalization of the multinational economy does not even hold up in the one area in which it seems most plausible—transnational investment capital. As he himself acknowledges, increasing protectionism in the industrial economies in the past few decades has *stimulated* foreign direct investment as an alternative to exports. If Europe limits imports of Japanese automobiles, Japanese car manufac-

[1]See Ethan Kapstein, "We are US," *The National Interest* (Winter 1991/92).

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turers invest in British auto factories and produce for the European market. Whatever one thinks of this trend, it is a tribute to the power of national governments to reduce trade, not evidence that national economic borders are dissolving.

If a "truly global" economy were really evolving, then efforts like European and North American economic integration would be supererogatory. Why even bother to negotiate bilateral free trade deals and multilateral economic blocs, when the inevitable logic of technological development and market forces is going to produce the same result anyway, and sooner rather than later? Like other interdependence theorists, Wriston reminds one of the Marxists, with their mixture of determinism and voluntarism. We must all work together to bring about what will happen in any case without our efforts. Determinism demands determination.

Sovereignty

AS WRISTON recognizes, our present-day notions of sovereignty originated *before* the great economic divide represented by the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. "Sovereignty," writes Wriston, "is a modern institution but a few hundred years old" that arose from "the efforts of kings to break the power of feudal lords and city-states and remove the privileges of the Church and trade guilds." But if the conventions of sovereignty have been able to survive the shattering transition from agrarian to industrial civilization, as well as several waves of industrial innovation, why is there any reason to believe that they will crumble before what is merely the latest wave?

Wriston notes that liberalization to date has taken place within sovereign states, as a matter of positive law. In a modern state, all social and economic institutions "live and act at the sufferance of the sovereign."

> Even in as liberal a nation as the United States, for example, the churches are free of government control not by virtue of ancient historical right or the force of custom or a commonly accepted view of natural law or the divine will or the protection of a rival sovereign or the churches' own economic, political, or military power but by the sovereign's own law, as expressed in the First Amendment.

Having said that personal and corporate liberties in liberal societies to date have been a result of sovereign choice, not necessity, Wriston then turns around and argues that "the power of the state will diminish, particularly its sovereign power: the power to judge without being judged, to delimit the powers and privileges of the other institutions within society." States will not choose to grant freedom in order to be more legitimate or more prosperous, they will have freedom wrested from them, by the dynamics of the new information economy. "A truly global economy, as opposed to the multinational economy of the recent past, will require concessions of national power and compromises of national sovereignty that seemed impossible a few years ago and which even now we can but partly imagine."

As we have seen, the supposed global economy, on inspection, looks a lot like a group of interlinked national economies, just as alleged global corporations turn out to be national corporations with foreign subsidiaries and affiliates. Deprived of the global economy, Wriston is deprived of the force to which he attributes the withering away of the state.

Just as well. No such Universal Witherization is taking place as a result of interdependence, despite economic and political liberalization in a number of countries and the whittling away of a few weak states (Lebanon, Colombia)—not by ineluctable economic and technical forces, but by civil war, terrorism and banditry. While many Third World and ex-communist states have severe debt crises, no major

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industrial country today lives at the margin of survival, as major powers in the sixteenth century did, when a dynasty could depend on a credit rating in the world's financial capital, Antwerp. No country, no matter how subordinate to the IMF, is as beholden to foreign capital as were some countries in the nineteenth century:

> Only slightly less striking was the spectacle of governments going bankrupt and being, in effect, delivered up into the hands of their private capitalist creditors, like common paupers being hauled into debtors' prison. The first country to suffer this humiliating fate was Egypt in the 1870s, which was compelled to experiment with a variety of different arrangements with its creditor banks. By the end of the century Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), of Baring Brothers Bank, was the virtual ruler of the country. Other states that similarly had to surrender important sovereign functions to private banks included Greece, Tunisia, Morocco, the Ottoman Empire and various small countries in the Caribbean and Central America.[2]

There is nothing comparable to such cessions of sovereignty today. Indeed, "the twilight of sovereignty" is much better as a description of the nineteenth century than of the twentieth—or, in all likelihood, of the twenty-first. Between 1800 and 1913, trade as a proportion of global production rose from 3 to 33 percent (it was 15 percent in 1980). The amount of voluntary mass migration was unparalleled—fifty million Europeans left for work and settlement overseas, thirty million of them immigrants to the United States. Borders were more open then, not only to the movement of labor but to the movement of capital, with Britain between 1870 and 1914 investing as much as 40 percent of its entire national savings abroad.[3] All of this ended with World War I, and the trends cited by Wriston, though important, do not begin to bring us back to that kind of open world.

Writers like Wriston who celebrate the dawn of interdependence and the twilight of sovereignty might think twice, if they realized that they are saying nothing that has not been said before—for example, in 1848:

> All old-fashioned national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed...In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations.

So wrote Marx and Engels, in the *Communist Manifesto*, predicting that, as a result of global capitalism, socialism would inevitably emerge, whereupon twilight would fall upon sovereign states.

National Security

IN REFLECTING on *The Twilight of Sovereignty*, I found myself picturing an interdependence theorist writing during the long decline of Rome. Call him Wristonius:

> We live in an age of ever-accelerating change and diminishing imperial sovereignty. The borders of the Roman empire, once considered permanent by unimaginative thinkers, are now in a state of constant fluctuation. What is more, those borders are more permeable than ever. Great swarms of people—Alemanni, Suebi, Franks—cross in and out of imperial provinces at will in search of safety and sustenance. The old distinction between Roman citizens and barbarians makes no sense in this age of shifting and interpenetrating identities. Attempts by central government to control the diffusion of technology are increasingly recognized as futile and reactionary reflections of the old, bureaucratic mentality.

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[2]Steven C., Neff, *Friends But Not Allies: Economic Liberalism and the Law of Nations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 59.

[3]Ibid., p. 47.

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> In these changing times, the very concept of "the empire" is coming into question, as people wonder whether they owe their first loyalties to the empire, to their province, their tribe or perhaps to the ever-more closely linked community of mankind. Trade between provinces and neighboring barbarian kingdoms is often greater than trade with other parts of the empire. The known world is being knit into a single complex whole.

Wristonius, of course, is describing the disintegration of a civilization and the beginning of ages of anarchy and bloody power-political competition. The very processes that he celebrates—the diffusion of technology to non-Roman peoples, the permeability of Roman borders, and the confusion of loyalties—brought an end to Rome in the West as a state and as a culture.

Something of the same comic effect is unintentionally produced by the blandness with which Wriston narrates truly alarming developments—like the possibility of *software attack*: "If nothing happened when the president pressed the button, if all our communications froze and our radar failed to function, our defensive posture would change dramatically." (I nominate that sentence for an Oscar in the category of deadpan delivery).

Wriston gives many other examples of developments that are enough to give strategists nightmares—computer chips that themselves contain listening devices; hackers committing espionage; advanced electronic cipher keys. With respect to the latter, Wriston writes, "officials worry about sending the technology overseas, where it might fall into the wrong hands." Worry they certainly should, if they are earning their salaries. For Wriston, though, they are fighting the inevitable: "Once more the power of sovereign control is being attenuated by rapidly moving technology. While the debate goes on in the United States, Europeans are already using and selling far more sophisticated ciphers to anyone who will buy them." *Interdependence marches on*!

Sometimes Wriston's own examples are at war with his complacent conclusions. He quotes Churchill: "Unless British science had proved superior to German and unless its strange sinister resources had been effectively brought to bear on the struggle for survival, we might well have been defeated, and, being defeated, destroyed." Wriston, appending the portentous Movietone News moral that "once again, information was the great equalizer," misses an obvious point. If technology was the great equalizer that saved Britain from Germany in the 1940s before the entry of the U.S. into the war, it was technology that had turned Germany into a threat to Britain in the first place. In 1840, Germany was a backward agricultural region, no match for a Britain which was then the greatest industrial power in the world. Information was the great equalizer indeed.

This strikes me as a compelling warning of the dangers of a laissez-faire attitude toward the spread of science and technology. When not only great-power status but perhaps a country's very existence as a sovereign state depends on a perilous margin of technological superiority, it seems rather cavalier, to say the least, to take the philosophical attitude that it is futile in the long run to try to restrict technology diffusion, and that sovereignty at any rate is in long-term decline.

Wriston is not very concerned about the implications of the phenomena he describes for security because he is confident that their negative aspects will be submerged by favorable trends toward liberty and democracy and peace. He follows his chapter on "The Great Equalizer" with a chapter entitled "Power to the People," in which he predicts that the information revolution will soon render dictatorship and military conquest obsolete:

> As information technology brings the news of how others live and work, the pressures on any repressive government for freedom and human rights will soon grow intolerable because the world spotlight will be turned on

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abuses and citizens will demand their freedoms. While old power structures will resist this kind of outside interference, technology will render them obsolete. At the end of the day, technology will be seen to have brought effective pressure for reform.

Alarmed by the previous chapter on weapons diffusion? Relax. Democracy is diffusing even more rapidly.

Technology, according to Wriston, will bring an end to tyranny and conquest "at the end of the day." Let us stipulate what seems unlikely, that technology really is driving the world toward a peaceful, liberal, democratic utopia—but that the end of the day will not arrive until, say, the twenty-third century. In that case, the reassuring message of Wriston's final chapter is much less immediately relevant than the troubling theme of his penultimate chapter on military technology; before the millenium of information-age peace arrives, we have two hundred years in which that great equalizer, information technology, is making many "Germanies" much more equal to our "Britain."

In the face of unfavorable trends (and accelerating loss of national control over advanced weapons technology and weakening state sovereignty, if they are genuine trends, are unfavorable by any strategist's definition) those who think they have a fighting chance of reversing them are more likely to be motivated to try than are those who have already resigned themselves to the inevitable flow of history. It may well be that the Roman empire was doomed in the long run; still, Romans had every justification to try to delay the end, notwithstanding the philosophical complacency of prophets like Marx, Wriston—and Wristonius. □

Michael Lind is Executive Editor of The National Interest.

A Farewell to Arms Control

Gideon Rose

Patrick Glynn, *Closing Pandora's Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War* (New York: A New Republic Book/Basic Books, 1992). 445 pp., $30.

Colin S. Gray, *House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). 242 pp., $28.95.

Marc Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 292 pp., $44.50.

ARMS CONTROL has topped the foreign policy agenda in America for decades, shaping how millions of people think and talk about the superpower rivalry and about international relations in general. For all this attention, however, the discussions have been numbing and the policies often ineffective. The end of the Cold War has brought one phase of this strategic "experiment" to a close, and gives us a rare opportunity to gauge its results.

Even a cursory review of the literature underscores how the more ambitious claims for arms control have been discarded. A com-

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prehensive study from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, for example, recently concluded that "what emerges above all is the modesty of what arms control has wrought." Last year many writers in *Daedalus*, reviewing a landmark issue of that journal from thirty years earlier, generally agreed. Still, bureaucratic and intellectual inertia push negotiations forward, and several commentators tout an arms control "process" as the answer to a wide range of current and future security problems. The three books reviewed here point out the emperor is scantily clad.

Colin Gray's skepticism about arms control has evolved into total rejection; *House of Cards* is a long essay on the "arms control paradox," arguing that major agreements must inevitably be either impossible to achieve or unnecessary. Patrick Glynn concurs; *Closing Pandora's Box* is a tour through twentieth-century international relations, purporting to show how arms control and "liberal-pacifist" thinking have consistently led to foreign policy disasters. Marc Trachtenberg is a diplomatic historian whose work is both more scholarly and less vituperative than the other two. The essays in *History & Strategy* explore American strategic thought and practice from World War II through the Cuban Missile Crisis, and add weight to Gray and Glynn's polemics. The books have their flaws, but together they make a strong case that a movement which many saw as an intellectual bombshell was really something of a dud.

DEFINITIONS OF "arms control" can be elusive, making claims on its behalf irrefutable. Its essence, however, involves formal or informal cooperation with enemies to control the risks of war, to limit the damage in war, and to reduce the costs of military competition. Ironically, given its status as a near-religion among American liberals in the 1970s and '80s, strategic arms control began as a centrist approach to the U.S.-Soviet nuclear rivalry—it sought merely to "manage" the conflict, instead of striving for outright victory or disarmament. Soon, however, arms control thought and practice would evolve; its second phase would brush politics aside in vain attempts to stop what many perceived as a dangerous and irrational arms race and promote harmony between the superpowers.

The original strategic arms control theorists tried to establish the meaning of prudent behavior in a nuclear world. During the 1950s the Cold War and the technology of mass destruction developed together, and the future seemed bleak. Although the United States had a technological head start, its nuclear superiority was clearly a "wasting asset." Since American diplomacy was partly based on this advantage—"massive retaliation" really meant a massive American nuclear first strike—everyone was troubled by the development of Soviet weaponry. Peace activists supported (and governments paid lip service to) the goal of "general and complete disarmament." Hardliners and the military, on the other hand, pushed weapons programs which would preserve U.S. strategic superiority—enough power, accuracy, and speed, in other words, to be able to destroy the Soviet nuclear force on the ground in a first strike. Some went so far as to favor preventive war before the Soviet program accelerated. "Give me the order to do it and I can break up Russia's five A-bomb nests in a week," the head of the Air War College told the *New York Times* in 1950. "And when I went up to Christ—I think I could explain why I wanted to do it—now—before it's too late. I think I could explain to Him that I had saved civilization."

In this context civilian strategists at the RAND Corporation, Harvard, and elsewhere tried to figure out ways the superpowers could live with nuclear weapons, continue to struggle, but nevertheless avoid total destruction. Combining the novel intellectual tools of game theory with technical data on the forces of both sides, they tried to predict how different force structures would affect super-

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power behavior. Albert Wohlstetter's pioneering studies, for example, demonstrated that the U.S. nuclear arsenal was concentrated around a few air bases and precariously open to sudden Soviet attack. He and writers like Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, and Herman Kahn pointed out that vulnerable nuclear arsenals created incentives for one side to launch a preemptive strike during a crisis, in order to avoid being destroyed first. To strengthen this "delicate balance of terror" (as Wohlstetter titled a famous *Foreign Affairs* article), the strategists recommended that the U.S. preserve an invulnerable retaliatory or "second-strike" capability. They also suggested various plans to reduce the risks of nuclear accidents and proliferation.

With the Kennedy administration the civilian strategists, promoted chiefly by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, gained power. In the détente following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the superpowers agreed to a Limited Test Ban Treaty (which reduced the environmental dangers of fallout) and set up a Hot Line for better communications during crises. These measures, along with later agreements on accidents and nonproliferation, were aimed not at ending nuclear competition or the underlying political struggle, but simply at avoiding needless risks on its margins—something they accomplished.

ACCORDING TO the abstract logic of game theory, though, the incentives for preemption which supposedly undermined crisis stability arose from the vulnerability of *anyone*'s strategic forces, including the Soviets'. The ability to protect one's own forces or to destroy another's was inherently provocative, because it generated rewards for striking first. Arms controllers reasoned that if both superpowers could be made to understand this logic—understand, in other words, that nuclear weapons could serve only to deter the use of other nuclear weapons—then the strategic competition itself could be "stabilized." This thinking, along with budgetary pressures to determine "how much is enough," eventually led McNamara to advocate a policy of mutual assured destruction. It was expressed in the central catechism of what would become a virtual arms control theology: "offense good, defense bad; killing cities good, killing missiles bad."

By the late 1960s this train of though began to fuse with broader notions of the irrationality of "arms races" and the dangers of growing nuclear stockpiles and technological developments. McNamara expressed this new connection in a September 1967 speech: "What is essential to understand here is that the Soviet Union and the United States mutually influence one another's strategic plans....It is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms race." Earlier U.S. gains had spawned Soviet moves, which in turn spawned U.S. countermoves; both sides needed to recognize, as the title of a Paul Warnke *Foreign Policy* article put it, that they were simply "apes on a treadmill." The policy prescriptions of this approach were clear: first, the U.S. should break the cycle by showing unilateral restraint, which would allay the fears of the Soviet Union and thus slow the race; second, formal international agreements could eliminate "destabilizing" weapons systems on both sides and "control" the competition in general.

These central arguments from strategic arms control's second phase were not new. They represented, in fact, a distinctive view of international politics, one put forward by Anglo-American liberals since the turn of the century. Modern wars, this reasoning ran, were often caused by weapons, munitions makers, and the misperceptions or bumblings of politicians and generals. These arguments had little to do with nuclear weapons per se; they spawned a host of international negotiations and treaties during the 1920s and 1930s. Writing during World War II, Walter Lippmann described the philosophy guiding these original arms controllers in biting terms: "Big warships meant big wars.

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Smaller warships meant smaller wars. No warships might eventually mean no wars."

During the 1970s arms control generated considerable hoopla and was enshrined in major treaties, but it did not have commensurate practical effects. Unilateral American restraint did not breed comparable restraint on the part of the Soviet Union, nor did agreements themselves lead to a better relationship. Events showed, as Harold Brown famously put it, that "when we build weapons, they build. When we stop, they nevertheless continue to build."

SALT I essentially combined a permanent ban on defensive weapons with temporary limits on offensive ones. It did not stop the Soviet Union from apparently pressing for strategic superiority during the 1970s, in response to which (over the protests of arms control devotees) the United States responded with its own military and strategic buildup during the late Carter and Reagan years. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the SALT II treaty, but that hardly seemed to matter—the "limits" it imposed on weapons stockpiles turned out to be so high that even the hawkish Reagan administration felt no need to move beyond them until the mid 1980s. It is hard to believe that without the SALT agreements the superpowers would have developed even greater offensive arsenals than they did, and technological and financial obstacles would probably have constrained defensive weapons almost as much as the ABM treaty. Endless arms control talks over conventional weapons in Europe generated little more than frustration.

Against these modest results, one must place the opportunity costs associated with arms control thinking. It misled the American people about the realities of world politics and fostered the pernicious belief that weapons themselves constituted the real threat to the United States. As a result, dovish arms controllers mistakenly feared additions to the American arsenal, while their hawkish brethren overestimated the risks of technical (and often mythical) "missile gaps" and "windows of vulnerability." Moreover, the American hunger for agreements and focus on the "arms race" as an independent strategic danger distorted national thinking about foreign policy and hindered appropriate responses to Soviet policies.

THE MAIN problem with placing arms control near the center of foreign policy discussion—as opposed to simply recognizing that crisis stability is one of several important concerns—lies in the theory's silence about politics. Soviet nuclear capability forced U.S. strategists to confront two basic questions: What political role can nuclear weapons play, and how serious are the dangers of accidental or inadvertent war? Arms controllers thought the respective answers were clear: none, and very. It followed that nuclear weapons could do little but deter other nuclear weapons—for which a small, secure retaliatory capability was all one needed. Moreover, since crisis stability was crucial and the balance of terror was "delicate," anything more than such a posture—on either side—was reckless and provocative. Arms control skeptics answered the questions differently. They thought the overall strategic balance did in fact have political consequences, and they thought that the dangers of unintended war were minuscule. Furious debates have sprung up, therefore, over what history can tell us about the answers to these two questions.

Strategic arms control devotees point to World War I as an example of the dangers of inadvertent war stemming from provocative military plans. While the Allies enshrined their initial views on "German guilt" in the Versailles Treaty, revisionist historians in the 1920s and '30s painted a dramatically different picture of the war's causes, one in which events had simply spun out of control. Popularized in books like Barbara Tuchman's *The Guns of August*, this interpretation of the war's origins came to stand for the true risks

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of the nuclear era. Even a realist like Henry Kissinger intoned the now-familiar litany: in addition to the lesson of World War II,

> Our age...must remember as well the lesson of World War I, when Europe, despite the existence of a military balance, drifted into a war no one wanted and a catastrophe that no one could have imagined. Military planning drove decisions; bluster and posturing drove diplomacy. Leaders committed the cardinal sin of statecraft: They lost control over events.

Glynn and Trachtenberg both refute this interpretation through lengthy treatments of the war's origins.[1] They show how at several points during the summer of 1914 German leaders consciously pushed events forward, striving to reach their foreign policy goals even if that meant risking a war. Moreover, they dismiss the notion that rigid military plans "forced" leaders' hands, demonstrating clearly that politicians were able to overrule generals at key moments.

For example, German leaders received a message on August 1 that Britain might remain neutral if Germany attacked east but not west. Many revisionists argue that the Kaiser wanted to accept the British offer, but was told by Moltke, the chief of the General Staff, that this was impossible. Trachtenberg quotes Bernard Brodie as an example of how this historical analogy influenced strategic arms control thinking:

> The falsity of the initial report saved that particular episode from being utterly grotesque; but the whole situation of which it formed a part reveals a rigidity and a habit of pleading 'military necessity' that made it impossible after a certain point to prevent a war which no one wanted and which was to prove infinitely disastrous to all the nations concerned.

The story is simply not true, however. In response to the message, the Kaiser in fact ordered the occupation of Luxembourg to be suspended. Moltke protested that the Schlieffen Plan required the use of railroads there, but—he wrote in his memoirs—"I was snubbed with the remark that I should use other railroads instead. The order must stand. Therewith I was dismissed. It is impossible to describe the state of mind in which I returned home. I was absolutely broken and shed tears of despair."

Most serious observers today agree that World War I occurred primarily because of the clash of Austrian, Russian, and especially German foreign policy aspirations, set against a backdrop of shifting relative power and perceptions of inevitable conflict. War certainly did not occur "by accident," but since no one set out to cause a general European conflagration that summer, it may be appropriate to call some aspects of it "inadvertent." Perceptions that mobilizing first conferred advantages aggravated crisis decision-making, but ultimately political rather than military considerations drove events. In sum, simplistic interpretations like the "Guns of August" school have been discredited, and thus arms controllers' scenarios of arms races spiralling into unintended catastrophes seem implausible.

BY DENIGRATING politics, critics argue, arms control devotees not only overstated the risks of unintended war, but also underestimated the extent to which the superpowers' strategic balance had political consequences in other areas of foreign policy. Rather than seeing nuclear weapons as evil and worthless, arms control skeptics believe with Leninists in the existence of a "correlation of forces"—the notion that many political factors, including the strategic balance, shape states' foreign policies. This school holds that exaggerated arms control thinking creates its own dangers, of self-deterrence.

The critics agreed with John F. Kennedy's worries about political challenges

[1]Readers of this magazine will remember Glynn's version from his article "The Sarajevo Fallacy" (Fall, 1987).

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in an era of nuclear parity. "[Soviet] missile power," Kennedy predicted in words that could have come from the Committee on the Present Danger

> will be the shield from behind which they will slowly, but surely, advance—through Sputnik diplomacy, limited brush-fire wars, indirect non-overt aggression, intimidation and subversion, internal revolution, increased prestige or influence, and the vicious blackmail of our Allies. The periphery of the Free World will slowly be nibbled away....Each such Soviet move will weaken the West; but none will seem sufficiently significant by itself to justify our initiating a nuclear war which might destroy us.

However difficult it might be to frame responses to such a situation—it need only be pointed out that the Kennedy team's answers included the Vietnam War—critics of the "apes on a treadmill" view argue that the real danger always lay in Soviet power and hegemonic desires, not in "action-reaction" cycles or the characteristics of weapons. Glynn puts this point well: "Arms were never the cause of [Cold War] conflict, but always merely a symptom. The arms race was not the product of a 'mutual' misunderstanding, but of the driving ambitions of one side."

These issues might have been clearer had nuclear weapons not fundamentally changed international relations by raising the stakes. It is difficult to argue precisely what political purposes nuclear weapons can serve beyond basic deterrence, just as it is difficult to determine what "credibility" means. The dangers of escalation counsel against issuing nuclear threats casually, but the same dangers hold out the promise of coercing opponents on a range of foreign policy issues. Trachtenberg argues convincingly that the early nuclear strategists themselves never settled this question—they ranged from abjuring the use of nuclear threats and substituting conventional ones; to devising a variety of "limited" nuclear options; to arguing in favor of "competitive risk-taking"—i.e., brinksmanship.

GLYNN HAS a simple answer to this dilemma—do the opposite of whatever doves suggest. His all-purpose foreign policy tool is "*a virtual ultimatum to escalate the conflict vastly.*" One need not be Carl Sagan to be uneasy about this; Glynn implies, for example, that he would have favored an air strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis rather than acknowledge the removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey. But escalation would have been a disastrous option, not least because we now know that there were also *tactical* nuclear weapons in Cuba, and that local commanders had the authority to use them in response to an attack.

Glynn's book is weakened by a series of one-sided readings of history which overemphasize the value of threats while ignoring their risks and the merits of concessions. His treatment of the end of World War II is representative: Roosevelt was a simpleton who gave Eastern Europe to Stalin; he should have confronted the Soviets over Poland; driven to Berlin; etc. Missing from this analysis, however, are realistic appraisals of what alternative policies could have achieved. Roosevelt did foster unrealistic expectations of postwar cooperation, and he was indeed too trusting of Stalin's intentions at Yalta. But by the last years of the war, the fate of Poland and Eastern Europe in general was largely beyond Western control; Roosevelt did not have them to "give away." Critics have to make a credible case for what a confrontational policy would have involved, and how it could have achieved the total defeat of Nazi Germany while avoiding a new war with the Soviet Union. Perhaps this could be done, but Glynn doesn't even try. His treatment of the Pacific theater follows the same pattern. He reads it as a pure demonstration of the effectiveness of nuclear coercion (ignoring the effect of Soviet entry into the war), and fails to consider whether a tinkering with the doctrine of "unconditional sur-

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render" might have averted the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands.

Gray's book concentrates on rebutting arms controllers' claims, not on offering suggestions for foreign policy in a nuclear era. In fact, he rejects the notion that nuclear weapons have changed international relations much if at all: "Just as the policies of revisionist states are the leading cause of war, so those policies and the countervailing policies they trigger abroad are the leading reason why arms control is Mission Impossible." In general, *House of Cards*, like his other books, is intellectually provocative but somewhat overstated; as he admits in the preface, his goal is "to explode an intellectual warhead underneath [arms control] proceedings."

Trachtenberg refrains from drawing direct policy lessons, but his book provides the most judicious account of how perceptions of the overall nuclear balance actually affected policy during the early Cold War. The short answer is more than true arms control believers will admit, but in more complicated, less mechanical ways than critics like Glynn and Gray suggest. During the early years of the Korean War, for example, American officials hesitated to threaten escalation because they felt a real sense of general military weakness vis-à-vis the Soviets. This reluctance evaporated when leaders grew confident that an American military build-up (begun in the winter of 1950) had tipped the general balance of power in favor of the U.S. While it remains unclear how important U.S. threats of escalation were in ending the war, they would probably have been implemented had fighting continued into the fall of 1953. As for choices during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Trachtenberg argues that the strategic balance did not drive American decision-making, but did help shape Soviet actions.

THE 1980s saw the rise to power of arms control skeptics in place of supporters, and lurking behind the current arms control debates are differing perceptions of the Reagan-era military buildup and pugnacity. Many arms control devotees argued that Reagan's policies were dangerous, destabilizing, and futile. Defenders argue that the policies were indeed destabilizing, but therein lay their strength: they destabilized the Soviet Union and thus dug up the "root cause" of America's foreign policy problems.

By the late 1970s the Carter administration—responding to Soviet adventurism and perceptions of a shift in the global balance of power—switched course, becoming more confrontational and starting a major rearmament program. The Reagan administration continued the build-up while adding two new elements: support for anti-Soviet insurgents around the world (the Reagan Doctrine) and intensive pursuit of strategic defenses (SDI). At the same time the traditional arms control agenda was deemphasized, held hostage to perennial bugaboos such as verification. The logic behind this course, set out in several speeches and articles by administration officials, was to prevent the Soviets from appearing to gain global momentum and to pressure them into internal reform. As it happened, there were two camps within the Soviet leadership, and in 1985 the doves—Gorbachev and his reformers—came into power. Soviet external behavior soon changed, internal evolution began, and by the end of the decade the Cold War had ended on American terms. As Gray's "arms control paradox" predicts, once the underlying political competition had ended, sweeping arms control treaties of a kind unimaginable a decade earlier suddenly fell into place.

There can be legitimate disagreements about the economic handling of the Reagan buildup and the extent to which it directly caused Soviet reforms, but the central complaint of arms controllers was that under pressure the Soviet Union would explode rather than implode. For all the public fears and dire predictions, however, the deploy-

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ment of Euromissiles did not bring on war or anything approaching it, and the threat of a new defensive arms race in high technology (whatever the actual feasibility of SDI) certainly did not prompt the Soviets to launch a preemptive strike. These policies, as arms control skeptics understood, had political effects rather than military ones, and helped convince Soviet elites that their only feasible option was foreign policy retrenchment combined with internal transformations.

Arms controllers fears, ironically, should have been muted by the recognition that mutual assured destruction was not a temporary phenomenon dependent on the weapons and targeting doctrines of one side, but rather a description of the basic strategic condition from the 1960s onward. In retrospect, at the very time theorists were worrying about the "delicacy" of the nuclear balance, the U.S. deployment of missiles on submarines took care of the most important problem. Despite appearances, from the end of the 1950s the balance of terror was actually remarkably robust, and underwrote the longest period of great power peace in the history of the modern European state system.

AS ANDREI Sakharov wrote in 1983, "the general trend of events since 1945...has been a relentless expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence." This drive to power by a revisionist state with a transnational ideology led to a powerful balancing coalition. The subsequent war between the great powers remained "cold" partly because bipolarity was a stabilizing force, partly because the division of Europe corresponded well to the actual balance of power at the time, but mostly because of the strength of nuclear deterrence. The first phase of strategic arms control helped make that deterrence stronger and safer at the margins. The second, more ambitious phase failed to do more than that because the essential conflict stemmed from political aspirations rather than military postures—as its end clearly showed.

The post-Cold War world retains the stabilizing force of nuclear weapons in the hands of the major Western powers, and so far lacks any revisionist powers worth bothering about. The collapse of a nuclear-armed empire, on the other hand, presents unprecedented dangers, and multipolarity has always led to wars in the past. In this environment the arguments of the first phase of strategic arms control theorists address real concerns, particularly about nuclear proliferation and the disposition of the erstwhile Soviet arsenal. But because the central threats to the United States will continue to stem from conflicts of state interest rather than from the numbers and details of weapon systems, it is hard to see what virtues the more ambitious version of arms control offers.

Attempting to salvage something from the wreckage, some commentators suggest that its real value lies less in specific agreements than in the entire arms control "process." Arms control, we are now told, is the best way to reduce uncertainty, provide information, and coordinate relations among independent states. But there already is a term for such activity, and it does not carry with it the baggage of misguided ideas which distort the clarity of vision needed for good foreign policy. The word is diplomacy. □

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Rawdon Dalrymple:

IVAN HALL'S article, "Samurai Legacies, American Illusions" has a context in other thoughtful and influential works published by *The National Interest*. How will Japan fit into the world after the end of history in Francis Fukuyama's sense? Are Japan and the other East Asians more apt models than the West for "the Rest"? Do the Japanese have grounds for thinking that the United States is going to lose the will and capacity for purposeful and decisive influence?

Although he makes various important qualifications, reflecting a detailed knowledge and understanding of Japan, Hall sees Japan as essentially a sinister force from the viewpoint of American and Western interests. While he sees the danger as much in American error and negligence as in what he calls the "adamantine" nature of Japanese insularity, it is still a remarkably unsympathetic interpretation of Japan and its fit, or lack of fit, in the world. It is a very one-sided interpretation, which of course is not to say that it is very wrong.

Japan is indeed very different from the United States and it is even understandable that in some senses Japan should be seen as a threat to the United States—but not in any sense that implies Japanese hostility. It is important to recognize that there is still in Japan a strong attachment to the United States. It is not just a matter of the Security Treaty, though that remains of great importance. There is, not surprisingly, much greater awareness in Japan than in the United States of the extent to which present-day Japan, with its enormous achievements, was formed by Americans after the war. Americans know about MacArthur but not for example about Joseph Dodge or William Deming, who are seen here, in Tokyo, as among the main architects of modern Japan. It is recognized here that without the Americans it is quite uncertain when, or even whether, such a critical measure as land reform would have been undertaken. It would be misleading to suggest that this is seen as generating any sort of indebtedness, but it has generated a sense that America is a part of Japan's recent history in a quite unusual way—complicit, as it were, in what Japan has become and what it has achieved.

PARTLY BECAUSE the nature of the American achievement in Japan is not widely understood in the United States, and partly because there has been a strong reason in the long Cold War period to emphasize shared interests and alignments, it has become routine American rhetoric at the highest levels to make much play on the great ideals, principles, and goals which the two nations are said to share. Japanese official rhetoric of course reciprocates. But even if these are similar plants, they are rooted in such different national soils, nurtured and used so differently, that they should not be seriously represented as the same. Nevertheless the American expectation is that Japanese principles, institutions, and behavior will steadily be assimilated more and more to those of the United States, or to the models which the United States has in its collective political consciousness.

In some respects that probably will happen. There is a likelihood that Japan will move over time (more time than some current agendas would suggest) to a more open and responsive political system. There is also considerable and, to Japanese perceptions, quite rapid social change under way, as a new generation moves away from lifetime employment, starts to place family before

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company, takes longer holidays, and craves various manifestations of affluence. Career opportunities for women are also increasing at a pace that has large implications.

There is good reason to think that Japan will continue to attach much importance to American wishes in formulating its international behavior and priorities. But it will not adopt American prescriptions or models that would change Japan almost beyond recognition. In particular, Japanese will continue to get much of their sense of purpose and satisfaction from their role at work, from participation in the shared enterprise rather than from the individual development, which Americans see as the proper goal for all free people. That means that the United States—indeed all of us—will have to live with a Japanese Japan for the foreseeable future.

Does that matter, and even if it does matter, is it susceptible to American influence? To the latter part of that question, the answer is—very little. It is then in that light that the first part of the question has to be approached.

Japanese conduct will be different from that of the United States in that Japan is not and will not be driven by an ideological or proselytizing agenda. Japan is increasingly playing an important role in a number of areas. It has long done so in the international financial institutions. It is now also taking a major role in arms control and disarmament discussions, on environmental issues, in various international regulatory agencies, and on regional issues, notably Cambodia. In these and other areas Japan's role will continue to increase. But it will be a pragmatic role, seeking sensible results consistent with Japan's own interests and trying to maximize consensus. It will also pay close regard to the interests of Japan's neighbors.

In Japan there is no disposition to see an increasing role in world affairs as requiring some unifying doctrine to explain or justify it. There is no sense that Japan should have a mission to change the world. Japanese policymakers tend to think in terms of rather modest goals in specific areas. Far from finding fault with this approach, it seems to me that the rest of us should welcome it. If an outsider can detect an objective which Japan could be said to seek globally it would be economic development for all countries. It is widely believed here that if that is achieved most other things will fall into place. Why ask for more?

Japan's desire for major power status is driven primarily by a consciousness of position in "an hierarchically conceived international society." Professor Takashi Inoguchi of Tokyo University points out that this thinking is deeply rooted in modern Japan:

> "Occupying a respectable place in the international community" has long been a goal of the Japanese people and Government and it was written into the 1952 Constitution. Further back into history, "achieving an honorable position in the world" was enunciated in the five pledges of the Emperor Meiji in 1868 when Japan embarked upon its modernization program.

This desire to have a "respectable place" in the eyes of the world has two aspects. It leads the Japanese to take a considerable interest in what others think of them and it contributes to their desire to excel, to be the best. The former aspect at times may have contributed to that tendency to immobilism in foreign affairs of which others have complained, a tendency to wait and see how others will react, rather than working out a position and then seeking to persuade others to join in prompt and effective action. Also the present Japanese political arrangements are far from conducive to making major independent decisions on large international issues.

The Gulf War episode was painful for Japan in this respect, and added to the strains on the U.S./Japan relationship. But for all the anger Japan's reluctance to participate caused on the United States' side, others found it rather reassuring. For some of Japan's neighbors, especially, the present

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Japan is a more comfortable presence than would be a thrusting Japan, with ambitions to shape the international agenda to some ends of its own.

Just as Japanese society is changing in ways that enhance the scope for individualism (the focal issue for Hall), so Japan is taking on a larger and generally beneficent role in the world. But there is no likelihood, either in the domestic or in the international context, that Japan will meet all the requirements or tests set by some "revisionist" critics. No doubt a case can be made that this is in some respects regrettable. But in other respects the tests seem to rest as much on prejudice or on culturally determined preferences as on the requirements of international civil society.

Thus it is very reasonable to call for the Japanese, or anyone else, to amend behavior that frustrates and distorts open international trade or that is unfair and exploitative in regard to intellectual property and so on. But it is unreasonable to attack the Japanese, or anyone else, because they want to preserve their ethnic particularity, the central features of their inherited culture, and want their society to evolve in ways and at a pace of their own choosing. Why is it unacceptable for Japanese to suggest publicly that some of corporate America had the wrong priorities in the 'eighties, or that the very rapid influx of immigrants lacking skills could be a drag on American competitiveness—while grosser public attacks on Japan by some quite prominent Americans are dismissed without apology as "simplistic redneck hyperbole on our side"?

Ivan Hall complains of the "arriviste gloating of too many high-placed Japanese" and raises the specter of what he calls the New Old Right in Japan. Presumably the sort of gloating he is referring to is that contained in *The Japan That Can Say "No."* But gloating about Japan's achievements is rare, and must become rarer following the bursting of the economic bubble. It is misleading to suggest that there is in Japan some dangerous resurgence of ultranationalism. The hundreds of far-right organizations (*uyoku*) committed to an ultranationalist agenda have thousands of members and are occasionally noisy and visible, but they are not really influential. They have these days no well-known leader or figurehead.

Right-wing groups come and go, and some currently prominent politicians have belonged to groups such as *Seirankai* (Young Storm Society) which was established in 1973 and disbanded in 1977, or the *Reimeikai* (Dawn Society) founded in 1989 (whose agenda included abolition of the Super 301 Clause of the U.S. Trade Act and review of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty). Such associations are a strand in Japanese politics but a rather small and apparently declining one.

The Northern Territories issue could produce more public support for the ultranationalists, and there is a wider disposition to feel that foreign, and especially American, criticism of Japan is excessive. But none of this adds up to evidence for the conspiracy theories which have surfaced in the United States. The debate in Japan on the legislation to enable elements of the Self Defense Forces to be sent abroad to participate in peace-keeping operations, under tightly prescribed conditions and controls, should be reassurance to any who doubt the continuing commitment of Japanese to the essentials of the Peace constitution.

THOUGHTFUL AND influential Japanese look at the huge changes that have occurred in their country in recent years, partly in response to U.S. pressure, and at the continuing rapid change. They think about what would be needed to satisfy continuing and even escalating demands from the United States for further change. Increasingly there is a disposition to observe that the Structural Impediments Initiatives (SII) were supposed to summon up change in the United States as well as in Japan. Demonstrably, Japan has taken serious steps to address matters covered in the SII to date,

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and the current stimulatory measures take the process further. There are to be further large increases in public spending on infrastructure, and serious and expanding efforts to assist imports. Whether or not this is enough, and whether or not it is only in response to foreign pressure, the fact is that Japan has made and is making changes as demanded by the United States.

No doubt relevant changes are under way in the United States too. But the big issues, and especially the budget deficit, remain. Just in accounting terms, as long as the United States runs a massive public sector deficit and continues to have such a low savings ratio, it is going to have a current account deficit. That is not Japan's fault. It is not surprising that Japanese are increasingly saying that the deal is not being kept, that all the change is on one side.

The outlook for the trade issue between the two countries remains troubled. The Japanese economy faces a difficult period of adjustment, with domestic demand likely to remain subdued in 1993. The rise of the yen against the dollar until very recently seemed likely to exacerbate the trade surplus with the United States, at least in the short term. In Japan this prospect is viewed with concern, and serious efforts are being made through the MITI Import Board and other ways to try to encourage and facilitate American imports. A major underlying concern is that, increasingly, American complaints about their trade deficit focus on the *existence* of the deficit with Japan, regardless of its *cause*. The deficit as such is now alleged to be intolerable, whereas previously it was said to be intolerable because of unfair Japanese practices.

Quite apart from the U.S./Japan issue, it is a major step backward in the United States' global trade policy if particular deficits are going to be approached in this way. The trading system we have is not intended to run on a basis of each country balancing its trade separately with every other, and the United States takes a very different attitude to situations where it has a surplus in bilateral trade. Australia's deficit with the United States, for example, is proportionately far greater (nearly 2.5:1) than is the United States' deficit with Japan. Yet virtually every significant Australian export to the United States faces quantitative restrictions or other barriers. Those exports are of products in which Australia is one of the most efficient producers in the world and seeks to compete entirely on the basis of unsubsidized price and quality. But many years of effort have produced little or no progress in bringing down the import barriers. In some respects things are getting worse, as in recent years the United States has embarked on an export enhancement program under which subsidized U.S. grain is dumped on world markets.

The advantages of removing restrictions on trade have not yet been fully accepted and certainly not yet widely implemented in East Asia. But the rapid growth in trade between the countries of the region, and the increasingly developed links between them through investment and trade will ensure that a more open trading environment will develop in the years ahead. The East Asian region will, as Ivan Hall points out, share with Japan features of which he disapproves. But, if a sense of community does develop between these countries, they will all feel more confident about withstanding pressures from the United States.

In the last half-century, the United States has been the superpower leader of the world in overthrowing fascism, promoting freedom and development, and in steadfastly facing down communism until it collapsed. If that leaves us with only one undisputed political and economic model, it seems clear that within that model there are variations, with the potential to set off further struggle if they are not mutually recognized as legitimate and accommodated or resolved in other ways. To demand that Japan and others should convert to American-style individualism and an ideal of personal development is not only unrea-

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sonable. It is unnecessary.

Ivan Hall calls for much greater effort by Americans to understand Japan. He does so from a rather antagonistic stance, but he is right. The intellectual focus of the United States is heavily Atlanticist and elements of it are even dismissive of Japan and other societies and cultures as just too foreign and difficult. But increasingly, the economic interests and opportunities lie across the Pacific more than across the Atlantic and, if the development of East Asia is to be seen by the United States in dialectical terms of challenge and response, then it is worth making great effort to ensure that it occurs in a context of knowledge and understanding. □

The author responds:

SPACE LIMITATIONS preclude an adequate response to Ambassador Dalrymple's observations, but his characterization of my article as "antagonistic" and "remarkably unsympathetic" is a classic instance of the Japanese habit of personalizing and dismissing criticism of particulars as a rejection of Japan as a whole, thereby stopping all further discussion. The thrust of "revisionist" writing and of my own article, far from seeking to change Japan towards an American model, has simply been to seek a truer "understanding" of Japan as it is, that we may perceive it more clearly and adjust our own expectations and approaches accordingly, surely a formula for sounder relations in the long run. Ambassador Dalrymple makes light of the right wing, yet Japan's government is at this moment in crisis thanks to the recently revealed connections of the most powerful politician (Mr. Kanemaru) in the ruling party's most powerful faction (Takeshita) to leaders of ultrarightist (*uyoku*) and criminal underworld (*yakuza*) organizations.

Basically, it saddens me to see such a stalwart defense of Japan's insularism and of virtually official Japanese positions on U.S.-related trade issues by Canberra's envoy to Tokyo. For decades, beyond any mere military alliance, Australia has been America's closest partner in the Pacific in the fundamental arena of political and human values. One might have expected more sympathy for the goals of greater openness, reciprocity, and political liberalism now being sought throughout the post-Cold War world, including by internationally minded Japanese who need more, not less, encouragement from the outside. The notion that East Asians are somehow culturally unsuited for "individual development" is the stock in trade of powerful and politically insensitive Japanese preoccupied with market expansion and regional economic consolidation.

U.S. restrictions on certain Australian imports contradict America's own free trade demands and deserve a quick axe. I do not find them particularly relevant, however, to a discussion of Japan's social—and, yes, let's admit it, racial—exclusivism. And in any case they pale beside the overall openness of the U.S. market, access to which has fueled postwar recovery and economic boom throughout noncommunist Asia.

One small final point. I find quite incredible Ambassador Dalrymple's statement that "gloating about Japan's achievements is rare." Does he, I wonder, actually read Japan's opinion journals and its daily press—what the Japanese are saying to each other, as opposed to what they put out for foreign consumption? □

Ivan P. Hall
Tokyo

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Kidnapping Foreigners:

AS REGARDS my view that the Alvarez decision was wrong, Judge Bork writes that I am one "who frequently sees violations of international law in American actions abroad." This is fair enough. Lately. Might I expand, just a moment. I am first of all of a World War II generation that was taught to take international law seriously. I came back from an uneventful three years in the Navy to the G.I. Bill and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. I studied under Leo Gross and accepted the judgement that international legal order was central to American foreign policy and had always been.

In the years that followed I had no reason to think otherwise. As ambassador to India, for example, I never set foot in Goa. The United States did not recognize title to territory acquired by force. That is what the United Nations Charter was all about. Like it or not, it was law.

Hence I did not much like our sending troops into Grenada in 1983. Nor did I think it clever for us to mine harbors in Nicaragua the next year. This was a clear violation of a treaty. It seems to me the United States has a large interest in the general proposition *pacta sunt servanda*. I don't like what happens when we don't follow it any more than when others don't. The Iran-contra conspiracy developed directly from the abortive mining episode. As Theodore Draper would write of that sorry sequence: "If ever the constitutional democracy of the United States is overthrown, we now have a better idea of how this is likely to be done."

I have taken an oath to "defend and protect" that Constitution against "all enemies foreign and domestic." The Constitution makes treaties the "supreme Law of the Land." I believe we violated our extradition treaty with Mexico. I could be wrong, but I do think we need to keep an eye on this issue. It is, as they say, the law.

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
Washington, DC

IN THE REALM of foreign affairs there are many temptations to bypass the strictures of both constitutional and international law. Judge Robert Bork performed massive bypass surgery in "The Reach of American Law" (Fall 1992), defending the Supreme Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit's eminently sensible rulings in the Mexican kidnapping case (*U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain*).

The first temptation is to reinterpret a treaty or the facts underlying it to fit a foreign policy objective. The detailed procedures of the 1980 Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico complicated the objective of apprehending Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican doctor charged by U.S. authorities in connection with the torture/murder of a Drug Enforcement Agency agent on Mexican soil.

So the Supreme Court majority of six, cheered by Bork, reinterpreted two key elements of the treaty. First, they butchered the purpose of the treaty—to foster cooperation between the two governments on extradition matters—by canceling the treaty's terms when inter-governmental cooperation faltered. Thus by not cooperating, one party to the treaty could deny the courts the power to enforce its provisions. Sadly, the facts show that it was the American—not Mexican—authorities who proved most uncooperative in their zeal to get Alvarez.

In addition, the Court found that where a treaty does not explicitly prohibit certain

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conduct, then that conduct remains legitimate. The reinterpreters of numerous treaties and statutes—the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Boland Amendment, the Posse Comitatus Act, and the FBI enabling statute—have used this tactic. But the rationale for extradition treaties would be rendered nonsensical if alternative, nonconsensual means of kidnapping suspects on a treaty partner's own territory were not only condoned, but anticipated as permissible conduct.

Dissenting Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmunn and O'Connor, observed that the executive's apparent desire for revenge must not guide the Court's duty to render an even and dispassionate judgment. "That the Executive may wish to reinterpret the Treaty to allow for an action that the Treaty in no way authorizes should not influence this Court's interpretation," he wrote. But it did.

The second temptation is to dismiss customary international law as indecipherable, "general," and unenforceable by the federal courts. Yet *Alvarez-Machain* is an easy case warped by the majority's fear of the well-known. Long-standing fundamental principles of international law uphold national sovereignty and prohibit a state's agents from conducting nonconsensual raids on foreign territory to abduct criminal suspects. Mexican negotiators may indeed have known about U.S. cases (*Ker v. Illinois* and *Fisbie v. Collins*) that preserve federal jurisdiction regardless of how some defendants are apprehended. Yet Bork and the majority dismiss as mere distractions the obvious factual distinctions between those cases and what actually transpired in Alvarez-Machain, as well as the importance of the near-analogous case, *U.S. v. Rauscher*. They also fail to appreciate that the Extradition Treaty was negotiated, particularly by the Mexicans, against the background of customary international law, which clearly prohibits the DEA'S vigilante action.

When, ironically, Bork invokes another principle of customary international law—the right of self-defense—to justify the abduction of Alvarez, he grossly distorts that ancient rule. During the Reagan and Bush administrations the principle of self-defense was set adrift from its customary moorings to justify a wide range of controversial covert operations, unilateral military interventions, and now the thuggish kidnapping of a despicable Mexican citizen who is indeed protected by the Extradition Treaty. We would not countenance any claim of self-defense by the Mexican government if it snatched from U.S. soil an American citizen charged with violating Mexican law. If the sole remaining superpower has to resort to "self-defense" to justify violating an extradition treaty under such dubious circumstances, then its power is embarrassingly inflated and misdirected.

The third temptation is to deny the courts any judicial review of the executive branch's conduct of foreign affairs. But in *Alvarez-Machain* the majority abdicated its constitutional responsibility to uphold the Rule of Law—including the principles of customary international law that rank equally with treaties and federal statute—that the president is constitutionally bound to faithfully execute. The prohibition on nonconsensual abductions has never been rejected by Congress and until the Reagan/Bush era was upheld by the executive branch.

The Ninth Circuit grasped the fundamentals of international law and sought to curb a flagrant abuse of executive power. Six Supreme Court justices and Judge Bork have a long way to go to understand international law and its proper role in America's legal system—and foreign policy.

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Multiculturalism:

JAMES KURTH argues, with some boldness, that the ultimate consequence of multiculturalism is nothing less than the demise of the American nation-state ("The Post-Modern State," Summer 1992). Unfortunately, Kurth is less penetrating when it comes to identifying the cause of multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism is rising and the national culture is dissolving, Kurth says, because the nation-building forces of mass education and a common literature have been supplanted by the disintegrative forces of mass entertainment and global economy. This is a fascinating and useful insight, but hardly sufficient as an explanation of multiculturalism. After all, Germany and Japan, which Kurth considers the quintessential nation-states, also have mass entertainment, yet they haven't become multicultural societies or ceased to be nation-states, which Kurth says is the case in this country.

Kurth should have read the article adjoining his own: Lawrence Harrison's "America and its Immigrants." Harrison argues that recent immigration has resulted, not only in a lowering of skills in the workforce, but in the cultural balkanization of our society. Here is the missing link in Kurth's account of national dissolution. Our explosively increasing ethnic and cultural diversity, brought on by the massive immigration of the past twenty years, has set us on the path to becoming a multiracial, majorityless state, and, in so doing, has spurred the redefinition of America as a collection of separate cultural identities, literatures and "national stories," delegitimizing our former national culture.

The persistent reluctance (of which Kurth's article is a typical example) to face these demographic realities has left American elites incapable of mounting a coherent intellectual and political response to the threat of cultural disintegration. Kurth courageously calls for nothing less than a "civil war" against the multicultural enterprise. But how can such a war succeed if the principal cause of multiculturalism—which is not mass entertainment, but the revolutionary changes in the ethnic make-up of our society—continues to be ignored? It is time for critics of multiculturalism to direct their attention—and their courage—to the real source of the problem.

Lawrence Auster
New York

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Fourteen Points for Realists

Owen Harries

HOW SHOULD an aspiring realist approach the post-Cold War world and the problem of formulating a foreign policy suited to it? What sort of attitudes should he cultivate, what assumptions make? And, just as important, what should he be careful to reject and avoid? Here are some suggestions:

1) View with extreme skepticism the current outpouring of claims that what has been true about relationships between states from the time of Thucydides until yesterday no longer holds. Interdependence, transnational institutions, the spread of democracy, the obsolescence of war, the new primacy of economics, the dilution of sovereignty—take your pick, all have been nominated as revolutionizing international politics and falsifying classic realist premises. Do not allow your skepticism to be modified because some of these claims have been advanced by conservatives.

Similar or identical claims have been advanced in earlier periods and proved spectacularly and dangerously wrong. They invariably underestimate the durability and tenacity of the past. It is going to take a long time to alter the international system in any basic way. And to be prematurely right in international affairs, to anticipate a trend too early and to act on it, can be as fatal as being dead wrong.

Owen Harries is editor of *The National Interest.*

2) Resist the notion that we must now find a new, grand, elevating cause to perform the same function as anticommunism did until recently—that of providing coherence, unity, and high moral content to foreign policy. The Cold War was exceptional, not typical. The post-Cold War world is a fragmented and pluralist one, requiring diverse and particular policies, not one big policy based on one big concept—or, even worse, on a "vision." To adapt one of Harold Macmillan's better remarks, if you want a vision, consult a saint not a politician.

3) Also, discard the habit of making foreign policy in terms of sweeping doctrines that purport to lay down general, binding principles and rules of conduct that must be followed consistently, across the board. Elevate discrimination and selectivity over consistency and comprehensiveness. If anyone accuses you of "double standards" for doing so, relax and live with it. Dean Acheson once explained very clearly why you should:

> The United States in my judgment, acts in regard to a foreign nation strictly in regard to its interests or those wider interests which affect it. And if it is to American interests or those wider interests which affect it to do one thing in one country and another thing in another country, then that is the consistency upon which I propose to advise the president. And I am not in the slightest bit worried because somebody can say, "Well, you said so

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and so about Greece, why isn't all this true about China?" I will be polite. I will be patient, and I will try to explain why Greece is not China, but my heart will not be in the battle.

Discrimination is always necessary because circumstances alter cases. In the 1990s it will be particularly important, because the resources available for foreign policy are going to be more limited and choices will be unavoidable.

4) As the essence of the realist disposition is a concern to see things as they are, apply yourself to unlearning and discarding the habits, assumptions, and categories that depended on the conditions of the Cold War for their validity. For example, stop thinking as a matter of course in terms of a unified political entity called "the West," because in the absence of a threatening "East" it increasingly lacks substance and conviction. (Already, the French and Germans and the Japanese clearly do not think or act in terms of a united West.)[1] Similarly, the concept of a "Third World" has lost most of its relevance in the absence of first and second world conflict. Now that the United States is not engaged in a global struggle against a serious enemy, huge tracts of the world that used to be regarded as important may be viewed with geopolitical indifference, and the same applies to millions of "hearts and minds."

5) While the United States should be prepared to promote democracy in a modest, non-insistent way (because democracies are more peaceful towards other democracies and therefore easier for America to live with; and because doing so is consistent with America's sense of itself), it should certainly not make the promotion of democracy a major—let alone the centerpiece—feature of its policy, as some have eloquently urged.

By its very nature, democracy is a do-it-yourself enterprise, not an export commodity. Americans do not have the understanding of other societies and peoples, the attention span or staying power, to engage in an active, interventionist policy of democracy promotion on a large scale. Only trouble—for the United States and for others—will result if they try. Unless you are prepared to support conquest and prolonged U.S. occupation of targeted countries, resist the argument that America's success in fostering democracy in post-World War II Germany and Japan validates a democratic crusade now.

I don't often find occasion to quote Brent Scowcroft—who does?—but I agree with him that as far as promoting democracy is concerned, America should be content merely to "nudge" other countries, rather than attempt to interfere deeply in their internal affairs.

6) In terms of regional involvement, the United States should increasingly (but not abruptly) leave Europe to the Europeans—and that emphatically includes Yugoslavia. That is the way the Europeans seem to want it, and America should respect their wishes. Some Europeans—notably the French—may soon come to feel a new need for a continuing American commitment to Europe (again, see O'Brien's article), and when they do, the United States should consider dispassionately whether its interests would be served by a positive response. In the meantime, nothing will be lost and something will be gained by making it clear that the United States does not insist on clinging to Europe, does not demand a major role there.

The United States should concentrate its attention on the north Pacific, where the intersecting interests of three great powers and a divided Korea make the danger of a general conflagration real, and where

[1]The term may of course acquire a new meaning, reflecting changed circumstances and needs. For a persuasive explanation of why it is likely to do so, see Conor Cruise O'Brien's article in this issue.

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American sea and air power can be effective; and on the Middle East, where the combination of oil, religion, passionate hatred, sophisticated weaponry, an old-fashioned readiness to resort to force, and commitment to Israel requires American involvement.

The regional relationship between Ukraine and Russia is of great importance, but it is difficult to see how the United States could play a major role if the relationship were to deteriorate seriously. Good offices, yes—but beyond that intervention would be both dangerous and probably ineffectual.

In all three cases America's principal concerns should be to maintain regional equilibrium and stability, and to prevent the emergence of an irresponsible nuclear power capable of endangering world peace.

7) As I am not one of those realists who hold that the international system counts for everything and the individual character of countries and regimes for nothing, I believe that we should keep well in mind the peculiar and exceptional character of some of the leading actors on today's international stage. Three of the leading four states—Germany, Japan, and Russia—have been traumatized by humiliating defeat and collapse, well within living memory. It is too early to say with certainty how this experience will affect Russia, though most of the signs are bad. I don't think it unfair to say that Germany and Japan are in some respects neurotic states. They tend to have violent mood swings—from arrogant assertiveness and insensitivity to timidity and self-pity. Both are reluctant to assume responsibility and have little experience in wielding it. Another major actor, France—also defeated and occupied in living memory—is obsessed with status and bitterly resents dependence on America. And then there is China—inward turning, unable to reconcile its ideology and its economic practice, substantially increasing its military spending, soon to face a succession crisis. There is enough in all this to temper any bliss-was-it-in-that-dawn optimism.

8) It has now become something of a cliché to say that the post-Cold War world is assuming a triangular shape, with the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific as the three centers of power. Bear in mind that, in political terms, a system of three is inherently unstable. Bismarck once observed that in a game of five, the object should always be to be one of three. Likewise, in a game of three, the aim should always be to be one of two—or at least to avoid being isolated while the other two draw closer together. In this respect the United States starts with an advantage, in that in recent decades it has had a very strong relationship with both the others, while the relationship between Japan and Europe has been weak. It should be a central objective of U.S. policy to ensure that this advantage is not dissipated.

Down the road it might come to a choice between putting the European or the Asian relationship first. If it does, many Americans would not hesitate to opt for Europe. Indeed many see a united Europe as an unmitigated good for the United States. For example, the *New York Times* editorialized on Sept. 18, 1992: "The U.S. has a strong stake in European integration; it would dampen historic rivalries, encourage international cooperation and promote global prosperity." Perhaps. But it is worth reflecting that a united Europe is the only entity that could, in the foreseeable future, challenge and surpass the United States as an all-round power. Europe is also currently the pacesetter in undermining international free trade.

9) Be aware that being—or being seen as—the world's only remaining superpower is not altogether a comfortable situation to be in. The historical tendency has been for other states to gang up on and challenge the No. 1 state. Perhaps the United States will be an exception to this, as to some extent Britain was. But it is worth remembering that Britain succeeded in this respect by remaining relatively detached and unthreatening, content most of the time to act as balancer of

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last resort, rather than an assertive leader, active instigator, or bossy "policeman."

10) Do not take American policy in the Gulf crisis as a suitable model or precedent for post-Cold War regional policy. Expeditions involving half-a-million men and half-a-dozen aircraft carriers can not be repeated on a regular basis. Other countries will not cough up $50 billion to pay for such American commitments, especially if they were not consulted before the commitments were made in the first place. Unilateral initiative on this scale was a luxury the United States could once afford; no more.

11) Be cautious about yielding to the temptation of using the UN—and particularly the Security Council—as an instrument of American policy, now that the Soviet veto is effectively removed. While doing so might have short-term advantages, it would create precedents that could well come back to haunt you in the future. It would also strengthen misunderstandings in American minds as to how international politics really works—for example, by encouraging the belief that a range of actions can only acquire legitimacy and moral acceptability if they are based on a UN "mandate"; or by creating the illusion of action when in reality problems are being evaded.

12) Do not listen to those who sneer at the maintenance of stability, order, and equilibrium as unworthy foreign policy objectives. The international state system is inherently unstable, and the forces unleashed by the collapse of the last great empire—the Soviet Empire—make it especially so today. Instability can very easily and quickly get out of hand, and the cost of treating it complacently comes high. As a satisfied "have" country, but one whose primacy is diminishing, the United States has a particular stake in stability at this time. It needs a period of equilibrium—one in which excessive demands will not be made on its resources and energy—to buy time, so that it may attend to serious domestic problems and put its house in order.

13) Pin up on your wall, declaim in lectures, essays, debates and casual conversations, print in your Christmas cards, and otherwise propagate in every way you can, Walter Lippmann's great sentence:

> Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.

This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded. But it is going to be particularly necessary during a period of diminishing primacy.

14) Some will tell you that the kind of realist precepts advanced here might be all very well for other countries but are inappropriate for the United States, are fundamentally at odds with the American ethos. Treat this view respectfully—it is held by some individuals with whom you are likely to have much in common—but reject it.

America has a perfectly good realist tradition, extending from its beginnings until now. Washington's farewell address; the Louisiana Purchase; the Monroe Doctrine and its corollary, as well as the actions based on them; the Mexican and Indian and Spanish wars (perhaps the most successful series of wars of acquisition since the days of the Romans); the coalition building of World War II and the Cold War—it is absurd to say that realism is alien to the American tradition. In opting for realism now, the United States would be following a course that has served it well in the past. □

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

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